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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 黃銘傑 | |
dc.contributor.author | Yi Tsai | en |
dc.contributor.author | 蔡儀 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T03:35:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-03-02 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2018-03-02 | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2018-02-12 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 中文文獻
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H. (1978). Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With Itself. New York: Free Press. Boskin, M. & Lau, L. Capital, (1992). Technology, and Economics Growth, in Technology and the Wealth of Nations 17 (Nathan Rosenberg et al. eds., 1992). Clayton, C. (1997). The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Glader, M. (2006)., Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis, Camberley, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Hataway, S. C. 2016. US Merger Control in the High-Technology Sector. Pp. 61-67 in The Merger Control Review, edited by Gotts, I. K. Washington, DC: PAUL HASTINGS LLP Hébert, R. F. & A. N. Link (1982). The Entrepreneur. New York: Praeger. Kirzner, I.M. (1973). Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Lindsay, A. & Berridge, A. (2003). The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues. London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell Lyons, B. (1989). Barriers to entry. In: Davies, S., Lyons, B., Dixon, H. & Geroski, P. (Eds.), Surveys in Economics: Economics of Industrial Organisation. London, UK: Longman. Scherer, F.M. & Ross, D. (1990). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Shackle, G.L.S. (1971). Economics For Pleasure. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sutton, J. (1991). Sunk Costs and Market Structure, London, UK: The MIT Press. 二、學位論文 Trattner, M. (2016). Assessment of anti-innovative mergers in high technology markets: What kind of substantive test should be done to protect innovation?. Faculty of Law, Lund University. 三、期刊論文與研討會論文 Ahlborn, C., Denicolò, V., Geradin, D. & Padilla, A. J. (2006). DG Comp’s Discussion Paper on Article 82: Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust Rules for Dynamically Competitive Industries. Audretsch, D. B., Baumol, W. J., Burke, A. E. (2001). Competition Policy in Dynamic Markets. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, 613-634. Baer, B. (2016, June). Remarks at American Antitrust Institute’s 17th Annual Conference. Conference conducted at the meeting of American Antitrust Institute, Washington, DC Barnett, T. (2008). Maximizing Welfare Through Technological Innovation. George Mason Law Review, 15, 1191-1199. Berry, M. N. (1996). Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers: In Search of a Defense, San Diego Law Review, 33, 515-532. Bower, J. & Christensen, C. (1995). Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave, Harvard Business Review, 73, 43-53. Buehler, B. and Federico, G. (2016). Recent developments in the assessment of efficiencies of EU mergers. Competition Law & Policy Debate, 2, 64-74. Carlton, D. W. & Israel, M. (2010). Will the New Guidelines Clarify or Obscure Antitrust Policy? Antitrust Source, 10, 1-4. Cassiman, B., Colombo, M., Garonne, P. & Veugelers, R. (2005). The Impact of M&A on the R&D Process. An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Technological and Market Relatedness. Research Policy, 34, 455-476. Colomo, P. K. (2016, October). Merger trends in innovation markets. The ENTraNCE Annual Conference. Conference conducted at the meeting of European University Istitute, Florence, Italy. Commission (2016). EU merger control and innovation. Competition Policy Brief. Coninck, R. D. (2016). Innovation in EU Merger Control: in Need of a Consistent Framework. Competition Law & Policy Debate, 2, 41-51. Creighton, S. (2010). 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: The View from the Technology Industry, Antitrust Source, 1-4. de Streel, A. & Larouche, P. (2015). Disruptive Innovation and Competition Policy Enforcement. OECD Working Paper, DAF/COMP/GF(2015)7. Evans, D. S. & Schmalensee, R. (2002). Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 2, 1-50. Ezrielev, J., Ordover, J. A. (2010). The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A static compass in a dynamic world? Antitrust Source, 10, 1-6. F. Scott-Morton (2012, December). Antitrust Enforcement in High-Technology Industries: Protecting Innovation and Competition. The NYSBA Annual Antitrust Forum on Antitrust in High Technology Markets. Forum conducted at the meeting of New York State Bar Association, New York City, NY. Fackelmann, C. R. (2006). Dynamic Efficiency Considerations in EC Merger Control An Intractable Subject or a Promising Chance for Innovation?. The University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy, Working Paper (L), 09/06. Farrell, J. & Saloner, G. (1986). Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation. American Economic Review, 76, 940-955. FTC (2013). Consumer Protection & Competition, Regulation in a High-Tech World: Discussing the Future of the Federal Trade Commission. Report 1.0 of the FTC: Technology & Reform Project. Gilbert, R. & Newbery, D. (1982). Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly. American Economic Review, 72, 514-526. Gilbert, R. J. & Greene, H. (2015). Merging Innovation Into Antitrust Agency Enforcement of the Clayton Act. George Washington Law Review, 863, 1902-1944. Gilbert, R. J. & Tom, W. K. (2001). Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later. Antitrust Law Journal, 69, 43-86. Gilbert, R.J. & Sunshine, S.C. (1995). Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets. Antitrust Law Journal, 63, 569-601. Gotts, I. K., Sher, S. & Lee, M. (2008). Antitrust Merger Analysis in High-Technology Market. European Competition Journal, 4, 463-483. Graef, I., Wahyuningtyas, S. Y. & Valcke, P. (2014, June). How Google and others upset competition analysis: disruptive innovation and European competition law. 25th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS). Conference conducted at the meeting of ITS, Brussels, Belgium. Gundlach, G. (2016, June). Non-Price Effects of Mergers: A Primer. American Antitrust Institute Invitational Symposium on the Non-Price Effects of Mergers. Symposium conducted at the meeting of American Antitrust Institute, Washington, DC. Harty, R. P. (2014). Interview with FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, The Mergers & Acquisitions Committee, XIV. Hesse, R. (2014, January). At the Intersection of Antitrust & High-Tech: Opportunities for Constructive Engagement. The Conference on Competition and IP Policy in High-Technology Industries. Conference conducted at the meeting of Cornerstone Research, in cooperation with the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford, CA. Katz, M. & Shelanski, H. (2004). Merger Policy and Innovation: Must Enforcement Change to Account for Technological Change?. NBER Working Paper, No. 10710. Katz, M. & Shelanski, H. (2005). Merger Policy and Innovation: Must Enforcement Change to Account for Technological Change?. In Innovation Policy and the Economy, ed. Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner, and Scott Stern. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Katz, M. & Shelanski, H. (2007). Mergers and Innovation. Antitrust Law Journal, 74, 1-85. Katz, M. L. & Shapiro, C. (1986). Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities. The Journal of Political Economy, 94, 822-841. Katz, M. L. & Shapiro, C. (1994). Systems Competition and Network Effects. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 93-115. Kern, B. (2014). Innovation markets, future Markets, or potential competition: How should competition authorities account for innovation competition in merger reviews?, Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, No. 08-2014 Krueger, A. (1974). The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society. American Economic Review, 64, 291-303. Laitenberger, J. (2015, December). Competition and Innovation. The CRA Annual Brussels Conference. Conference conducted at the meeting of CRA, Brussels, Belgium. Landman, L. B. (1999). Innovation and the Structure of Competition. Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society, 81, 728-741. Martyn Taylor, Competition Law in High Technology Industries, Competition Law Conference (2015). McSweeny, T. (2015, January). The Role of Antitrust Enforcers in Dynamic High-Tech Markets. Skadden Arps / Compass Lexecon Symposium: Antitrust in the Technology Sector. Symposium conducted at the meeting of Skadden’s Antitrust and Competition Group & Compass Lexecon, Palo Alto, CA. OECD (1997). Application of Competition Policy to High Tech Markets. OCDE/GD(97) 44, Competition Policy Roundtables, Paris: OECD. OECD (2002). Merger Review in Emerging High Innovation Markets. DAFFE/COMP(2002)20, Competition Policy Roundtables. OECD (2008). Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Analysis. DAF/COMP(2007)41, Competition Policy Roundtables. Owings, T. M. (2013). Identifying a Maverick: When Antitrust Law Should Protect a Low-Cost Competitor. Vanderbilt Law Review , 66, 323-354. Porter, M. (2001). Competition and Antitrust: Toward a Productivity-Based Approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures. Antitrust Bulletin, 46, 919-958. Posner, R. A. (1976), The Robinson-Patman Act: Federal Regulation of Price Differences, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. Posner, R. A. (1979). The Chicago School of Economic Analysis. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 127, 925–948. Posner, R. A. (2000). Antitrust in the New Economy. John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper, No. 106 (2nd series). Rapp, R. T. (1995-96). The Misapplication of the Innovation Market approach to Merger analysis. Antitrust Law Journal, 64, 19-47. Riemenschneider, K. (2006). New Economy/Antitrust Review of Merger Analysis Using Innovation Markets. Antitrust Modernization Commission Public Comment. Robert Kramer (1999, May) . Antitrust Considerations in International Defense Mergers. Speech Before the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Virginia, DC. Rosch, T. (2014). Economics in Merger Analysis. The Antitrust Bulletin, 59, 111-128. Segal, W. (2005). Antitrust in Innovative Industries. Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper, No. 312. Shapiro, C. (2010). The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years. Antitrust Law Journal , 77 , 49-107. Shapiro, C. (2011). Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull's Eye?, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited, NBER Chapters, 361-404. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Sidak, G. & Teece, D. (2009). Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 5(4), 581–631. Solow, R. (1957). Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function. Review of Economics and Statistics, 39, 312-320. Stasi, M. L. & Solidoro, S. (2016). Emerging Trends in US Antitrust and EU Competition Law. ENTraNCE, Issue 2016/04. Vestager, M. (2016, April). Competition: the mother of invention. European Competition and Consumer Day. Amsterdam, The Netherlands. White, M., Braczyk, HJ., Ghobadian, A. & Niebuhr, J. (1988). Small Firms’ Innovation: Why Regions Differ. Policy Studies Institute. Yao, D. A. & DeSanti, S. S. (1993). Innovation Issues Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines. Antitrust Law Journal, 61, 505-525. 四、研究計畫與政府出版品 Antitrust Division, U.S.Dept. of Justice. (1999). Annual Report FY1999. Available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/10/23/4523.pdf Antirust Modernization Commission. (Apr. 2007). Report and recommendations. Available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm Monopolkommission. (2015). Competition policy: The challenge of digital markets, Special Report 68. Available at http://www.monopolkommission.de/images/PDF/SG/s68_fulltext_eng.pdf 五、網路資源 Browdie, M., Grise, J. & Morse, H. (2017). Re: United States: Technology Mergers. Retrieved from https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/reprints/2017/2017-01-31-us-technology-mergers.ashx?la=en Donahue, L. & Salins, L. (2014). Re: Recent Developments in Antitrust Enforcement Within High-Tech Markets. Retrieved from http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/3fd1586f-8af7-4edb-bae4-afa1513bbf91/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/13f9e617-f500-47e6-851b-b90276063d77/Antitrust_Alert_02142014.pdf Garrahan, M. (2009). Re: The Rise and Fall of MySpace, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009) . Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/fd9ffd9c-dee5-11de-adff-00144feab49a Gen News Highlights (2015). Re: Array BioPharma Gains $85M from Novartis in Deal for Cancer Compounds, GEN (Mar. 2, 2015) . Retrieved from http://www.genengnews.com/gen-news-highlights/array-biopharma-gains-85m-from-novartis-in-deal-for-cancer-compounds/81250984 Nigro Jr., B. A., Asker, N. L. & Cirincione, M. R. (2015). Re: Future Competition Poses Present Risk To Deals. Retrieved from https://www.law360.com/articles/652601/future-competition-poses-present-risk-to-deals Wilkinson, L. (2014). Re: DOJ Successful Challenge of Bazaarvoice’s Acquisition: A Reminder That Consummated Deals Are Not Immune from Section 7 Scrutiny. Retrieved from https://antitrust.weil.com/doj-successful-challenge-of-bazaarvoices-acquisition-a-reminder-that-consummated-deals-are-not-immune-from-section-7-scrutiny/ | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/69956 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 傳統的事業水平結合管制著重靜態的競爭分析,旨在防杜結合後事業間缺乏價格競爭,侵蝕消費者福利。然而,高科技產業卻常以創新與研發作為競爭的優勢因素,因技術生命週期短暫,事業唯有不斷創新才能享有市場優勢地位,動態競爭更符合高科技事業透過創新彼此競爭的本質,其市場地位相對的脆弱且暫時。又少數事業享有顯著市場優勢地位不一定代表欠缺競爭,Schumpeter v. Arrow的理論之爭揭示了市場結構對於促進創新的多種可能性。因創新所帶給消費者的福利不必然低於價格競爭帶來的福利,當代結合管制應納入創新的考量,個案中容許(甚至鼓勵)一定程度的市場集中。
有鑑於創新對於經濟成長、長期提升消費者福祉之重要性,美國、歐盟的競爭政策皆認知到創新競爭面向並納入保護創新的概念作為政策的指導,於其主管機關頒佈之結合處理準則中,並可見納入創新效果之評估。本文欲借鏡晚近競爭理論的發展與比較法經驗,從促進創新之觀點,檢討我國結合管制法規曁執法層面問題,從結合管制態樣之掌握、結合的實體規範要件、市場界定、市場占有率分析、至單純的價格效果預測等判斷標準都值得更進一步的補充與細緻化。 | zh_TW |
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dc.description.tableofcontents | 目錄
中文摘要 i Abstract ii 目錄 iii 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機 1 第二節 研究方法與範圍 2 第三節 研究架構 3 第二章 結合管制面臨創新之衝擊與管制新思維 5 第一節 結合管制概說 5 第一項 結合管制規範目的 5 第二項 結合之概念及類型 5 第一款 概念 5 第二款 類型 6 第三項 結合管制手段 7 第二節 動態性競爭分析之基礎概念 8 第一項 創新之類型 8 第二項 靜態效率及動態效率 10 第一款 效率類型 10 第二款 科技變化及動態效率之重要性 12 第三項 競爭與創新之關係 13 第一款 Schumpeter vs. Arrow 爭論 13 第二款 相關經濟學討論對競爭政策的啟示 14 第四項 產業經濟學之探討 16 第一款 靜態學術傳統及理論發展 17 第二款 奧地利學派觀點 19 第三款 芝加哥學派之啟示 21 第四款 轉向動態的晚近主流觀點 22 第三節 創新產業特性之競爭分析意涵 24 第一項 動態競爭 24 第二項 固定成本顯著 25 第三項 網路效應 26 第四項 耐久財 28 第五項 先進者優勢 28 第六項 智慧財產權之角色 29 第三章 創新對美國水平結合審查之影響 31 第一節 現行水平結合實體審查 31 第一項 現行分析架構概說 31 第二項 2010 年最新修訂準則之重要轉變 34 第一款 弱化市場界定角色 34 第二款 擴增價格效果經濟分析工具 34 第三款 更重視非價格效果 35 第二節 水平結合管制政策下的創新考量 37 第一項 歷來結合準則演變 38 第一款 1968 年結合準則 38 第二款 1980 年代之結合準則 38 第三款 1990 年代之水平結合準則 39 第四款 2010 年水平結合準則 41 第一目 創新之限制 41 第二目 動態效率評估 43 第三目 其他動態性修訂 44 第二項 創新市場分析法 46 第三節 近期執法動向及其問題點 48 第一項 Applied Materials/Tokyo Electron 50 第二項 H&R Block/TaxAct 51 第三項 Bazaarvoice/PowerReviews 51 第四項 近期執法動向評析 53 第五項 美國結合管制執法之問題 55 第四節 小結 57 第四章 創新對歐盟水平結合審查之影響 59 第一節 歐盟水平結合管制下之創新考量 59 第一項 歐盟水平結合之實體審查架構 59 第一款 相關市場之界定 60 第二款 限制競爭效果衡量 61 第三款 抵銷限制競爭疑慮之考量 63 第二項 現行架構下之創新影響評估 65 第一款 結合是否消除重要的競爭力? 65 第二款 效率性抵銷因素 67 第三項 近期執法動向及其問題點 67 第一款 Novartis/GSK的抗癌藥業務結合案 68 第二款 GE/Alstom 結合案 69 第三款 近期執法動向評析 70 第四款 歐盟結合管制執法的問題點 71 第一目 效率性反證過於嚴格 71 第二目 靜態、動態影響之權衡 72 第四項 小結 72 第二節 美國與歐盟創新產業結合執法趨勢比較 73 第一項 競爭政策執法目標之調整 73 第二項 創新作為競爭變量 75 第三項 「創新市場」理念應用 76 第四項 垂直、多角結合:創新考量取代封鎖效果? 77 第五章 以創新觀點建置我國水平結合管制 78 第一節 公平法結合管制基本架構 78 第二節 結合態樣廓清—專利聯盟結合案之檢討 78 第一項 One-Blue 專利聯盟結合案 79 第二項 評析 81 第一款 結合之概念與「經常共同經營」 81 第二款 以結合規範專利聯盟衍生問題 84 第三款 本文建議 86 第三節 現行結合分析檢討 88 第一項 公平會結合管制實務中的創新因素考量 88 第二項 實體規範要件問題 93 第三項 實體審查架構問題 96 第一款 相關市場界定 96 第二款 動態市場的市占率定位 100 第三款 限制競爭效果評估 102 第四款 創新與經濟效率 105 第四節 科技大廠利用結合阻撓破壞式創新之問題 109 第一項 概說 109 第二項 因應破壞式創新結合管制之調整 111 第一款 申報門檻 111 第二款 實體審查 113 第六章 結論 116 參考文獻 120 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 競爭法水平結合管制研究─以高科技產業之創新為中心 | zh_TW |
dc.title | A Study on Horizontal Merger Control─ Focusing on Innovation of High-tech Industries | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 106-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 顏雅倫,陳皓芸 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 公平交易法,結合管制,高科技產業,創新,動態競爭,動態效率,破壞式創新, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Fair Trade Act,Merger Control,High-tech Industries,Innovation,Dynamic Competition,Dynamic Efficiency,Disruptive Innovation, | en |
dc.relation.page | 127 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201800514 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2018-02-12 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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