「結盟」對權力轉移之影響：「修昔底德陷阱」之重估

Abstract

本文欲解決「修昔底德陷阱」理論化不足之問題，並檢討「修昔底德陷阱」是否必然帶來支配性強權與崛起強權戰爭悲劇，試以權力轉移理論及結盟理論，補充「修昔底德陷阱」命題，同時將「結盟」變數加入權力轉移過程，觀察其對「修昔底德陷阱」發生戰爭結果之影響。具體作法為：一、以「修昔底德陷阱」、權力轉移理論及結盟理論互為補充，建構具操作性的分析架構。二、利用所建構之分析架構剖析支配性強權與崛起強權間的結盟類型，探索不同類型與戰爭發生之關連。三、將研究結論套用在美中「修昔底德陷阱」走向分析上，以助吾設立未來美中關係之觀察指標。 經研究後發現，強權在權力轉移過程中的「結盟」型態，直接影響支配性強權與崛起強權發生戰爭之機率。本文具體將支配性強權與崛起強權在權力轉移過程中的結盟分為四大類型：一、支配性強權與崛起強權直接相互結盟；二、支配性強權與崛起強權的重疊型結盟；三、支配性強權與崛起強權的排他性同盟均勢型；四、支配性強權與崛起強權排他性同盟非均勢型。利用艾利森的「修昔底德陷阱」案例分析後發現，最終發生戰爭的案例均集中在支配性強權與崛起強權的排他性同盟均勢型，其他類型的結盟則有助消弭強權的權力轉移戰爭。總體來說，「修昔底德陷阱」並非支配性強權與崛起強權間的陷阱，而是種「結盟陷阱」。 此外，運用本文建立之分析框架觀察美中關係發現，兩國權力對比貼近「均勢」狀態，彼此正處「修昔底德陷阱」溫床階段。目前美國同盟與中國潛在同盟間的排他性正在形成，惟中國潛在同盟暫無轉化為軍事同盟之跡象，故暫時消弭兩國間原本因實力相近可能爆發戰爭的風險。若中國能持續採取「結伴不結盟」政策，讓美中排他性均勢同盟不發生甚或建構美中盟國重疊乃至雙方直接結盟，則美中「修昔底德陷阱」悲劇仍能受到阻卻。

This thesis tries to enhance the theoreticalization of Thucydides's Trap and to revisit that Thucydides's Trap predicts the war must happen between dominate power and rising power. It uses power transition theory and alliance theory for improving Thucydides's Trap proposition in order to build an operational framework which can use for analyzing Thucydides's Trap war. In process, there are three steps. First, to make a theorical framework by Thucydides's Trap, power transition theory and alliance theory. Second, using the framework to typify the alliance of dominate power and rising power for observing the influence on the process of power transition. Third, to analyze U.S. and China whether or not sinks into war; Besides, to offer the researcher indicators being used to observe U.S.-China relations in the future. According to the finding of this thesis, the status of great powers’ alliance would influence the probabilities of war between dominate power and rising power directly. There are four typies of their relations which includes rivals’ alliance, inclusive alliance, parity exclusive alliance, and asymmetry exclusive alliance. After reviewing Thucydides's Trap cases that Gramham Allision gave us, we discover that all dominate power and rising power war occurs only when the parity exclusive alliance had exsisted; Furthermore, the other alliance tpyes can bring the peaceful outcome. In concluion, the nature of Thucydides's Trap is not a trap between great powers but between alliances. Using the framework being built by this thesis to analyze U.S. and China, we could tell the relative capability between them is in parity status. That is to say, U.S. and China quite possiblely had indulged in Thucydides's Trap. However, the exclusive alliance between U.S. alliance and China’s potential alliance is still forming. China hasn’t built it owns military alliance so far, so it reduces the risk of the war breaking out. If China can keep the policy “building partnership rather than alliance”, it could stop exclusive alliance forming and then to interrupt the war tragedy occuring. In addition, to build rivals’ alliance between U.S. and China is also a good way to vanish Thucydides's Trap.