臺灣應對中國崛起之避險戰略選擇（1988-2016）

Abstract

中國崛起除了帶來龐大的經濟利誘外，中國的軍武實力也隨之提升，對於面臨中國主權要求的臺灣，對中國之戰略選擇便處於安全威脅抑制與經濟利得汲取兩者之間的拉扯上。也因此，過往單純的「抗衡」與「扈從」應難以作為臺灣應對崛起中國的戰略選擇說明，混合戰略的使用應更為貼切於臺灣之戰略選擇。因此，本文透過「避險」理論的援用，分析臺灣於1988年至2016年三位總統任期間之對中戰略選擇，並探討其形成、成效與限制。 而鑒於兩岸關係的特殊性與比較之便利性，本文對過往之避險理論進行避險行為定義之修正，並納入兩岸政治定位與政治承諾討論，最後亦予以避險戰略指數化。另外，本文亦建立一套臺灣對中國避險戰略之短期成效指標，檢視臺灣在軍事安全、經貿投資與政治外交等三面向之回饋。透過修正後之避險理論框架與新建之成效指標，配合既有兩岸關係研究之文獻討論，本文對李登輝、陳水扁與馬英九三位總統之對中國戰略進行個別之探討，並最後予以比較。 本文認為，從三位總統任期中臺灣對中國避險戰略選擇的影響變項討論與比較觀察可發現，結構因素已決定臺灣必須採取避險之混合戰略。然而，細部操作取決於國內與領導人個人層次之因素，如政治權力鞏固程度、任期、領導人個人意志、選舉因素與身分認同等。此外，中國對臺灣採取戰略之反應與回饋，亦影響後續臺灣避險戰略的選擇。而在避險戰略與成效的比較上則顯示，避險戰略越傾向接受中國者，所獲得之短期成效越佳，此可能係反映臺灣對中國政治承諾在短期成效追求目標中之重要性。最後，從相關成效與回饋之檢視顯示，臺灣之避險選擇亦面臨中國對「一個中國」之堅持、美國與臺灣國內選民的相關限制，而此大體框限了臺灣對中國之避險選擇空間。

In addition to the huge economic interest brought by the rise of China, its military strength has also been rising. As Taiwan facing the demand for sovereignty, Taiwan’s strategy toward China is swinging in between security interests and economic gain. Therefore, the previous concept of pure 'balancing” and pure “bandwagoning” should not clearly explain the situation, instead the “mixed strategy” should be more appropriate to illustrate Taiwan's strategic choices. Hence, by using the theory of 'hedging', the paper analyzes the strategic choice of Taiwan during the three presidential periods from 1988 to 2016, and discusses its formation, effectiveness and limitations. In the light of the special nature of the Cross-Strait relations and the convenience for comparison, the paper amends the definition of hedging behaviors in the past hedging theory, and includes the discussion of the political status and political commitment. In addition, the paper also establishes a set of indicators of short-term effectiveness of Taiwan's hedging strategy toward China, which examines the feedback in three aspects, including military security, economic and trade investment, and politics and diplomacy. Through the revised framework of hedging theory and the newly established indicators, in line with the existing literature on Cross-Strait relations, the paper discusses the strategy toward China on individual president, Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, and makes a comparison at the end of the discussion. After the discussion and comparison of variables of Taiwan's choice on hedging strategies during the three presidential tenures, the paper argues that the structural factors have determined the adoption of hedging strategy. Yet the detailed operation still depends on factors of domestic and personal level, such as the consolidation of political power, tenure, personal will of the leaders, election factors and identity. In addition, China's response and feedback also affects the following choices of Taiwan's hedging strategy. Besides, the comparison between the hedging strategy and the effectiveness shows that the more hedging strategy favors China, the better the short-term result will be. This may reflect the importance of Taiwan's political commitment on pursuing short-term results. Finally, the review of relevant performance and feedback shows that Taiwan's hedging choice also faces China's insistence on 'one China' and restrictions from the United States and voters in Taiwan, which generally limits Taiwan's hedging space toward China.