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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 汪信君 | |
dc.contributor.author | Hsiao-Chi Tseng | en |
dc.contributor.author | 曾筱棋 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T04:32:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-08-22 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2018-08-22 | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2018-08-10 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 中文文獻
一、專書與書之篇章 王澤鑑(2006)。《債法原理(一)債之發生基本理論—契約、代理權授與、無因管 理》,頁42-45。台北:三民。 江朝國(2009)。《保險法基礎理論》,新修訂5 版。台北:瑞興。 汪信君、廖世昌(2017)。《保險法理論與實務》,4 版。台北:元照。 施文森(2006)。〈論最大誠信善意原則之法制化〉,《施文仁庭長暨夫人七秩華誕祝 壽圖文集》,台北:元照。 姚志明(2003)。《誠信原則與附隨義務之研究》。台北:元照。 Richard H. Thaler、Cass R. Sunstein(著),張美惠(譯)(2014),《推力:推出你的影 響力》,2 版,台北:時報。 二、期刊論文與學位論文 江朝國(1987),〈論保險法上保險人之通知及告知義務〉,《中興法學》,25 期,頁 128-156。 杜怡靜(2010),〈投資型保險商品關於說明義務與適合性原則之運用--台北地院九 十六年度保險簡上字第六號及台北地院九十七年度再易字第一號判決〉,《月 旦民商法》,27 期,頁130-141。 張冠群(2014),〈投資保險保險人說明義務之內容與履行方法⁄臺高院101 保險上易 8 判決〉,《台灣法學雜誌》,252 期,頁203-211。 黃中麟(2014),《金融消費者保護法管制機制之研究-以保險業資訊提供義務為中 心》,國立中央大學法律與政府研究所碩士論文,桃園。 葉啟洲(2013),〈臺灣保險消費者之資訊權保護-以金融消費者保護法之說明義務 規範為中心〉,《月旦法學雜誌》,214 期,頁46-68。 葉啟洲(2017),〈保險消費者資訊權保障之現在與未來〉,《月旦法學雜誌》,263 期,頁56-77。 羅俊瑋(2008),〈論保險人告知說明之義務〉,《國會月刊》,36 卷12 期,頁61- 86。 羅俊瑋(2009),〈論保險人之誠信義務(下)〉,《萬國法律》,163 期,頁80-94。 羅俊瑋(2010),〈論保險人資訊提供之義務〉,《財產法暨經濟法》,24 期,頁129- 160。 羅俊瑋、盧永龍(2012),〈從金融消費者保護法論保險人說明義務〉,《法令月 刊》,63 卷4 期,頁54-76。 饒瑞正(2006),〈保險法先契約據實說明義務之再建構(上)-波希米亞的狂想 -〉,《台灣本土法學》,82 期,頁18-31。 饒瑞正(2006),〈保險法先契約據實說明義務之再建構(下)-波希米亞的狂想 -〉,《台灣本土法學》,83 期,頁47-58。 財團法人金融評議中心網站統計資料,https://www.foi.org.tw/Article.aspx?Arti=57&Lang=1&Role=2&Pno=7(最後瀏 覽日:12/11/2017) 證交所網站,http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/listed/XBRL/aboutXBRL.php (最後瀏覽 日:03/20/2017) 外文文獻 一、專書與書之篇章 Ackert, L., & Deaves, R. (2010). Behavioral Finance: Psychology, Decision-Making, and Markets. Mason, OH: Southern Westhern Cengage Learning. Agnew, J., & Szykman, L. (2010). Information Overload and Information Presentation in Financial Decision Making. In B. Bruce (Ed.), Handbook of Behavioral Finance (pp. 25-44). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Baron, J. (2014). Heuristics and biases. In E. Zamir & D. Teichman (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law (pp. 3-27). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Belsky, G., & Gilovich, T. (2000). Why Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes--and How to Correct Them: Lessons from the New Science of Behavioral Economics. New York, NY: Fireside. Bettman, J. R. (1979). An Information Processing Theory of Consumer Choice. Reading, Ma: Addison-Wesley Pub. Brandeis, L. D. (1914). Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It. New York, NY: Frederick A. Stokes Company. Camerer, C. F., & Loewenstein, G. (1993). Information, Fairness, and Efficiency in Bargaining. In B. A. Mellers & J. B. (Eds.), Psychological Perspectives on Justice (pp. 115-179). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. DeJoy, D. M. (1999). Attitudes and Beliefs. In M. S. Wogalter, D. M. DeJoy & K. R. Laughery (Eds.), Warnings and Risk Communication (pp. 189-219). Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis. Easterbrook, F. H., & Fishel, D. R. (1991). The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gilovich, T., & Griffin, D. (2002). Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (pp. 1–18). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Jones, B. D., Boushey, G., & Workman, S. (2006). Behavioral Rationality and thePolicy Processes: Toward a New Model of Organizational Information Processing. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.), Handbook of public policy (pp. 49-74). London, England: SAGE. Johns, G. (1999). A Multi-Level Theory of Self-Serving Behavior in and by Organizations. In R. I. Sutton & B. M. Staw (Eds.), 21 Research in Organizational Behavior (pp. 1-38). Stanford, CT: Elsevier Science/JAI Press. Levitt, A. (1997, January). Corporate Finance in the Information Age. Remarks delivered to the Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, CA. Mazer, R., McKee, K., & Fiorillo, A., (2014). Applying Behavioral Insights in Consumer Protection Policy (Focus Note 95). Washington, D.C.: CGAP. Nevid, J. S. (2013). Psychology: Concepts and Applications. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Sunstein, C.R. (2013). Simpler: The Future of Government. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, Inc. Soman, D. (2015). The Last Mile: Creating Social and Economic Value from Behavioral Insights. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press. Thaler, R. H. (1992). The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life. New York, NY: Free Press. Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 二、期刊論文與研討會論文 Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). A Model of Investor Sentiment. Journal of Financial Economics, 49(3), 307-343. Bhargava, S., & Manoli, D. (2012). Why Are Benefits Left on the Table? Assessing the Role of Information, Complexity, and Stigma on Take-Up with an IRS Field Experiment. Advances in Consumer Research, 40, 298-302. Camerer, C., Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G., & Thaler, R. (1997). Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 407-441. Chuah, S. H., & Devlin, J. (2011). 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The Effects of Summary Information on Consumer Perceptions of Mutual Fund Characteristics. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 42(1), 37-59. Langevoort, D. C. (1995). Ego, Human-Behavior, and Law. Virginia Law Review, 81(3), 853-886. Langevoort, D. C. (1997a). Organized illusions: A behavioral theory of why corporations mislead stock market investors (and cause other social harms). University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146(1), 101-172. Langevoort, D. C. (1997b). Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology- Enhanced Investing. Washington University Law Quarterly , 75(2), 753-778. Langevoort, D. C. (2002). Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation. Northwestern University Law Review, 97(1), 135-188. Langevoort, D. C. (2004). Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls. Georgetown Law Journal, 93(1), 285-317. Latin, H. (1994). “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations. Ucla Law Review, 41(5), 1193-1295. Levenson, A. B. (1971). The Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection Agency. The Business Lawyer, 27(1), 61-70. Levie, W. H., & Lentz, R. (1982). Effects of Text Illustrations: A Review of Research. ECTJ, 30(4), 195–232. Libby, R., & Rennekamp, K. (2012). Self-Serving Attribution Bias, Overconfidence, and the Issuance of Management Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(4), 197–231. Lowenstein, L. (1994). Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime. Washington and Lee Law Review, 51(3), 925-944. Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (1992). Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 573-597. Loewenstein, G., Sunstein, C. R., & Golman, R. (2014). Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything. Annual Review of Economics, 6, 391-419. Malhotra, N. K. (1984). Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision-Making. Journal of Consumer Research, 10(4), 436-440. Odean, T. (1998). Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? Journal of Finance, 53(5), 1775-1798. Paredes, T. A. (2003). Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation. Washington University Law Quarterly, 81(2), 417-475. Prentice, R. (2002). Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future. Duke Law Journal, 51(5), 1397-1511. Read, D., Loewenstein, G., & Rabin, M. (1999). Choice Bracketing. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1-3), 171-197. Ribstein, L. E. (2002). Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: Critique of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Journal of Corporation Law, 28(1), 1-68. Ripken, S. K. (2006). The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward A More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation. Baylor Law Review, 58(1), 139-205. 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University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 147, 613-675. Sunstein, C. R. (2011). Empirically Informed Regulation. The University of Chicago Law Review, 78(4), 1349-1428. Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler R. H. (2003). Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron. The University of Chicago Law Review, 70(4), 1159-1202. Stewart, N. (2009). The cost of anchoring on credit-card minimum repayments. Psychological Science, 20(1), 39–41. Stigler, G. (1961). The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), 213-225. Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics. The American Economic Review, 92(3), 460-501. Svenson, O., (1981). Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers. Acta Psychologica, 47(2), 143-148. Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health. Psychological Bulletin, 103(2), 193-210. Thaler, R. (1985). Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. 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Act Release No. 33-10425, 82 Fed. Reg. 50988 (2017). 四、網路資源 Dubner, S. J., & Levitt, S. D. (2007, November 18). The Stomach Surgery Conundrum [Online Newspaper Column]. Retrieved from https://nyti.ms/2pYSVUZ. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/70618 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 歷年來占金融消費爭議案件大宗之保險業業務招攬爭議案件中,向來不乏主
張保險人於締約前之商品銷售階段未為充分說明者,若探究此種爭議案件之根本 來源,應在於保險業者與保險消費者之間的資訊不對稱問題,蓋伴隨現代金融市 場之發展,保險商品之高度專業性、技術性與複雜性,已導致保險業者與保險消 費者間之資訊優勢地位漸往保險業者傾斜,並產生是否應將保險人說明義務制度 化之討論。 金融消費者保護法於2011 年實施之後,業已為我國之保險人說明義務提供 明文法律基礎,然而針對此種藉由資訊揭露規範來處理資訊不對稱問題之管制手 段,過往幾十年之間,行為經濟學研究領域已提出許多個體於判斷與決策時存在 系統性錯誤之相關證據,並對資訊揭露規範之管制效力產生廣泛的討論與質疑, 從而本文擬自行為經濟學之角度,檢視資訊揭露管制規範之效力邊界,並回頭審 視我國金融消費者保護法下保險人說明義務規範架構是否尚存在修正與改進之空 間。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Over recent decades, with the development of financial markets have come highly
complex, professional and technical characteristics of insurance products, which keeps deteriorating the information asymmetry between insurers and insurance consumers. Given that mandatory disclosure has been traditionally considered an appropriate regulatory response to market failures that stem from asymmetric information and widely adopted as an effective regulatory tool in the context of financial consumer protection, there appears to be necessity of imposing the duty of disclosure on insurers to protect insurance consumers. In fact, disputes over solicitation arising from insurance industries, particularly disputes over whether the insurers had fully explained the important aspects of their products, have long been one of the most common types of financial consumer disputes in Taiwan. Besides, while the Financial Consumer Protection Act entered into force in 2011, it provided a legal basis for the insurer’s duty of disclosure at the same time. However, insights from behavioral economics have shown that people do display systematic biases in judgement and decision-making. The effectiveness of statutory disclosure requirements therefore encounters more and more questions and challenges. For these reasons, this paper wishes to discuss the limitation of the effectiveness of disclosure regulations from the view of behavioral economics and subsequently investigate whether there is still room for improvement with regard to the insurer's duty of disclosure in the Financial Consumer Protection Act. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T04:32:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-107-R03a21113-1.pdf: 8873808 bytes, checksum: bd68bf96f655d382a7e365ca8f2f22d1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | ⼝試委員審定書 ................................................................................................................................ i
謝辭 ..................................................................................................................................................... ii 中⽂摘要 ........................................................................................................................................... iii ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................... iv ⽬錄 ..................................................................................................................................................... 1 表⽬錄 ................................................................................................................................................. 6 第⼀章 緒論 .......................................................................................................................... 7 第⼀節 研究動機 ................................................................................................................. 7 第⼆節 研究⽅法與範圍 .................................................................................................... 8 第三節 研究架構 ................................................................................................................. 8 第⼆章 ⾏為經濟學與⾦融消費者保護之關聯 ........................................................ 10 第⼀節 ⾏為經濟學之發展 ............................................................................................. 10 第⼀項 ⾏為經濟學研究之興起 .............................................................................. 10 第⼆項 ⾏為經濟學理論與公共政策領域結合之趨勢 ..................................... 12 第⼆節 ⾏為經濟學在⾦融消費者保護議題上之重要性 ...................................... 13 第三節 影響⾦融消費者⾏為之偏誤 ........................................................................... 15 第⼀項 影響偏好的偏誤 ........................................................................................... 17 第⼀款 當下偏誤 ...................................................................................... 17 第⼆款 參考點依賴與損失趨避 .......................................................... 18 第三款 後悔及被其他情緒引發的偏好 ............................................. 19 第⼆項 影響信念之偏誤 ........................................................................................... 20 第⼀款 過度⾃信 ...................................................................................... 20 第⼆款 過度外推 ...................................................................................... 23 第三款 投射偏誤 ...................................................................................... 23 第三項 影響決策歷程之偏誤 .................................................................................. 23 第⼀款 ⼼理帳⼾與狹窄界定 ............................................................... 23 第⼆款 框架、顯著性與有限注意⼒ ................................................. 25 第三款 決策經驗法則 ............................................................................. 26 第四款 說服與社會影響 ........................................................................ 27 第三章 強制資訊揭露之⾦融消費者保護效⼒ ........................................................ 28 第⼀節 資訊揭露作為⾦融管制⼿段之興起 ............................................................. 28 第⼆節 以資訊揭露保護⾦融消費者之理論基礎 .................................................... 29 第三節 現代⾦融市場發展帶來之挑戰 ...................................................................... 31 第⼀項 資訊過載 ......................................................................................................... 31 第⼆項 資訊複雜性 .................................................................................................... 32 第四節 ⾏為偏誤對資訊揭露效⼒之影響 .................................................................. 33 第⼀項 當下偏誤 ......................................................................................................... 34 第⼆項 參考點依賴與損失趨避 .............................................................................. 34 第三項 後悔及被其他情緒引發的偏好 ................................................................ 35 第四項 過度⾃信 ......................................................................................................... 35 3 第五項 過度外推 ......................................................................................................... 37 第六項 框架、顯著性與有限注意⼒ .................................................................... 37 第七項 定錨捷思與可得性捷思 .............................................................................. 39 第⼋項 說服與社會影響 ........................................................................................... 40 第五節 ⾏為經濟學觀點下之效⼒改進建議 ............................................................. 40 第⼀項 原則性建議 .................................................................................................... 42 第⼀款 資訊揭露內容 ............................................................................. 42 第⼀⽬ 簡化內容與篇幅 ............................................................... 42 第⼆⽬ 標準化與⽐較性資訊 ...................................................... 44 第⼆款 資訊揭露形式 ............................................................................. 45 第⼀⽬ 簡明的資訊揭露語⾔ ...................................................... 45 第⼆⽬ 將重要資訊置於可預期消費者注意處 ...................... 46 第三⽬ 伴隨說明⽂字提供圖像 ................................................. 46 第⼆項 具體資訊揭露⼿段建議 .............................................................................. 47 第⼀款 摘要性揭露 ................................................................................. 47 第⼆款 ⾵險與報酬 ................................................................................. 48 第三款 商品價格 ...................................................................................... 50 第四款 ⽐例之使⽤ ................................................................................. 51 第四章 我國⾦融消費者保護法下保險⼈說明義務規範架構 ............................. 53 第⼀節 保險⼈說明義務發展背景 ............................................................................... 53 第⼆節 ⾦融消費者保護法下之保險⼈說明義務 .................................................... 56 第⼀項 保險⼈說明義務之法律基礎 .................................................................... 56 第⼆項 保險⼈說明義務性質 .................................................................................. 57 第三項 保險⼈說明義務之主體 .............................................................................. 58 第⼀款 說明義務⼈ ................................................................................. 58 第⼆款 說明義務之履⾏對象 ............................................................... 60 第四項 保險⼈說明義務之內容與範圍 ................................................................ 61 第⼀款 ⼀般性規範 ................................................................................. 63 第⼀⽬ 應說明之重要內容 .......................................................... 64 第⼆⽬ 應說明之⾵險 ................................................................... 67 第⼆款 投資型保險商品規範 ............................................................... 68 第五項 保險⼈說明義務履⾏⽅式 ......................................................................... 71 第⼀款 ⼝頭或書⾯說明之限制 .......................................................... 71 第⼆款 具體履⾏⽅式 ............................................................................. 73 第⼀⽬ ⼀般性規範 ........................................................................ 73 第⼆⽬ 投資型保險商品規範 ...................................................... 75 第五章 ⾏為經濟學觀點於說明義務規範之應⽤ .................................................... 77 第⼀節 現⾏規範架構之再檢視 .................................................................................... 77 第⼆節 ⾦評中⼼評議案件之探討 ............................................................................... 78 第⼀項 無法理解保險商品資訊 .............................................................................. 81 第⼆項 誤導性銷售⽂件與⼝頭說明 .................................................................... 85 第三項 資訊呈現⽅式致難以閱讀 ......................................................................... 87 第四項 信賴業務員⽽未閱讀資訊 ......................................................................... 89 第三節 資訊揭露與規範修正效⼒測試 ...................................................................... 90 第四節 ⼩結 ........................................................................................................................ 91 第六章 結論 ........................................................................................................................ 93 參考⽂獻 .......................................................................................................................................... 96 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 資訊揭露管制規範之界線—由行為經濟學檢視金融消費者保護法保險人說明義務規範 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Boundary of Disclosure Regulations─Apply Behavioral Economics to the Insurer's Duty of Disclosure in Financial Consumer Protection Act | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 106-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 莊永丞,邵慶平 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 行為經濟學,金融消費者保護法,保險人說明義務,資訊不對稱,資訊揭露,偏誤, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Behavioral Economics,Financial Consumer Protection Act,Information Asymmetries,Disclosure,Biases, | en |
dc.relation.page | 105 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201802517 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2018-08-10 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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