美國證管會監管信函對非GAAP與GAAP盈餘間差額之影響

Abstract

本研究旨在探討與非一般公認會計準則之盈餘（以下簡稱non-GAAP盈餘）相關之監管信函對公司non-GAAP盈餘及一般公認會計準則之盈餘（以下簡稱GAAP 盈餘）間差額之影響。將經理人的動機納入考量後，本研究發現收到與non-GAAP盈餘相關之監管信函後，公司的non-GAAP盈餘及GAAP盈餘間的差額增 加，我們認為其中一個可能的原因是當公司收到與non-GAAP盈餘相關之監管信函後，認為美國證券交易委員會（TheU.S.SecuritiesandExchangeCommission, the SEC）（以下簡稱美國證管會）不僅會對於 non-GAAP議題進行調查，還會對於公司其他重要的議題進行審查，GAAP盈餘乃是依照一般公認會計準則編製而產生的盈餘，實為重要的財務資訊，因此公司認為GAAP盈餘極有可能落入美國證管會的調查範疇，導致不僅non-GAAP盈餘受美國監管信函影響，GAAP 盈餘亦受 影響。本研究亦發現分析師無法預測美國證管會監管信函對non-GAAP盈餘及GAAP盈餘間差異的影響，且社會大眾可預期及不可預期的non-GAAP盈餘及GAAP盈餘間之差異都增加。排除掉金融業和公共產業後我們獲得相同的結果，將經理人動機以類別變數衡量後也得到類似的結果。本研究發現美國證管會與non-GAAP相關之監管信函對non-GAAP 盈餘及GAAP盈餘間有顯著的影響。

This paper examines the effect that the SEC comment letters on non-GAAP issues make on the difference of firms’ non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings. After considering managers’ motivation, we find that the rifts between non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings of motivated firms expand after they receive non-GAAP comment letters. We provide a possible explanation that although it’s non-GAAP issues that the comment letters elaborate on, they may also restrain opportunism on GAAP earnings because firms will assume, given on the SEC has already kept an eye on themselves, the SEC not only inspect non-GAAP earnings but GAAP earnings. We further decompose the exclusions into two parts that analyst can predict and can not predict, we observe that analyst are unable to capture the effect of non-GAAP letters. Furthermore, we also find recurring exclusions, no matter they’re opportunistically defined by managers, are enlarged after non-GAAP comment letters arrive. Our results are robust to removing financial and utility industries and measure managers’ motivation in form of dummy variables. Overall, comment letters on non-GAAP issues have impact on the difference between non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings.