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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/72847完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 葉疏(Shu Yeh) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wangzhe Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳旺喆 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T07:07:58Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2029-12-31 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2019-08-13 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2019-07-23 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/72847 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 在以個人投資者為主的中國大陸資本市場，多數投資者只能從上市公司披露的公開信息中獲得關於政府補助的欠缺完整性的信息。考慮到這種完整性的缺失，本文旨在研究在中國資本市場，投資者對上市公司所披露的政府補助相關信息是否充分反應。
本文的研究對象是與研發相關的補助（R&D-related subsidy）和與產能相關的補助（Capacity-related subsidy）。在開展研究之前，根據財務報表附註所披露的相關信息，作者先構造了一個衡量補助相關信息完整性的指標；該指標顯示，從總體上看，國有企業（SOE）比民營企業（Non-SOE）披露的補助相關信息的完整程度更低，這一結果具有一定的統計學顯著性，且與大量旁證相符。以上述結果為基礎，作者將樣本分成國有企業與民營企業兩組，分別測試再對比結果。 首先，作者應用Landsman et al. (2011)的方法檢測了政府補助的價值相關性（value relevance test），得出結論：在信息披露當年，投資者對政府補助的價值評估與該補助對公司未來現金流的預測效果不存在方向性的錯配。這證明投資者可以從一定程度上理解政府補助對公司價值的影響，並以此作出反應。 然後，作者應用Sloan (1996)的方法，檢測了依據補助金額構建的投資組合的「買入－持有」超額收益率（buy-hold abnormal return）；此檢驗結果顯示，國有企業中獲得研發相關補助最高（前10%）的公司構成的投資組合可產生統計意義顯著的超額年化收益率。這一結果可從一定程度上證明，投資者在補助確認信息披露時候作出的反應不夠充分，價格發現存在一定程度的滯後。而民營企業構成的投資組合並未產生類似的超額年化收益率，這從一定程度上說明，這種價值發現的滯後現象與信息完整性的缺失有關。 綜上，中國資本市場的投資者對政府補助相關的公開信息反應程度不足，且這種現象很可能是由相關信息的完整性的缺失導致。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In China, investors may get only incomplete public information about government subsidies to a listed firm. This paper investigates whether investors react completely to potentially incomplete public information about government subsidies in China. To measure the completeness of disclosures about two kinds of subsidies (R&D-related subsidies and capacity-related subsidies), I develop an index, finding that the level of such completeness is lower among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than among Non-SOEs, as consistent with existing evidence. First, following Landsman et al. (2011), I document that, to both SOEs and Non-SOEs, no mismatch exists between valuation relevance and forecasting relevance of both kinds of subsidies. However, following Sloan (1996), I capture abnormal buy-hold annual return from only portfolios of SOEs with highest level of R&D-related subsidies. Taken together, the investors do react to public information about subsidies, but appear to not react completely, potentially due to information incompleteness. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T07:07:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-108-R05722054-1.pdf: 1016078 bytes, checksum: 41faff136b86865d72fffdcfed587f11 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝 辭 i
摘 要 ii ABSTRACT iv 1. Introduction 1 2. Background 8 2.1. Accounting and disclosure requirements for subsidies 8 2.2. External pressures on government subsidies 12 2.3. Government’s role in subsidies’ disclosures 13 2.4. Ownership’s potential influence on disclosures 16 2.5. Index to measure “completeness” of disclosure 19 3. Hypotheses development 21 3.1. Hypotheses concerning Q1 21 3.2. Hypotheses concerning Q2 23 4. Research design 28 4.1. Computation of R&D-related subsidies and capacity-related subsidies 28 4.2. Data and variables 30 4.3. Forecasting and valuation equations 31 4.4. Speculation portfolio 35 5. Results 40 5.1. Descriptive statistics 40 5.3. Results of the speculating strategy 47 References 56 Appendix A: the average numbers of Chinese characters contained per piece of disclosure per firm-year observation 63 Appendix B: Index to measure the level of completeness of subsidies’ disclosure 67 Appendix C: The numbers of firms making R&D-related subsidies’ disclosures 70 Appendix D: Details for portfolios excluding the overlap 71 Appendix E: List of website links 72 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 市場有效性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 政府補助 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 不完整信息 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 價值相關性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 超額報酬率 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | incomplete information | en |
| dc.subject | market efficiency | en |
| dc.subject | abnormal return | en |
| dc.subject | Chinese government subsidy | en |
| dc.subject | value relevance | en |
| dc.title | 中國大陸投資者對涉及政府補助的公開信息是否作出了充分反應？ | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Do Investors React Completely to Public Information about Government Subsidies in China? | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 107-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王全三(Chuan-San Wang),廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien Liao) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 政府補助,不完整信息,價值相關性,超額報酬率,市場有效性, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Chinese government subsidy,incomplete information,value relevance,abnormal return,market efficiency, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 73 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201901803 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2019-07-24 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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