請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/72940完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳思寬(Shikuan Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yen-Chen Wu | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 吳彥成 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T07:11:05Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-18 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2019-08-18 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2019-07-19 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Aitken, B., Harrison, A., 1999. Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign investment? Evidence from Venezuela. American Economic Review 89, 605–618.
Amiti, M., Javorcik, B.S., 2008. Trade costs and location of foreign firms in China. Journal of Development Economics 85, 129-149. Barros, P.P., Cabral, L., 2000. Competing for foreign direct investment. Review of International Economics 8, 360-371. Bauer, C., Davies, R.B., Haufler, A., 2014. Economic integration and the optimal corporate tax structure with heterogeneous firms. Journal of Public Economics 110, 42-56. Barros, P.P. and Cabral, L., 2000. Competing for foreign direct investment. Review of International Economics, 8, 360-371. Becker, D., 2018. Heterogeneous firms and informality: The effects of trade liberalization on labour markets. Oxford Economic Papers, 70, 47–72. Bernard, A. B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. B., and Kortum, S., 2003. Plants and productivity in international trade. American Economic Review, 93, 1268–1290. Bernard, A. B. and Jensen, J. B., 2007. Firm structure, multinationals, and manufacturing plant deaths. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89, 193–204. Bénassy-Quéré, A., Gobalraja, N., Trannoy, A., 2007. Tax and public input competition. Economic Policy 22, 386-430. Bjorvatn, K., Eckel, C., 2006. Policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries. European Economic Review 50, 1891-1907. Chor, D., 2009. Subsidies for FDI: Implications from a model with heterogeneous firms. Journal of International Economics 78, 113-125. Contessi, S., 2010. How does multinational production change international comovement? Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2010-041A. D'Auria, F., 2015. The effect of fiscal shocks in a new keynesian model with useful government spending. Macroeconomic Dynamics 19, 1380-1399. Davies, R.B., Eckel, C., 2010. Tax competition for heterogeneous firms with endogenous entry. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2, 77-102. Dembour, C., Wauthy, X., 2009. Investment in public infrastructure with spillovers and tax competition between contiguous regions. Regional Science and Urban Economics 39, 679-687. Devereux, M.P., Griffith, R., 1998. Taxes and the location of production: Evidence from a panel of US multinationals. Journal of Public Economics 68, 335-367. Evans, L. and Kenc, T., 2003. Welfare cost of monetary and fiscal policy shocks. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 7, 212–238. Ferrett, B., Wooton, I., 2010. Competing for a duopoly: International trade and tax competition. Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue canadienne d'économique 43, 776-794. Fumagalli, C., 2003. On the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments. European Economic Review 47, 963-983. Ganelli, G., Tervala, J., 2010. Public infrastructures, public consumption, and welfare in a new-open-economy-macro model. Journal of Macroeconomics 32, 827-837. Ghironi, F., Melitz, M.J., 2005. International trade and macroeconomic dynamics with heterogeneous firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 865-915. Goodspeed, T., Martinez-Vazquez, J., Zhang, L., 2006. Are other government policies more important than taxation in attracting FDI? Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Research Paper No. 06-28. Grubert, H., Mutti, J., 2000. Do taxes influence where US corporations invest? National Tax Journal 53, 825-839. Haaparanta, P., 1996. Competition for foreign direct investments. Journal of Public Economics 63, 141-153. Haufler, A., Wooton, I., 1999. Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment. Journal of Public Economics 71, 121-139. Helpman, E., Melitz, M.J., Yeaple, S.R., 2004. Export versus FDI with heterogeneous firms. American Economic Review 94, 300-316. Hindriks, J., Peralta, S., Weber, S., 2008. Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization. Journal of Public Economics 92, 2392-2402. Kind, H.J., Knarvik, K.H.M., Schjelderup, G., 2000. Competing for capital in a 'lumpy' world. Journal of Public Economics 78, 253-274. King, I., McAfee, R.P., Welling, L., 1993. Industrial blackmail - Dynamic tax competition and public-investment. Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue canadienne d'économique 26, 590-608. Krautheim, S., Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T., 2011. Heterogeneous firms, 'profit shifting' FDI and international tax competition. Journal of Public Economics 95, 122-133. Krugman, P., 1980. Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade. American Economic Review, 70, 950–959. Lapan, H. E., 1976. International trade, factor market distortions, and the optimal dynamic subsidy. American Economic Review, 66, 335–346. Laussel, D., Le Breton, M., 1998. Existence of Nash equilibria in fiscal competition models. Regional Science and Urban Economics 28, 283-296. Liu, Z., 2008. Foreign direct investment and technology spillovers: Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics 85, 176-193. Melitz, M.J., 2003. The impact of trade on intra‐industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity. Econometrica 71, 1695-1725. Melitz, M.J., Redding, S.J., 2014. Heterogeneous firms and trade. Handbook of International Economics 4, 1-54. Mintz, J., Smart, M., 2004. Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: Theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada. Journal of Public Economics 88, 1149-1168. Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 2000. The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause? NBER Working Paper Series, 7777. Olsen, T.E., Osmundsen, P., 2003. Spillovers and international competition for investments. Journal of International Economics 59, 211-238. Oman, C., Oman, C., 2000. Policy competition for foreign direct investment: A study of competition among governments to attract FDI. Universidad de la República. Ottaviano, G.I.P., van Ypersele, T., 2005. Market size and tax competition. Journal of International Economics 67, 25-46. Pennings, E., 2005. How to maximize domestic benefits from foreign investments: the effect of irreversibility and uncertainty. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 29, 873–889. Peralta, S., van Ypersele, T., 2006. Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries. Regional Science and Urban Economics 36, 708-726. Pflüger, M., Suedekum, J., 2013. Subsidizing firm entry in open economies. Journal of Public Economics 97, 258-271. Pieretti, P., Zanaj, S., 2011. On tax competition, public goods provision and jurisdictions' size. Journal of International Economics 84, 124-130. Rioja, F.K., 2003. Filling potholes: Macroeconomic effects of maintenance versus new investments in public infrastructure. Journal of Public Economics 87, 2281-2304. Schmitt-Grohé, S. and Uribe, M., 2007. Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 1702–1725. Stewart, K., Webb, M., 2006. International competition in corporate taxation: Evidence from the OECD time series. Economic Policy 21, 155-201. Turnovsky, S.J., Fisher, W.H., 1995. The composition of government expenditure and its consequences for macroeconomic performance. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19, 747-786. UNCTAD, 2017. World Investment Report 2017. National and International Perspectives. United Nations, New York, FDI Policies for Development. Walz, U., Wellisch, D., 1996. Strategic provision of local public inputs for oligopolistic firms in the presence of endogenous location choice. International Tax and Public Finance 3, 175-189. Wells, L. T., Allen, N. J., Morisset, J., and Pirnia, N., 2001. Using Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreign Investment: Are They Worth the Costs? Washington D.C., USA: The World Bank. Wilson, J.D., 1991. Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments. Regional Science and Urban Economics 21, 423-451. Wilson, J.D., 1999. Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal 52, 269-304. Wilson, J.D., Wildasin, D.E., 2004. Capital tax competition: Bane or boon. Journal of Public Economics 88, 1065-1091. Woodford, M., 2003, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton University Press. Zissimos, B., Wooders, M., 2008. Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition. Journal of Public Economics 92, 1105-1121. Zodrow, G.R., Mieszkowski, P., 1986. Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public-goods. Journal of Urban Economics 19, 356-370. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/72940 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本論文由兩篇分析關於吸引更多外來直接投資政策意涵的文章所組成。第一篇文章在考慮外國廠商可以自由決定是否進入國內市場以及以何種方式銷售其產品時,分析本國政府採取補貼政策來吸引更多外來直接投資會對總體變數產生何種影響。我們發現如果廠商的生產力有差異時,本國政策提供小額的補貼計劃就可以引起國內消費的增長並且為國內帶來短期福利水準改善。然而,這樣的補貼會產生新問題並導致財富再分配效應,從而導致國內長期福利水準的惡化。此外,我們還發現如果對所有在本國境內從事生產的廠商進行補貼,則會促使國內的福利改善。
第二篇文章探討在三國隨機動態一般均衡的模型下,兩國競爭第三國的外來直接投資的後果。我們發現如果公共設施的投資是通過勞動收入稅上調,進口關稅或政府消費減少來籌集資金,那麼公共投資的增加會吸引更多的外來直接投資。而隨著公共設施的累積,國內生產力也會提高,並且導致實際匯率升值以及貿易條件惡化。另一種有效吸引外來直接投資的方式是降低企業稅率。但是,如果公共設施隨著公司稅率的降低而降低,則減稅就失去效果。最後,無論本國政府採用何種政策來吸引外來直接投資,國內永久性放鬆管制都會改善社會福利。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation consists two essays about the policy implications of attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI). The first subject analyzes the macroeconomic-impacts of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are determining whether to enter or how to serve foreign markets. We show that a small FDI subsidy scheme induces consumption gains and delivers short-term welfare improvement for the FDI host country if firms differ in their productivity. However, the subsidy would generates a new problem and result in the wealth reallocation effect, leading to welfare deterioration for the host country in the long run. Moreover, we find that a subsidy program would induce a welfare improvement for the host country if it is offered to all domestic producers instead of foreign producers only in the host country.
The second subject explores the consequences of FDI competition between two countries under a three-country DSGE model. We find that an increase in the public investment in physical infrastructure attracts more FDI if that infrastructure investment is financed via labor income tax hikes, import tariffs, or government consumption reductions. Increasing public infrastructure also increase domestic production and generally results in a real exchange rate appreciation as well as a terms of trade deterioration. To reduce the corporate tax rate is another effective way to draw FDI. However, corporate tax reductions do not work if the public infrastructure decreases along with the reduction of the corporate tax rate. Finally, permanent deregulations in the host country improve social welfare regardless of the policies the host government employs to attract FDI. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T07:11:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-D99724011-1.pdf: 2225901 bytes, checksum: 59d360b9d5891ebec5da57557d518d0b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Verification Letter from the Oral Examination Committee ⅰ
Acknowledgments ⅱ Chinese Abstract ⅲ English Abstract ⅳ 1 Introduction 1 2 FDI Subsidy in a DSGE Model with Heterogeneous Firms 6 2.1 Relevant Literature 6 2.2 The Financial Autarky Model 9 2.3 The Effect of FDI Subsidies 17 2.4 Policy Interventions and Macroeconomic Dynamics 23 2.5 Extensions 31 2.6 Concluding Remarks 33 3 Competing for FDI – an Analysis of Consequences via a Three-Country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model 36 3.1 Relevant Literature 36 3.2 The Three-Country Model 40 3.3 Model Properties 55 3.4 Long-run effects of different fiscal policy instruments 60 3.5 Concluding Remarks 68 4 Conclusion 71 References 72 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 外來直接投資 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 廠商進入 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 異質性廠商 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 獨佔性競爭 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 財政政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | firm entry | en |
| dc.subject | FDI subsidies | en |
| dc.subject | fiscal policy | en |
| dc.subject | monopolistic competition | en |
| dc.subject | firm heterogeneity | en |
| dc.title | 分析吸引外來直接投資的政策意涵 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The policy implications of attracting FDI from the DSGE model with heterogeneous firms | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 107-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 張銘仁(Ming-Jen Chang),萬哲鈺(JER-YUH WAN),馮炳萱(Ping-Hsuan Fung),朱琇妍(Shiou-Yen Chu),秦國軒(Kuo-Hsuan Chin) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 外來直接投資,廠商進入,異質性廠商,獨佔性競爭,財政政策, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | FDI subsidies,firm entry,firm heterogeneity,monopolistic competition,fiscal policy, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 87 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201901685 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2019-07-22 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 國際企業學系 | |
文件中的檔案:
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-108-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 2.17 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。
