冷戰造就發展型國家：台灣與韓國全民儲蓄運動下信用動員與分配(1961-1978)

Abstract

本文從台灣與韓國同時發起全民儲蓄運動的經驗作為切入點，整合Tilly的命題（戰爭造就國家）與發展型國家理論來解釋冷戰造就發展型國家的過程。Tilly命題著重於戰爭使得國家加強資源動員能力的過程，卻很少討論後續的資源分配面向。反之，發展型國家重視國家以信用分配執行產業政策的面向，卻將信用動員視為給定的條件。為了更完整解釋從戰爭到產業政策效果的發展型國家形成過程，本文追問：冷戰局勢的變化下，國家主導的信用動員與分配，如何造成發展型國家之間的異同？ 本文發現，冷戰在台韓造就了發展型國家，冷戰對兩國的不同衝擊也造成這兩個發展型國家理論經典個案之間的内部差異。1960至70年代，在國際冷戰局勢的變化下，美國對東亞的經濟與軍事等資源部署減少，引發台韓政府資源不足與國家安全危機，進而刺激兩國政府加强國内信用動員與分配能力，推行全民儲蓄運動動員家庭儲蓄。兩國政府利用戰時的金融控制模式，將家庭部門的儲蓄存款集中分配到產業部門來推行產業結構轉型，這導致了在台韓同步形成發展型國家。 然而，本文亦指出，由於台韓政府面對不同的危機，導致兩國形成不同的發展型國家。對朴正熙政府而言，美援減少與尼克森主義的外部衝擊，造成嚴重的資源不足與軍事戰危機。因此，朴正熙政府垂直整合官民機構與儲蓄機構能力，廣泛使用强制手段來動員家庭部門的定存，把它集中分配給民間財閥，以推行國防工業建設與重化工業出口導向政策。反觀國民黨政府，以國内資源取代美援的過程相對順利，但尼克森主義引發了外交戰的挫折與其内部統治正當性危機。在此情況下，國民黨政府將社會穩定視為最重要政策目標，維持官民機構與儲蓄機構之間水平分工模式、以經濟誘因與强制教育來動員活存，並將信用優先分配給公營企業，以推行十大建設與第二階段進口替代政策。 根據經驗發現，本研究對Tilly命題與發展型國家理論提出三個重要補充。首先，本文細緻化了冷戰對發展型國家形成的影響之相關討論。其次，本文整合信用動員與分配過程，更完整分析形成發展型國家的過程。最後，本研究帶回在東亞經濟奇跡的故事中被遺忘的家庭部門的角色，立體化Tilly的命題與發展型國家理論的國家與社會關係。

Building on Charles Tilly’s state formation theory, this thesis explains how the Cold War led to the creation of national savings movements in Taiwan and South Korea, and their developmental effects in both states. Although Tilly described in detail how wars strengthened the capacities of nation-states to mobilize resources, he paid little attention to resource allocation. Despite highlighting the importance of credit allocation as an industrial policy tool, developmental state theorists have tended to take credit mobilization for granted. To bridge these gaps, this thesis uses state-led credit mobilization and allocation practices to examine differences in developmental states due to Cold War factors. With declines in American economic and military aid in the 1960s and 1970s, both Taiwan and South Korea confronted credit and national security crises. In response, the two governments enhanced their capacities to mobilize and allocate credit by implementing national movements that relied on household savings to support industrial transformation policies. However, the two countries suffered separate crises in shaping their respective developmental states. The combination of sharply reduced US aid and the Nixon doctrine triggered credit and military crises in South Korea that resulted in vertically integrated public, private, and savings institutions. The government forced South Korean households to participate in a long-term savings program that supported chaebols created to manufacture arms and to create export-oriented heavy and chemical industries. In contrast, the Taiwanese government successfully replaced US aid with domestic resources, but the Nixon doctrine resulted in a diplomatic crisis that threatened internal legitimacy. In response, the government proclaimed social stability as its top priority and restricted its capacity to mobilize credit, focusing instead on educational activities and economic incentives to promote short-term savings, and channeling the resulting credit to complete major infrastructure projects controlled by state-owned companies. This thesis makes three contributions to the literatures on state formation and developmental state theory: it broadens our knowledge of how the Cold War led to the creation of developmental states, provides a more comprehensive understanding of the strong connection between credit mobilization and allocation during the developmental-state building process, and extends existing analyses of state-society relations by reinserting the family unit into the story of the East Asian economic miracle.