請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/68894
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 顏厥安(Chueh-An Yen) | |
dc.contributor.author | Shih-Chiang Hung | en |
dc.contributor.author | 洪詩強 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T02:40:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-24 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-08-24 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-08-18 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 王贊榮(2013),《從法律規範性到法理學方法論》,臺北市:元照。 王鵬翔(2008),〈法律, 融貫性與權威〉,《政治與社會哲學評論》,24期,頁23-68。 王鵬翔(2008),〈規則是法律推理的排它性理由嗎?〉,收於:王鵬翔(編),《2008法律思想與社會變遷》,頁345-386,臺北市:中央研究院法律研究所籌備處。 王鵬翔(2012),〈獨立於內容的理由與法律的規範性〉,《中研院法學期刊》,11期,頁203-247。 王鵬翔(2014),〈接受的態度能夠證成法律的規範性嗎?——評莊世同〈法律的概念與法律規範性的來源——重省哈特的接受論證〉〉,《中研院法學期刊》,14期,頁387-405。 王鵬翔(2015),〈規則的規範性〉,收於:謝世民(編),《理由轉向:規範性之哲學研究》,頁325-356,臺北市:臺大出版中心。 王鵬翔(2018),〈法律的根據與法律義務的性質〉,《政治與社會哲學評論》,65期,頁89-152。 哈特(著),許家馨, 李冠宜 and 高忠義(譯)(2018),《法律的概念》,增訂三版,臺北市:商周出版。 莊世同(2000),〈Ronald Dworkin與柔性法實證主義〉,《月旦法學雜誌》,64期,頁54-69。 莊世同(2001),〈再訪Hart的承認規則〉,收於:林文雄教授六秩晉五華誕祝壽論文集編輯委員會(編),《當代基體法學理論:林文雄教授祝壽論文集》,頁73-109,台北:學林。 莊世同(2002),〈法律的規範性與法律的接受〉,《政治與社會哲學評論》,1期,頁43-84。 莊世同(2007),〈描述性法理論是可能的嗎?——一個批判性的反省〉,《政治與社會哲學評論》,21期,頁1-46。 莊世同(2013),〈法律的概念與法律規範性的來源——重省哈特的接受論證〉,《中研院法學期刊》,13期,頁1-36。 莊世同(2014),〈法律的規範性與法官的義務——對三篇評論文的回應〉,《中研院法學期刊》,14期,頁429-478。 莊世同(2015),〈法律的規範性與理由的給予〉,收於:謝世民(編),《理由轉向:規範性之哲學研究》,頁285-323,臺北市:臺大出版中心。 莊世同(2018),〈法律、道德與自然必然性:論哈特的自然法最低限度內容〉,《政治與社會哲學評論》,64期,頁1-47。 許家馨(2014),〈從「接受論證」到「深層內在觀點」——評莊世同〈法律的概念與法律規範性的來源——重省哈特的接受論證〉〉,《中研院法學期刊》,14期,頁375-386。 陳景輝(2014),〈哈特的接受論證與法律的規範性——對「莊世同/王鵬翔」之爭的評論〉,《中研院法學期刊》,14期,頁407-428。 顏厥安(2006),〈規範縫隙初探〉,收於:楊日然教授紀念論文集編輯委員會(編),《法律的分析與解釋-楊日然教授紀念論文集》,頁61-89,臺北市:元照。 顏厥安(2008),〈由規範縫隙到規範存有——初探法律論證中的實踐描述〉,收於:王鵬翔(編),《2008法律思想與社會變遷》,頁13-44,台北:中央研究院法律學研究所籌備處。 Alvarez, M. (2016, Apr. 24). Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2017. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/ Baker, D. (2018). Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter. In Shafer-Landau, R. (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Vol. 13, pp. 230-252). Bix, B. (2018). Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity. Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law/Revija za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava(34), 1-17. Broome, J. (2013). Rationality Through Reasoning. Wiley-Blackwell. Coleman, J. (2003). The Practice of Principle. Oxford University Press. Copp, D. (2007). Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity. In Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics (pp. 249-283). Cambridge University Press. Copp, D. (2007). The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason. In Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics (pp. 284-308). Cambridge University Press. Copp, D. (2019). Legal Teleology: A Naturalist Account of the Normativity of Law. In Toh, K., Plunkett, D. and Shapiro, S. (Eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (pp. 45-64). Oxford University Press. Dancy, J. (2002). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press. Darwall, S. (1983). Impartial Reason. Cornell University Press. Darwall, S. (2001). Normativity. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/normativity/ doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L135-1 Davidson, D. (2001). Essays on Actions and Events (2 ed.). Clarendon Press. Dreier, J. (2015). Another World. In Johnson, R. and Smith, M. (Eds.), Passions and Projections Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn (pp. 155-171). Oxford University Press. Dreier, J. (2015). Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question? In Björnsson, G., Björklund, F., Strandberg, C., Eriksson, J. and Francén Olinder, R. (Eds.), Motivational Internalism (pp. 167-181). Oxford University Press. Dworkin, R. (1978). Taking Rghts Seriously. Harvard University Press. Enoch, D. (2011). Reason-giving and the Law. In Green, L. and Leiter, B. (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Vol. 1, pp. 1-38). Oxford University Press. Enoch, D. (2019). Is General Jurisprudence Interesting? In Toh, K., Plunkett, D. and Shapiro, S. (Eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (pp. 65-86). Oxford University Press. Finlay, S. (2019). Defining Normativity. In Toh, K., Plunkett, D. and Shapiro, S. (Eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (pp. 187-219). Oxford University Press. Finlay, S. and Plunkett, D. (2018). Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory. In Gardner, J., Green, L. and Leiter, B. (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Vol. 3, pp. 49-86). Oxford University Press. Finlay, S. and Schroeder, M. (2008, Aug 18, 2017). Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2017 Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-internal-external/ Fogal, D. (2016). Reasons, Reason, and Context. In Lord, E. and Maguire, B. (Eds.), Weighing Reasons (pp. 74-103). Oxford University Press. Foot, P. (1972). Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. The Philosophical Review, 81(3), 305-316. Hart, H. L. A. (1958). Legal and Moral Obligation. In Melden, A. I. (Ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy (pp. 82-107). University of Washington Press. Hart, H. L. A. (1958). Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. Harvard Law Review, 71(4), 593-629. Hart, H. L. A. (1963). Law, Liberty and Morality. Oxford University Press. Hart, H. L. A. (1982). Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory. Oxford University Press. Hart, H. L. A. (2012). The Concept of Law (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. Hershovitz, S. (2014). The End of Jurisprudence. Yale Law Journal 124, 1160. Himma, K. E. (2018). The Problems of Legal Normativity and Legal Obligation. In Himma, K. E., Jovanovi, M. and Spai, B. (Eds.), Unpacking Normativity : Conceptual, Normative, and Descriptive Issues (1 ed., pp. 55-76). Hart Publishing. Joyce, R. (2001). The Myth of Morality. Cambridge University Press. Kant, I. (2016). Grundlegung Zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Felix Meiner. (Original work published 1785) Kolodny, N. (2005). Why Be Rational. Mind, 114(455), 509-563. Letsas, G. (2019). How to Argue for Law’s Full-Blooded Normativity. In Toh, K., Plunkett, D. and Shapiro, S. (Eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (pp. 165-185). Oxford University Press. MacCormick, N. (1987). Comment. In Gavison, R. (Ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of HLA Hart (pp. 81-104). Marmor, A. (2010). Philosophy of Law. Princeton University Press. McPherson, T. (2011). Against Quietist Normative Realism. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 154(2), 223-240. McPherson, T. (2018). Authoritatively Normative Concepts. In Shafer-Landau, R. (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Vol. 13, pp. 253-277). Oxford University Press. McPherson, T. (2018). Explaining Practical Normativity. Topoi, 37(4), 621-630. Olson, J. (2009). Reasons and the New Non-naturalism. In Robertson, S. (Ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press. Olson, J. (2014). Moral Error Theory : History, Critique, Defence. Oxford Oxford University Press. Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. Parfit, D. and Broome, J. (1997). Reasons and Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, 71, 99-146. Perry, S. R. (2001). Hart's Methodological Positivism. In Coleman, J. L. (Ed.), Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law (pp. 311-354). Oxford University Press. Plunkett, D. (2019). Robust Normativity, Morality and Legal Positivism. In Toh, K., Plunkett, D. and Shapiro, S. (Eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (pp. 105-136). Oxford University Press. Plunkett, D. and Shapiro, S. (2017). Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry. Ethics, 128(1), 37-68. doi:10.1086/692941 Pojman, L. P. and Fieser, J. (2012). Ethics : Discovering Right and Wrong (7 ed.). Wadsworth. Postema, G. J. (1982). Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law. The Journal of Legal Studies, 11(1), 165-203. Postema, G. J. (1987). The Normativity of Law. In Gavison, R. (Ed.), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of HLA Hart (pp. 81-104). Postema, G. J. (1998). Jurisprudence As Practical Philosophy. Legal Theory, 4, 329-357. Postema, G. J. (1998). Norms, Reasons, and Law. Current Legal Problems 51(1), 149-179. Raz, J. (1984). Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 4, 123-131. Raz, J. (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Clarendon Press. Raz, J. (1990). Practical Reason and Norms (2nd ed.). Princeton University Press. Raz, J. (1993). H.L.A. Hart (1907–1992). Utilitas, 5(2), 145-156. Raz, J. (1994). Authority, Law, and Morality. In Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics. Clarendon Press. Raz, J. (2000). Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford University Press. Raz, J. (2009). The Authority of Law : Essays on Law and Morality (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. Raz, J. (2009). Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. Raz, J. (2011). From Normativity to Responsibility. Oxford University Press. Robertson, S. (2009). Introduction: Normativity, Reasons, Rationality. In Robertson, S. (Ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity (pp. 1-28). Oxford University Press. Scanlon, T. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Schroeder, M. (2011). Ought, Agents, and Actions. The Philosophical Review, 120(1), 1-41. Smith, M. (1987). The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind, 96(381), 36-61. Tiffany, E. (2007). Deflationary Normative Pluralism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 37(sup1), 231-262. Toh, K. (2005). Hart's Expressivism and his Benthamite Project. Legal Theory, 11(2), 75-123. Wedgwood, R. (2018). The Unity of Normativity. In Star, D. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (pp. 23-45). Oxford University Press. Wodak, D. (2019). Mere Formalities: Fictional Normativity and Normative Authority. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49(6), 828-850. Woods, J. (2018). The Authority of Formality. In Shafer-Landau, R. (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Vol. 13, pp. 207-229). Oxford University Press. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/68894 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本文嘗試從莊世同2013年發表於《中研院法學期刊》的〈法律的概念與法律規範性的來源〉與王鵬翔〈接受的態度能夠證成法律的規範性嗎?〉對該文的評論出發,整理出兩文對於法律規範性問題之刻畫與哈特(H. L. A. Hart)之法律規範性觀點的三個初步共識:「蘊涵理由的法律規範性是法哲學上重要的問題」、「哈特採取蘊涵理由的規範性」與「權威法律理由是特別的規範理由」。 本文將透過比較英美分析法哲學中哈特、拉茲(Joseph Raz)、Gerald Postema與David Enoch等諸位法哲學家對於法律規範性問題之刻畫(第二章),並引入後設倫理學與後設規範研究中,不同學者對於直覺上不同層次規範性意義的區分與說明(第三章),嘗試對哈特法哲學提出一種形式法律規範性研究的理解。此外,本文且主張哈特晚年出版的《論邊沁文集》(Essays on Bentham),不構成其對於法律規範性看法的重要轉向(第四章)。最後,據此於結論主張法律的形式與強韌規範性都是法哲學上重要的問題。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Recently, legal philosophers in Taiwan start to write articles about “the problem of normativity of law” or normativity of law. Shih-Tung Chuang’s “The Concept of Law and the Sources of Legal Normativity: Hart’s Acceptance Argument Reconsidered” and Peng-Hsiang Wang’s “Can the Attitude of Acceptance Justify the Normativity of Law? : Comment on Shih-Tung Chuang’s The Concept of Law and the Sources of Legal Normativity: Hart’s Acceptance Argument Reconsidered” are the most illuminating two of them. However, there are no further discussions on these two articles since they were published.
Therefore, this thesis tries to exanimate the characterizations of the normativity of law and the interpretations of H.L.A. Hart’s conception of normativity of law in these two articles, and argue that there are three important consensuses in them. Firstly, they both agree that the reason-implying normativity of law are important issue of legal philosophy. Secondly, they also agree that H.L.A. Hart accepted the reason-implying normativity of law, at least in his “Essays on Bentham”. Thirdly, they are also the same of opinion, that “legal authoritative reasons” mentioned in “Essays on Bentham” and special kind of normative reasons. By comparing the works from several analytical legal philosophers like H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, Gerald Postema and David Enoch, and by introducing the literatures on different varieties of normativity in meta-ethics or meta-normative inquiry, this thesis interprets H.L.A. Hart’s legal philosophy as an inquiry concerning formal normativity of law, regardless in his earlier “The Concept of Law” or later “Essays on Bentham”, and claims that formal and robust normativity of law are both important issues of legal philosophy. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T02:40:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-1708202002570900.pdf: 3643267 bytes, checksum: 1680c89bbbfb6ebf443e7a000f85407a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 前言 1 第二節 出發點——國內關於哈特、接受與法律規範性的論爭 8 第一項 論爭的背景:2012年以前的法律規範性相關文獻 8 第二項 莊世同〈法律的概念與法律規範性的來源〉 12 第三項 王鵬翔〈接受的態度能夠證成法律的規範性嗎〉 14 第三節 爭論中關於法律規範性的共識 19 第一項 共識一:蘊涵理由的法律規範性是法哲學上重要的問題 19 第二項 共識二:哈特採取蘊涵理由的規範性 21 第三項 共識三:「權威法律理由」是特別的規範理由 23 第四節 支持共識的三種理由 28 第一項 法律的實踐規範本質 29 第二項 哈特法哲學的核心問題為法律規範性 35 第三項 哈特的法律規範性相當於法律一般所具備的實踐規範性 37 第二章 法哲學家對法律規範性的探究 41 第一節 法律論述中的規範性語詞與概念使用 41 第二節 法律的行為指引功能(一):被共同接受的行為標準 43 第三節 法律的行為指引功能(二):對社會規則理論的不滿 48 第一項 德沃金論規範規則與社會規則之不同 48 第二項 拉茲論規則陳述的規範性格 55 第四節 法律的行為指引功能(三):對實踐審思具重要性之行為標準 60 第一項 拉茲論理由、法律觀點與法律的超然規範陳述 60 第二項 Gerald Postema論法律的規範性與實踐哲學的邏輯觀點 80 第三項 David Enoch論法律的給予理由特徵 86 第五節 小結 90 第三章 不同層次的規範性與後設倫理學家對其之說明 93 第一節 直覺上不同層次的規範 93 第二節 疊加模式 100 第一項 形式與強韌的規範性 100 第二項 泛稱、動機與權威的規範性 103 第三項 Derek Parfit的規範性概念觀作為疊加模式的詮釋與其盲點 106 第四項 疊加模式中的額外要素 110 第五項 疊加模式的優勢與挑戰 112 第三節 派生模式 114 第一項 真正與擬似的規範性 115 第二項 真正與虛構的規範性 118 第三項 真正與派生規範性刻畫的缺陷 120 第四節 擬似與形式規範性的取消論——單一的真正規範性 122 第一項 論點一:強韌規範性不以形式規範性作為條件 124 第二項 論點二:形式規範性的普遍性 126 第三項 論點三:形式規範性的問題不是開放性問題 127 第四項 論點四:承認形式意義規範性在存有論上的不簡約 128 第五項 論點五:形式意義規範性不具「規範重要性」 129 第五節 強韌或真正規範性的懷疑論 132 第一項 規範多元論:規範統一性的懷疑論 133 第二項 從多元論到緊縮論:強韌或真正規範性的懷疑論 137 第三項 懷疑論的代價 141 第六節 小結 142 第四章 不同意義的法律規範性:以《法律的概念》及《論邊沁文集》為例 145 第一節 一般法理論作為不同意義的後設法律規範研究 145 第二節 《法律的概念》作為法律形式規範性之研究 146 第一項 法律與遊戲:社會規則的內在面向 148 第二項 法律與社會道德:奠基於社會壓力的義務說明 151 第三項 批判道德:對社會安排批判與證成的理性一般原則 154 第四項 自然法的最低內容:條件下的強韌規範性 157 第五項 法律與道德概念上的必然關連 161 第六項 反駁《法律的概念》詮釋為法律強韌規範性研究之看法 174 第三節 《論邊沁文集》作為法律強韌規範性研究的轉向? 185 第一項 法律陳述的規範性作為邊沁法理論的缺陷 186 第二項 對於道德接受命題的批判與哈特的「非認知」法律義務理論 188 第三項 權威法律理由與法律的規範性 195 第四項 《論邊沁文集》仍作為法律形式規範的研究 215 第四節 小結 216 第五章 結論 219 第一節 權威法律理由是形式規範理由,接受理由是動機理由 219 第二節 哈特採取形式意義的法律規範性 220 第三節 法律的形式與強韌規範性都是法哲學上重要的問題 221 參考文獻 225 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 法律規範性的不同意義——以哈特的法哲學作為考察對象
| zh_TW |
dc.title | The Varieties of Normativity of Law and H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Philosophy | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 莊世同(Shih-Tung Chuang),王鵬翔(Peng-Hsiang Wang),陳弘儒(Hung-Ju Chen) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 法律規範性,形式與強韌規範性,哈特,規範理由,權威法律理由, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | normativity of law,robust and formal normativity,H.L.A. Hart,normative reasons,authoritative legal reason, | en |
dc.relation.page | 230 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202003662 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-08-19 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
U0001-1708202002570900.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 3.56 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。