特別股的現在與未來：超越股東平等原則之限制與迷思

Abstract

當新形態的籌資工具與金融商品在國際上日益多樣化之際，發行特別股作為籌資方式的一種，可謂企業彈性募集資金的重要管道，惟我國在現行法令及實務解釋上，對於特別股之權利義務內容定有諸多限制。觀其原因，不外係企業發行具有特殊權利義務之特別股時，將造成公司股份間之權利義務不平等，從而違反傳統通說所謂之股東平等原則，主管機關與法院歷年來對新形態特別股之發行，因此多傾向保守之限制態度。然而，特別股的多樣化與創新並非必然與投資市場之健全所相悖，一概地限制特別股之發行除了無助於股東權利之保護，亦可能阻礙資本市場之發展，因此，該等規範模式在現行法制度下是否合理，其背後之論理基礎是否充足，乃值得吾人進一步深究。 本文透過比較法之方式，援引美國立法例上公司法以及交易所對於股東平等原則之規範模式，做為評析我國現行通說與實務見解之參考，並且藉由現行法令的彙整以及論理的梳理，檢討現行通說下，股東平等原則的理論定位與其機能在學理與實務操作上之困難。釐清股東平等原則之定位後，邏輯上始能再進一步地確立特別股之法律性質，藉由突破股東平等原則在傳統上過於僵化之限制與重新定位，現行特別股制度在法令適用上的曖昧始能被正確評價，並且建立正確的規範模式。

When the financial commodity and financing approach have become diversified, the issue of preferred stocks, as one of those approaches, plays an important role to companies in issue proceeds. However, the designation of the rights and obligations covered by preferred stocks has been highly regulated by the existing legislation and legal practice in Taiwan. To the origin of the matter, the issue of preferred stocks with special rights may result in the unequivalence within the issued stocks in whole, which violates the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders. As the result, when it comes to the development of the new preferred stocks, the authority and court are more inclined to be conservative. Nonetheless, the diversity and innovation of preferred stocks, in fact, is not necessarily inconsistent with the nature of a well-formed investment market. In reality, restrictions to the new formulation of preferred stocks without strong reasons may not only be unconducive to protecting the rights of shareholders, but also, more likely, hinder the development of the capital market. Therefore, it does worth thinking about the rationality and theoretical foundation of the existing legislation. In order to review the foundation of the major theory of the existing legislation, this paper will first conduct a comparative analysis of legal regime in U.S. corporate law and the regulations promulgated by Stock Exchanges in U.S. regarding the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders. Moreover, this paper will indicate the theoretical and operational problems of the major theory by sorting, collecting, and reviewing the relevant regulations and judicial practice in Taiwan, and then, reprofile the nature of the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders based on such analysis. After all, the legal regime of the preferred stock can be confirmed logically only upon the correct understanding to the nature of the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders. Only by breaking through the fossilized registration of the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders and repositioning it can we establish the correct regulation framework of the preferred stock.