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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 李艷榕(Yen-Jung Lee) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yu-Hsiang Chiang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 江育祥 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T04:25:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-19 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2018-08-19 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2018-08-14 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 第六章、參考文獻
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Executive Pay and Firm Performance. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 43(3), 13–29. Main, B., O’Reilly, C. A., & Wade, J.,(1993). Top executive pay: Tournament or teamwork? Journal of Labor Economics, 11(4): p.607-628. McConnell, J. J., and Servaes,H. (1990). Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27: p.595-612. McLaughlin, K. J. (1988). Aspects of Tournament Models: A Survey. Research in Labor Economics, 9, 225–256. Melton, M., & Zone, T. S. (2000). Risk taking in tournaments. Managerial Finance, 26(7), 52–61. Miller, D.J., (1995). CEO Salary Increases May Be Rational After All: Referents and Contracts in CEO Pay. Academy of Management Journal, 38:p.1361-1385. Milkovich, G.T., &Newman,J.M., (2002). Compensation. McGraw-Hill. Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W., (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20: p.293-315. Perri, T.J., (1994). 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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/70323 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究係根據競賽理論和行為理論對於企業薪酬差距的不同觀點為理論基礎，來研究組織內部高階管理階層中受到性別和研發密集程度調節後對組織績效的關係。本研究從Execucomp中的COMPUSTAT資料庫中蒐集到美國3661家公司為研究對象，研究期間為1992年到2016年共25年。實證結果發現，當公司內部高階管理階層中有女性經理人存在，團隊的組織特性較符合行為理論的觀點，當公司內部的薪酬差距越小，公司整體的績效表現較佳；而當科技密集程度越高的企業，若其高階管理階層之間的薪酬差距越大，組織績效表現也會越差，此結果也證實了行為理論中所提及當企業組織之間的相互合作協調性越高的企業，提高薪差之差距並不利於組織績效的發展。本研究期望能給予未來的企業管理當局在思考和評估公司的薪酬策略時，對於組織整體績效的發展有更全面性的參考方向。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This research is based on the tournament theory and behavioral theory on the compensation gap of the enterprise. The purpose of the study is to investigate the influence of gender and R&D intensity on firm performance in the Top Management Team ( TMT ). Using 3,661 companies from Execucomp for a total of 25 years from 1992 to 2016, this study shows that when there are female managers in the TMT of the company, the relation between compensation gap and organizational performance is more consistent with the prediction made by the behavioral Theory. That is, a smaller compensation gap is associated with better overall firm performance. This study also finds that the compensation gap is negatively associated with firm performance for firms with higher R&D intensity. This result is consistent with the prediction made by the Behavioral Theory, which says that increasing the compensation gap in the TMT is disadvantageous to firm performance for firms that require higher coordination within the organization. This study shed light on how to design compensation strategies to motivate better firm performance. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T04:25:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-107-R01722038-1.pdf: 2995500 bytes, checksum: 26ee1f4285133652df22f287a9a63cd5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
第一章、緒論 1 第二章、文獻回顧 5 第一節、薪酬差距與競賽理論 5 第二節、薪酬差距與行為理論 7 第三節、薪酬差距與性別的影響 8 第四節、薪酬差距與科技密集度 10 第三章、研究設計 12 第一節、研究架構 12 第二節、實證假說模型建立 12 第三節、實證模型及變數衡量 14 第四節、樣本選取與資料來源 17 第五節、 資料分析方法 18 第四章、實證結果 19 第一節、敘述統計分析 19 第二節、實證結果分析 20 第三節、敏感性分析 25 第五章、研究結論與建議 28 第一節、研究結論 28 第二節、研究限制 29 第三節、研究建議 30 第六章、參考文獻 31 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 性別和研發密集程度對薪酬差距與組織績效間之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Empirical Research on the Influence of Gender and R&D Intensity on the Association between Compensation Gap and Organizational Performance. | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 106-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien Liao),尤琳蕙(Lin-Hui Yu) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 薪酬差距,性別,研發密集度,競賽理論,行為理論, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Compensation gap,Gender,R&D intensity,Tournament Theory,Behavioral Theory, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 36 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201803451 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2018-08-15 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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