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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 廖芝嫻 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Jia-An Lin | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 林家安 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T07:32:05Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-07-02 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2019-07-02 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2019-06-05 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Adam, R.B., Almeida, H., and Ferreira, D. 2005. Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance. Review of Financial Studies 18 (4), 1403–1432.
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/73389 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究主要探討執行長(CEO)及財務長(CFO)之薪酬差距對財務報導品質之影響。本研究之薪酬資料來自Execucomp資料庫，財務變數資料來自Compustat資料庫樣本所涵蓋之所有期間為2006年至2017年之美國上市櫃公司。實證結果發現，薪酬差距對應計數管理與實質盈餘管理的影響並不一致，短期薪酬差距愈大會增加實質盈餘管理，而長期薪酬差距愈大則會增加應計數管理。本研究期望對公司薪酬政策的制訂有參考價值，薪酬委員會除考量薪酬水準與薪酬結構之外，對於CEO與CFO的薪酬差距也應一併考量。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the effect of pay gap between CEOs and CFOs on financial reporting quality. In this study, all samples are selected from the Compustat and Execucomp database during the period of years 2006–2017. The empirical results show that pay gap has differential impacts on discretionary accruals and real activity manipulation. Larger short-term pay gap increases real activity manipulation, whereas larger long-term pay gap increases discretionary accrual management. The findings provide implications to corporate decision-making regarding the compensation policy. In addition to the pay level and pay structure, the compensation committee should also consider the pay gap between CEOs and CFOs. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T07:32:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-R06722036-1.pdf: 919621 bytes, checksum: e874713c61d5326a441087577f921ede (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 壹、緒論……………………………………………………………………………… 1
貳、文獻回顧及假說建立…………………………………………………………… 3 一、薪酬差距的實證研究………………………………………………………… 3 二、CEO或CFO薪酬水準對財務報導品質的影響……………………………. 4 三、研究假說……………………………………………………………………… 4 參、研究設計………………………………………………………………………… 6 一、樣本選取與資料來源………………………………………………………… 6 二、實證模型建立………………………………………………………………… 8 三、變數衡量…………………………………………………………………….. 10 肆、實證結果……………………………………………………………………….. 14 一、敘述統計分析……………………………………………………………….. 14 二、迴歸分析…………………………………………………………………….. 16 伍、CEO權力之影響………………………………………………………………. 22 陸、研究結論與建議……………………………………………………………….. 26 一、研究結論…………………………………………………………………….. 26 二、研究限制與建議…………………………………………………………….. 26 柒、參考文獻……………………………………………………………………….. 28 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 實質盈餘管理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 裁決性應計數 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 財務報導品質 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 薪酬差距 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Pay gap | en |
| dc.subject | Financial reporting quality | en |
| dc.subject | Discretionary accruals | en |
| dc.subject | Real activities manipulation | en |
| dc.title | 執行長與財務長薪酬差距對財務報導品質之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Effect of Pay Gap between CEOs and CFOs on Financial Reporting Quality | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 107-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 高偉娟,尤琳蕙 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 薪酬差距,財務報導品質,裁決性應計數,實質盈餘管理, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Pay gap,Financial reporting quality,Discretionary accruals,Real activities manipulation, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 31 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201900861 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2019-06-06 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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