不同公司治理模式下台灣上市櫃公司之盈餘管理、關係人交易與潛在舞弊的比較

Abstract

在台灣，是否存在某一種公司治理模式優於其他公司治理模式仍是個備受爭議的問題。為檢視各公司治理模式的監督力道，本研究比較不同公司治理模式下台灣上市櫃公司的盈餘管理、關係人交易與潛在舞弊程度。實證結果顯示，在減緩盈餘管理、關係人交易與潛在舞弊程度上，並不存在某一種公司治理模式完全優於其他公司治理模式。考慮了自願選任獨立董事以及自願設置審計委員會的潛在內生性後，實證結果仍然支持這項結論。這些研究發現意味著每一種公司治理模式都有其待改進之處，而且金融監督管理委員會不應該強制台灣上市櫃公司選任獨立董事以及設置審計委員會。

In Taiwan, it remains a subject of substantial debate whether there is a corporate governance model that is better than others are. To examine supervision power among different corporate governance models, this study compares level of earnings management, related-party transactions, and potential frauds among different corporate governance models adopted by Taiwanese listed firms. The empirical results indicate that there is not a certain corporate governance model that is completely better than others are in terms of mitigating level of earnings management, related-party transactions, and potential frauds. After taking into account potential endogeneity in voluntary independent director appointment and voluntary audit committee establishment, the empirical results still support this conclusion. These findings imply that each corporate governance model leaves room to be improved, and imposition of independent director appointment and audit committee establishment on Taiwanese listed firms by the Financial Supervisory Commission is inappropriate.