請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件：
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/6799完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 彭孟堯(Meng-Yao Peng),王文方(Wen-Fang Wang) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chia-Hao Hsieh | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 謝嘉豪 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-05-17T09:18:22Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2012-07-19 | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-05-17T09:18:22Z | - |
| dc.date.copyright | 2012-07-19 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012-07-17 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barnes, J. 1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (ed.), Vol. I & II, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Boolos, G. 1984. “To Be Is To Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables),” reprinted in Boolos, 1998, 54-72. --------. 1985. “Nominalist Platonism,” reprinted in Boolos, 1998, 73-87. --------. 1998. Logic, Logic, and Logic, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Casati, R. and Varzi, A. 1999. Parts and Places: The Structures of Spatial Representation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chisholm, R. M. 1976. Person and Object, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Reprinted in 2002, London: Routledge. Dorr, C. 2005. “What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology,” in Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press: 234-286. Fine, K. 1982. “Acts, Events and Things”, in Language and Ontology, Proceedings of the Sixth International Wittgenstein Symposium: 97-105. --------. 1992. “Aristotle on Matter”, Mind, Vol:101, 35-57. --------. 1994a. “A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form”, in Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ed. T. Scaltsas, D. Charles and M. L. Gill, Oxford, Clarendon Press: 13-40. --------. 1994b. “Compounds and Aggregates”, Nous, Vol:28, No. 2: 137-158. --------. 1995. “The Problem of Mixture”, published in revised form in Form, Matter, and Mixture in Aristotle, ed. Frank Lewis and Robert Bolton, Oxford, Blackwell (1997): 266-369. --------. 1998. “Mixing Matters”, reprinted in Oderberg (ed.), Form and Matter: Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics, 1999: 65-75. --------. 1999. “Things and Their Parts”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 23: 61-74. --------. 2003. “The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter”, Mind, Vol. 112: 195-234. --------. 2007. “Response to Kathrin Koslicki,” Dialetica, Vol. 61, No. 1: 161-166. --------. 2010. “Towards A Theory of Part,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 107, No. 11: 559-589. Goodman, N. 1977. The Structure of Appearance, 3rd ed. (With an Introduction by G. Hellman), Dordrecht: Reidel. Original Published in Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951. Hestevolt, H. S. 1981. “Coinjoining,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 41, No. 3: 371-385. Hoffman J. and Rosenkrantz G. S. 1997. Substance: Its Nature and Existence, New York: Routledge. --------. 1998. “On the Unity of Compound Things: Living and Non-living,” reprinted in Oderberg (ed.), Form and Matter: Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics, 1999: 76-102. Horgan T. 1993, “On What There Isn’t,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No.3: 693-700. Hossack, K. 2000. “Plurals and Complexes,” British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 51: 411-443. Hudson, H. 2001. A Materialist Conception of the Human Person, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press. Koslicki, K. 2007. “Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Mereology,” Dialectica, Vol. 61, No.1: 127-159. --------. 2008. The Structure of Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Leonard H. S. and Goodman N. 1940. “The Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 5, No. 2: 45-55. Leśniewski, S. 1916. “Foundations of the General Theory of Sets. I,” Eng. trans. by D. I. Barnett: in Collected Works, S. J. Surma, J. Srzednicki, D. I. Barnett, and F. V. Rickey (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992, Vol. 1: 129-173. Lewis, D. 1986, On the Plurity of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. --------. 1991. Parts of Classes, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Markosian, N. 1998a. “Brutal Composition,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 92: 211-49. --------. 1998b. “Simples,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 76: 213-28. --------. 2008. “Restricted Composition,” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Sider, Hawthorne and Zimmerman 2008, 341-363. Merricks, T. 2001. Objects and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moschovakis, T. 2006. Notes on Set Theory, 2nd ed. New York: Springer. Oderberg, D. S. 1999. Form and Matter: Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell Publisher. Olson E. T. 2007. What Are We?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rea, M. C. 1995. “The Problem of Material Constitution,” The Philosophical Reviews, Vol. 104, No. 4: 525-552. --------. 1997. Material Constitution: A Reader (ed.), Lanham, Maryland: Roman & Littlefield Publishers. --------. 1998. “In Defense of Mereological Universalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 2: 347-360 --------. 1999. “McGrath on Universalism,” Analysis, Vol. 59, No. 3: 200-203. Rescher, N. 1955. “Axioms for the Parts Relation,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1: 8-11. Rosen G. and Dorr C. 2002, “Composition as a Fiction,” in The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, edited by Richard M. Gale, 2002, Oxford: Blackwell Publisher: 151-174. Rosenberg, J. 1993. “Comments in Peter van Inwagen’s Material Beings,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No. 3: 701-708. Schaffer, J. 2007. “Form Nihilism to Monism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 2: 175-191. Sider, T., Hawthorne, J. and Zimmerman D. W. (eds.) 2008. Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Sider, T. 1993. “Van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk,” Analysis, Vol. 53, No. 4: 285-289. --------.1997. “Four-Dimensionalism,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 106, No. 2: 197-231. --------. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press. --------. 2003. “Against Vague Existence,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 114, No. 1/2: 135-146. --------. 2007. “Parthood,” Philosophical Review, Vol. 116, No. 1: 51-91. Simons, P. 1987. Parts: A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Clarend Press. Thomasson, A L. 2007. Ordinary Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thomson, J. J. 1983. “Parthood and Identity Across Time,” reprinted in Rea (ed.), Material Constitution: A Reader, 1997: 25-43. Unger, P. 1979a. “I Do Not Exist,” reprinted in Rea (ed.) Material Constitution: A Reader, 1997: 175-190. --------. 1979b. “There Are No Ordinary Things”, Synthese, 41: 117–154. --------. 1979c. “Why There Are No People,” Midwest Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 4: 177-222. P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein. (eds.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. --------. 1980a. “Skepticism and Nihilism,” Nous, Vol. 14: 517-545. Uzquiano, G. 2004. “Plurals and Simples,” The Monist, Vol. 87, No. 3: 429-451. Van Cleve, J. 1986, “Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 11: 141-156. P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. --------. 2008. “The Moon and Sixpence: A Defense of Mereological Universalism,” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Sider, Hawthorne and Zimmerman 2008, 321-340. Van Inwagen, P. 1990. Material Beings, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. --------. 1994. “Composition as Identity,” reprinted in Van Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in metaphysics, 2001: 95-110. --------. 2001. Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yi, B-U. 1999. “Is Mereology Ontological Innocent?,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 93, No. 2: 141-160. Zimmerman, D. 1996. “Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts? An Argument for ‘Atomless Gunk’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 56, No. 1: 1-29. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/6799 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 一般而言，我們會認為大部分存在於這個世界中的事物都是由其部分所組成的，但是這些「組合」需不需要滿足一些組合的條件呢？這便是所謂的「特殊組合的問題」：亦即，到底在什麼樣的充分與必要條件之下，一群個物可以組合而成一個個物？
本文的前三章將分別討論限制式的、虛無式的以及總體論式的組合理論，儘管這幾條進路都可以為特殊組合的問題帶來不同的回答，並提供它們各自的理由，但是它們也都似乎得面對各自的困難。為了對特殊組合的問題做出恰當的回答，我認為范恩在一系列的文章中提供了更具說服力的看法。范恩企圖去論證，當我們面對組合這樣的問題時，應該要考慮個物之間所具有的「結構」，而不是單單用傳統的部分整體學去分析個物之間的組合關係。我將在最後一章論證這個─我稱為結構論─的觀點，並認為范恩的看法能夠提供一個對特殊組合的問題更好的回答，而「結構」正是我們對個物作分析時不可或缺的要素之一。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | There are a number of material objects in our ordinary life, and most of them composed by their parts. But, is there any condition to be satisfied for the composition of material objects? This is so-called Special Composition Question (SCQ): What are the sufficient and necessary conditions for any xs out of which an object is composed?
I introduce Restricted Composition, Nihilism and Universalism. Although each of these theories has its own answer to SCQ, and also offers some convincing reasons to support its own account, but they all face some serious problems. Hence, I reject these theories. And I find that the series of works by Kit Fine provides more plausible approach to SCQ. Fine suggests that we pay more attention to the aspect of structure of material objects, and I call this account Structuralism. I defend this account in the last chapter and conclude that a theory of composition is acceptable, only when it can well explain the nature of structural composition. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-05-17T09:18:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R98124015-1.pdf: 1586190 bytes, checksum: c80b3d0529d29c98fbdcc02a73f3392d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 III
ABSTRACT V 導論 1 第一章 限制的組合理論 9 1.1 接觸理論 10 1.2 扣緊理論 12 1.3 序列理論 17 1.4 多重要素理論 23 1.5 VAN INWAGEN的生機論 26 1.6 HOFFMAN與ROSENKRANTZ對生機論的批評 33 第二章 虛無論式的組合理論 37 2.1 日常個物存在嗎？ 38 2.2 對直覺的保存─改寫策略 40 2.3 對常識的挑戰 45 2.4 UNGER的堆垛論證 47 2.5 失效的改寫 52 2.6 GUNKY WORLDS 57 第三章 總體論式的組合理論 60 3.1 膨脹的本體論？─無害的認肯 61 3.2 部分整體學 64 3.3 時態化的部分整體學 78 3.4 總體論的幾個論旨 84 3.5 LEWIS－SIDER的模糊論證 89 3.6 總體論在組合方面的困難 96 第四章 結構論式的組合理論 103 4.1 結構論的基本主張 104 4.2 來自FINE的挑戰 106 4.3 FINE的具現理論 113 4.4對結構論之辯護與回應 129 結論 140 參考書目 146 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.title | 從結構式組合理論看整體─部分關係 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Structural Composition Theory on Parthood | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 王志輝(Zhi-Hue Wang) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 組合,整體－部分關係,部分整體學,生機論,虛無論,總體論,結構論,形質論,范恩, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | composition,parthood,mereology,organicism,nihilism,universalism,structuralism,hylomorphism,Fine, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 150 | |
| dc.rights.note | 同意授權(全球公開) | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2012-07-17 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 文學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 哲學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 哲學系 | |
文件中的檔案：
| 檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ntu-101-1.pdf | 1.55 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
系統中的文件，除了特別指名其著作權條款之外，均受到著作權保護，並且保留所有的權利。