請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/71725完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 周雍強(Yon-Chun Chou) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ching-Chi Huang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 黃敬祺 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T06:07:46Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-01-15 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2019-01-15 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2018-12-30 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 1 Arshinder, K., Kanda, A., & Deshmukh, S. G. A review on supply chain coordination: coordination mechanisms, managing uncertainty and research directions. In Supply chain coordination under uncertainty (pp. 39-82). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2011).
2 Bai, Q., Chen, M., & Xu, L. Revenue and promotional cost-sharing contract versus two-part tariff contract in coordinating sustainable supply chain systems with deteriorating items. International Journal of Production Economics, 187, 85-101 (2017). 3 Ballou, R. H., Gilbert, S. M., & Mukherjee, A. New managerial challenges from supply chain opportunities. Industrial marketing management, 29(1), 7-18 (2000). 4 Basak, D., & Wang, L. F. Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure. Economics Letters, 138, 53-56 (2016). 5 Benjamin, J. D., Boyle, G. W., & Sirmans, C. F. Retail leasing: The determinants of shopping center rents. Real Estate Economics, 18(3), 302-312 (1990). 6 Bloom, P. N., Gundlach, G. T., & Cannon, J. P. Slotting allowances and fees: Schools of thought and the views of practicing managers. Journal of Marketing, 64(2), 92-108 (2000). 7 Bloom, P. N., & Perry, V. G. Retailer power and supplier welfare: The case of Wal-Mart. Journal of Retailing, 77(3), 379-396 (2001). 8 Bolen, W. H. Contemporary retailing. Prentice Hall (1982). 9 Cachon, G. P. Supply chain coordination with contracts. Handbooks in operations research and management science, 11, 227-339 (2003). 10 Chen, J. M., Cheng, H. L., & Chien, M. C. Profit-maximization models for a manufacturer-retailer channel under consignment and revenue sharing contract. Journal of the Chinese Institute of Industrial Engineers, 25(5), 413-422 (2008). 11 Choi, S. C. Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer. Marketing Science, 10(4), 271-296 (1991). 12 Chu, W. Demand signalling and screening in channels of distribution. Marketing Science, 11(4), 327-347 (1992). 13 Chung, G. L. A Game Theoretical Analysis of Slotting Allowance. NTU Management Review, 6, 61-81 (1995). 14 Clark, A. J., & Scarf, H. Optimal policies for a multi-echelon inventory problem. Management science, 6(4), 475-490 (1960). 15 Corbett, C. J., & Tang, C. S. Designing supply contracts: Contract type and information asymmetry. In Quantitative models for supply chain management (pp. 269-297). Springer, Boston, MA (1999). 16 Giannoccaro, I., & Pontrandolfo, P. Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts. International journal of production economics, 89(2), 131-139 (2004). 17 Jeuland, A. P., & Shugan, S. M. Managing channel profits. Marketing science, 2(3), 239-272 (1983). 18 Kolay, S., & Shaffer, G. Contract design with a dominant retailer and a competitive fringe. Management Science, 59(9), 2111-2116 (2013). 19 Kolay, S., & Shaffer, G. Contract design with a dominant retailer and a competitive fringe. Management Science, 59(9), 2111-2116 (2013). 20 Lee, H. L., Padmanabhan, V., Taylor, T. A., & Whang, S. Price protection in the personal computer industry. Management science, 46(4), 467-482 (2000). 21 Lehoux, N., D’Amours, S., & Langevin, A. Inter-firm collaborations and supply chain coordination: review of key elements and case study. Production Planning & Control, 25(10), 858-872 (2014). 22 Li, Q., & Liu, Z. Supply chain coordination via a two-part tariff contract with price and sales effort dependent demand. Decision Science Letters, 4(1), 27-34 (2015). 23 Li, Q., & Liu, Z. Supply chain coordination via a two-part tariff contract with price and sales effort dependent demand. Decision Science Letters, 4(1), 27-34 (2015). 24 Liu, X. Supply chain contract design in supplier-versus buyer-driven channels (Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University) (2006). 25 McGuire, T. W., & Staelin, R. An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration. Marketing science, 2(2), 161-191 (1983). 26 Messinger, P. R., & Narasimhan, C. Has power shifted in the grocery channel?. Marketing Science, 14(2), 189-223 (1995). 27 Pashigian, B. P., & Gould, E. D. Internalizing externalities: the pricing of space in shopping malls. The Journal of Law and Economics, 41(1), 115-142 (1998). 28 Raju, J., & Zhang, Z. J. Channel coordination in the presence of a dominant retailer. Marketing Science, 24(2), 254-262 (2005). 29 Shi, Z., Wang, N., Jia, T., & Chen, H. Reverse revenue sharing contract versus two-part tariff contract under a closed-loop supply chain system. Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2016 (2016). 30 Simatupang, T. M., Wright, A. C., & Sridharan, R. The knowledge of coordination for supply chain integration. Business process management journal, 8(3), 289-308 (2002). 31 Stank, T., Crum, M., & Arango, M. Benefits of interfirm coordination in food industry supply chains. Journal of business logistics, 20(2), 21 (1999). 32 Tang, S. Y., & Kouvelis, P. Pay‐back‐revenue‐sharing contract in coordinating Supply Chains with random yield. Production and Operations Management, 23(12), 2089-2102 (2014). 33 Taylor, T. A. Channel coordination under price protection, midlife returns, and end-of-life returns in dynamic markets. Management Science, 47(9), 1220-1234 (2001). 34 Wang, H. Slotting allowances and retailer market power. Journal of Economic Studies, 33(1), 68-77 (2006). 35 Wong, W. K., Qi, J., & Leung, S. Y. S. Coordinating supply chains with sales rebate contracts and vendor-managed inventory. International Journal of Production Economics, 120(1), 151-161 (2009). 36 Xu, G., Dan, B., Zhang, X., & Liu, C. Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse under a two-way revenue sharing contract. International Journal of Production Economics, 147, 171-179 (2014). 37 Xu, L., & Beamon, B. M. Supply chain coordination and cooperation mechanisms: an attribute‐based approach. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 42(1), 4-12 (2006). 38 You, Z., Si, Y. W., Zhang, D., Zeng, X., Leung, S. C., & Li, T. A decision-making framework for precision marketing. Expert Systems with Applications, 42(7), 3357-3367 (2015). 39 Zabin, J., & Brebach, G. Precision marketing: The new rules for attracting, retaining, and leveraging profitable customers. John Wiley & Sons (2004). 40 Zhang, J., & Zhu, J. Research intelligent precision marketing of e-commerce based on the big data. Journal of Management and Strategy, 5(1), 33 (2014). 41 王立達. 大型流通業對上游供應商收取附加費用之競爭法規範: 問題架構與管制方向. 行政院公平交易委員會, 8(3), 33-60 (2000). 42 林明煌.食品供應商對連鎖通路因應之道. 國立中央大學管理學院高階主管企管碩士班碩士論文 (2003). 43 胡淑雅. 精準行銷搭配 Web3. 0 之應用對於隱私權之影響--以社群網站為例. 國立臺灣科技大學管理學院MBA, 1-130 (2012). 44 王怡婷. 通路商領導下的兩部收費合約規格制定. 臺灣大學工業工程學研究所學位論文, 1-58 (2016). 45 范綱傑. 以通路商的角度對多家產品供應商設計兩部收費契約. 臺灣大學工業工程學研究所學位論文, 1-86 (2015). 46 張孫恩. 創新產品之精準行銷商業模式. 臺灣大學商學研究所學位論文, 1-39 (2012). 47 鄭有順. 一個供產品供應商考量隱私之實體通路精準行銷方法. 國立臺灣科技大學資訊管理學研究所學位論文, 1-75 (2016). 48 謝碧芳. 虛實整合創新服務: 以巨量資料分析建立精準行銷之個案研究. 國立臺灣科技大學工業管理學研究所學位論文, 1-57 (2014). | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/71725 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 觀察現今各行各業，分工越來越細膩，供應鏈成員也更依賴著彼此的訊息及資源，這種依賴也伴隨著風險、不確定性及更多的利益，因此供應鏈上下游、不同廠商間的合作及協調，變得格外重要，為了應對這些挑戰，供應鏈成員必須努力建立統一的系統並互相協調，以解決供應鏈不確定性和實現供應鏈協調。
達成供應鏈協調有相當多的方法，其中，製訂契約是一種常見的方式，過往研究在對於兩部收費契約中抽成比例及固定收費仍有缺陷，本研究欲發展出一兩部收費契約，改善目前契約設計上的缺陷，初始研究模型考慮供應鏈中的兩端，一端為供應鏈上游之供應商，一供應商市佔率大、另一供應商則相對市佔率小；供應鏈另一端為獨占通路商。假設兩供應商皆想在此通路平台上販售己身產品，以獲得市場上品牌的優勢、知名度等。通路商考慮供應商之異同的三大因素為：(1) 兩供應商相對市佔率、(2) 產品差異性、(3)市場規模，並以通路商領導之Stackelberg賽局模型來發展，追求供應鏈利益最大化，發展兩部收費契約制定方式。 除了實體通路外，電商通路近幾年越來越興盛，如：PChome線上購物、momo購物網、GoHappy、udn買東西等，皆為知名、高市佔率之通路商，而電商通路可透過大數據分析達到精準行銷之能力為其一大優勢，本研究欲在通路商能給予供應商精準行銷之服務下，發展兩部收費契約制定方式。 最終本研究成功改善過往兩部收費契約設計上之缺陷，發展出在實體通路及電商通路可行之兩部收費契約制定方式，並觀察到供應商對於通路商提供精準行銷之服務，會呈現兩極的M型化現象。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In observing today’s various trades and professions, we find that the division of labor has become increasingly more narrow. Suppliers are more dependent on each other for information and resources. This dependence brings about with it risks, uncertainty, and greater benefits. For this reason, manufactures and retailers in the supply chain, along with the cooperation and coordination of different companies becomes of utmost importance. In order to respond to these challenges, suppliers must strive to establish a unified system as well as coordinate with each other. Doing this will help solve uncertainty as well as realize coordination within the supply chain.
There are many ways to go about achieving coordination within the supply chain. Of these, formulating a contract is one of the most commonly seen methods. Research regarding the per-unit charge and fixed fees of two-part tariff contracts is still lacking. This research will be based on the perspective of the distributor, that is, the distributor will be the maker of the contract, the leader of the game, and design two-part tariff contracts when facing multiple suppliers. We assume that both suppliers want to sell their own products on this platform to gain the advantages and popularity of the brand on the market. Three major factors that vendors consider in their suppliers’ similarities and differences are: (1) the relative market share of two suppliers; (2) product differentiation; (3) market size. Then we construct the Retailer-Stackelberg model as the basic optimization model, and design two-part tariff contracts. In accordance with the results of the model, considering the E-commerce platform, the supplier's market share, product differentiation, and market size, we can formulate key strategies and design different two-part tariff contracts. Apart from physical platforms, in the last few years, e-commerce platforms have thrived. For example, companies such as PChome online, Momoshop, GoHappy, udn shopping are all well-known and have high market shares. One of the advantages of e-commerce platforms is that they can arrive at a precision marketing ability through big data analysis. This research hopes to develop a method for making two-part tariff contracts in the situation of retailers giving suppliers precision marketing services. Lastly, this research successfully makes up for the lack of adequate two-part tariff contract designs and develops a method for designing a two-part tariff contracts that are acceptable for both physical platforms and e-commerce platforms. It also observes the precision marketing service that suppliers provide from retailers will show an M-shaped phenomenon. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T06:07:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-107-R05546013-1.pdf: 6603996 bytes, checksum: 30fe478aa78c008922204242174b9324 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 #
致謝 i 摘要 ii ABSTRACT iii 目錄 v 圖目錄 viii 表目錄 x 第一章 緒論 1 1.1研究背景 1 1.2研究動機 2 1.3研究問題 4 1.4研究目的 6 1.5研究方法 6 1.6研究架構 7 第二章 文獻回顧 9 2.1供應商與通路商間的契約類型 9 2.2 兩部收費契約 11 2.3 供應鏈中領導權的轉移 16 2.4 供應商間的差異 21 2.4.1 市佔率 21 2.4.2 產品差異化 28 2.4.3 產品製造成本 30 2.4.4 新進供應商 31 2.5 大型流通業之附加費用及其類型 32 第三章 兩部收費契約分析與設計(M2) 35 3.1 Model M2之最佳化 35 3.2 Model M2之分析與討論 41 3.2.1 銷售數量抽成 41 3.2.2 零售價格 42 3.2.3 利潤 43 3.3 模式Mh -- 融合M1與M2的契約分析 46 3.3.1通路商利潤之比較 47 3.3.2 供應商利潤之比較 49 3.3.3 結論 49 第四章 兩部收費契約分析與設計(M3,M4) 51 4.1 Model M3之最佳化 51 4.1.1服務水準為離散變數 53 4.1.2服務水準為連續變數 55 4.1.3 M3結論 58 4.2 Model M4之離散 分析 59 4.3 Model M4之連續 分析 70 4.4 連續服務水準 對供應鏈三方的影響 76 4.4.1 服務水準 對供應商一的影響 76 4.4.2 服務水準 對供應商二的影響 79 4.4.3 服務水準 對通路商的影響 81 4.5 模式Mec -- 融合M3與M4的契約分析 83 4.5.1 變動營收差額之比較 83 4.5.2 通路商利潤之比較 84 4.5.3 供應商利潤之比較 85 4.5.4 結論 88 4.6 基於Mec模式的兩部收費契約設計 89 第五章 結論與建議 94 5.1建構Model Mh與Model Mec 94 5.2 觀察模式Model Mec下之兩部收費契約設計洞見 95 5.3 未來研究方向 96 參考文獻 97 附錄 102 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 供應鏈協調 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 契約設計 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 兩部收費契約 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 精準行銷 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | M型化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | precision marketing | en |
| dc.subject | contract design | en |
| dc.subject | two-part tariff | en |
| dc.subject | supply chain coordination | en |
| dc.subject | M-shaped | en |
| dc.title | 行銷通路對供應商的兩部收費契約設計 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Two-Part Tariff Contract Design for one Distributor and two Suppliers | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 107-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳政鴻(Cheng-Hung Wu),洪一薰(I-Hsuan Hong) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 供應鏈協調,契約設計,兩部收費契約,精準行銷,M型化, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | supply chain coordination,contract design,two-part tariff,precision marketing,M-shaped, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 108 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201804413 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2019-01-02 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 工業工程學研究所 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-107-1.pdf 未授權公開取用 | 6.45 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。