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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 吳淑鈴(Shu-Ling Wu) | |
dc.contributor.author | Shih-Jie Yan | en |
dc.contributor.author | 顏士傑 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T07:18:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-07-24 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2019-07-24 | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2019-07-11 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/73112 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 美國自2012年實施Say-on-Pay制度後,部分公司開始自願揭露高階主管已實現薪酬(Realized Pay),為投資人提供衡量薪酬績效關聯性(Pay-for-Performance)之額外資訊。然目前對於自願揭露已實現薪酬之看法仍不一,有學者認為該揭露能幫助投資人更準確衡量薪酬績效關聯性,但亦有學者認為公司從事該揭露出於投機性動機,本研究則進一步觀察投資人如何看待該資訊之揭露。
從事件研究法(Event Study)之實證結果可觀察到,自願揭露已實現薪酬之樣本相較於未自願揭露者,於事件期中存在顯著之負向累計異常報酬,表示投資人普遍並不樂見公司自願揭露已實現薪酬的資訊。本研究進一步探討投資人對於公司首次揭露該資訊之態度,從實證結果中發現,相較於非首次揭露的公司年度,首次揭露之公司年度存在顯著負向之累計異常報酬,表示公司首次揭露該資訊時,投資人抱持著懷疑的態度。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In the United States, after Say-on-Pay regulation has become effective in 2012, some companies have started to voluntarily provide investors with top executives’ “Realized Pay” information in the executive compensation disclosures. However, controversy about these companies’ purposes of realized pay disclosures has arisen since then. Some people argue that compared with the pay disclosures in the summary compensation table as currently required by regulations, the realized pay information can assist investors in measuring pay-for-performance more accurately, while some prior literature argued that the voluntary disclosure of realized pay might be opportunistic. In this thesis, I investigate how investors react to these realized pay disclosures to see how investors perceive these additional pay disclosures.
From the empirical evidence of this study, I found a negative average cumulative abnormal return during the three days centered on the proxy statement fling dates for firms which voluntarily disclose realized pay information in the compensation discuss and analysis section. I also find that this negative market reaction to realized pay disclosures is mainly driven by the initial disclosures of realized pay. The results suggest that, in general, realized pay disclosures raise investors’ concerns about companies’ purpose of providing this kind of disclosures. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T07:18:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-R06722048-1.pdf: 3082506 bytes, checksum: 31520061df783c69aa2dcfd6a20d4be8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 I
ABSTRACT II 目錄 III 表目錄 IV 圖目錄 V 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景與動機 1 第二節 研究目的 3 第三節 論文架構 5 第二章 文獻探討 6 第一節 代理問題 6 第二節 事件研究 8 第三節 自願性揭露 10 第四節 Say-on-Pay及已實現薪酬 12 第三章 研究方法 15 第一節 研究假說 15 第二節 研究設計 18 第三節 樣本選取 20 第四章 實證結果 21 第一節 敘述性統計 21 第二節 研究結果 23 第三節 穩健性測試 28 第一項 配對法 28 第二項 改變估計期 33 第五章 研究結論、建議及限制 35 第一節 研究結論與建議 35 第二節 研究限制 35 第六章 參考文獻 36 附錄一 40 附錄二 42 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 投資人對已實現薪酬揭露之反應 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Investors' Reaction to Realized Pay Disclosure | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 107-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 陳宗岡(Tsung-Kang Chen),洪聖閔(Sheng-Min Hung) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 已實現薪酬,自願性揭露,事件研究, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Realized Pay,Voluntary Disclosure,Event Study, | en |
dc.relation.page | 43 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201901395 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2019-07-11 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 會計學系 |
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