員工持股計劃的激勵效果與控制權保衛─以萬科為例

Abstract

本篇論文從代理理論的角度出發，在經營權與所有權分離的前提之下，剩餘索取權和控制權完全對應是不太可能的事，是故代理問題必然存在。因為經理人行動難以監督，也不能完全被契約規範，所以經理人必須有剩餘索取權以促使其努力工作，是故經理人的報酬應當與企業的經營績效連結，讓經理人應當承擔一定的風險。 本篇論文以個案分析的方式探討近年在中國企業間興盛的”事業合夥人制度'對公司治理兩大目的的影響：經營者的選擇問題和激勵問題。從萬科個案分析的結果觀察到事業合夥人制度針對激勵問題相對具有立即性的效果，然而，不同層級員工（ex:集團高管vs.項目公司主管）的反應可能不同，這可能源自於不同層級員工對企業貢獻和報酬的連結程度不一致。另一方面，從萬科個案分析的結果觀察到事業合夥人制度對於管理層捍衛控制權的效果可能需要更長的時間才能展現，因此管理層無法藉此在短時間內抵禦敵意併購。

This paper is based on agency theory. Under the premise of separation of ownership and control, it is unlikely that the residual claims and control rights are completely corresponding. Therefore, the agency problem exists inevitably. Because managers' actions are difficult to monitor and cannot be completely regulated by contracts, managers must have residual claims to encourage them to work hard. Hence, managers' compensation should be linked to the company's performance, so that managers should take certain level of risks. This paper explores the impact of the 'business partnership plan' prospered among Chinese companies in recent years on the two main dimension of corporate governance: the choice of managers and incentives effects. From the results of the Vanke case analysis, it is observed that the business partnership plan has a relatively immediate effect on the incentive effect. However, different hierarchy of employees (ex: group executives vs. project company directors) may react differently, which may be due to the inconsistent links betweeen corporate contributions and rewards among different hierarchy of employees. On the other hand, it is observed that the effect of the business partnership plan of Vanke on management's defense of control may take longer to present, so management cannot resist hostile takeover via business partnership plan in the short run.