請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/6984完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 楊金穆 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kei-Sang Kou | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 高基生 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-17T09:23:04Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2012-02-08 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-17T09:23:04Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2012-02-08 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012-01-10 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 1. Ayer, A. J. 1972. Probability and Evidence. The MacMillan LTD.
2. Broad, C. D. 1925. The Mind and its Place in Nature. New York: The Humanities Press Inc, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD. 3. Brueckner, A. 2005. ‘Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Mar., 2005), pp. 436-443. 4. — 2009. ‘E = K and Perceptual Knowledge’. Williamson on Knowledge. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds). Oxford University Press, pp.5-11. 5. Brueckner, A and Flocco, M. O. 2002. ‘Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument’. Philosophical Studies 110 (3): 285-293. 6. Burge, T. 2007. Foundations of Minds: philosophical essays. vol. 2. Oxford University Press. 7. Cassam, Q. 2009. ‘Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed?’. Williamson on Knowledge. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds). Oxford University Press, pp.12-30. 8. Descartes, R. 1996. Meditations on First Philosophy. John Gottingham (eds). Cambridge University Press. 9. Feigl, H. 1958. “The Mental and the Physical”. Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven & Grover Maxwell (eds). Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science II: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 10. Fricker, E. 2009. ‘Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against’. Williamson on Knowledge. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds). Oxford University Press, pp.31-59. 11. Goldman, A. 1976. ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 20 (Nov. 18, 1976), pp. 771-791. 12. —2009. ‘Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence’. Williamson on Knowledge. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds). Oxford University Press, pp.73-91. 13. Hindriks, F. 2007. ‘The Status of The Knowledge Account of Assertion’, Linguist Philos (2007) 30: 393-406. 14. Jackson, F. 2009. ‘Primeness, Internalism, Explanation’. Williamson on Knowledge. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds). Oxford University Press, pp.109-121. 15. Monaghan, P. X. 2008. ‘Williamson and the Argument from Luminosity’. Dialogue XLVII (2008): 619-32. 16. Neta, R and Rohrbaugh, G. 2004. ‘Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85: 396–406. 17. Quine, W. V and Ullian, J. S. 1978. The Web of Beliefs 18. Ramsey, F. P. 2000. ‘Knowledge’. The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Routledge. pp.258-259. 19. Steup, M. 2009. ‘Are Mental States Luminous’. Williamson on Knowledge. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds). Oxford University Press, pp.217-236. 20. Williamson, T. 1995. ‘Does Assertibility Satisfy The S4 Axiom?’. CRITICA, Vol. XXVLL, No. 81, diciembre 1995: 3-25. 21. —2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford University Press. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/6984 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本文的目的是要借威廉森(Timothy Williamson)的知識論來論證斷言的知識規則,即是人們必須:在知道 p 時,才斷言 p。假定人們是可以通過斷言溝通,那麼人們便可以通過斷言溝通知識。這樣,威廉森的知識論便說明了人們可以通過斷言溝通知識;從而回應了懷疑論者的質疑:人們是否可以溝通知識。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | The main thesis of this paper is to show that one is warranted to assert p if and only if one knows p. I will apply Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge First Epistemology to argue for this thesis. Because human beings do communicate with each others by assertions, if this thesis holds then human beings communicate knowledge by assertions. In this way, Williamson’s Knowledge First Epistemology replies to the sceptical challenge which doubts knowledge is able to be communicated.
Williamson proposed the notion of case in order to characterize a situation wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. In other words, one knows p if and only if one is in a case wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. Since one is warranted to assert p if and only if one knows p, one is warranted to assert p if and only if one is in a case wherein that the condition that one knows p obtains. Incidentally, one must assert p only if one has suitable evidence, so that one is warranted to assert p if and only if one has suitable evidence. Since one is warranted to assert p if and only if one is in a case wherein the condition that one knows p obtains, one has evidence to assert p if and only if one is in a case wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. This leads to the consequence that one’s evidence is one’s knowledge. In this thesis, I will demonstrate Williamson’s argument for the thesis that one’s evidence is one’s knowledge. Which case one is in determine one’s knowledge, evidence, and assertibility. This suggests that a class of cases wherein the condition that one knows p obtains is a model of one’s knowledge, evidence, and assertibility. In this thesis, I will indicate that Williamson provided such a elegant model for one’s knowledge, evidence, and assertibility. In this model, we only need to assume that there is a class of cases wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-17T09:23:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R98124005-1.pdf: 898894 bytes, checksum: 3f164a1869551468b7674da7ce4b08e0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Introduction 1
Williamson’s main theses and presuppositions 2 Plan 7 Chapter 1 Mental State and Prime Condition 9 1.1 Knowing as a Mental State 12 1.2 Prime condition of mental state 19 1.3 Criticism 24 1.4 Conclusion 27 Chapter 2 Anti-Luminosity and Anti-KK Principle 30 2.1 Safety Requirement of Knowledge 32 2.2 Anti-Luminosity and Anti-KK Principle 36 2.3 Criticism 41 2.4 Conclusion 47 Chapter 3 Luminosity of Evidence 48 3.1 Sameness of Evidence in different cases 50 3.2 Williamson’s argument against Luminosity of Evidence 53 3.3 Criticism 55 3.4 Conclusion 58 Chapter 4 Knowledge Rule of Assertion 59 4.1 Williamson’s argument for E = K 61 4.2 Knowledge rule of Assertion 68 4.3 Criticism 73 4.4 Conclusion 75 Chapter 5 Conclusion 77 Toward an Elegant Model for Knowledge, Evidence, and Assertibility 77 Bibliography 83 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | 威廉森論斷言 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Williamson on Assertion | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 100-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 方萬全,林從一 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 威廉森,斷言, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Williamson,assertion, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 83 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2012-01-10 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 哲學系 | |
文件中的檔案:
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-101-1.pdf | 877.83 kB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。
