權利與承認：論Honneth 承認理論中的權利

Abstract

法權與社會解放的關係自十九世紀以來即已不斷被討論，二十世紀後半批判法學對民主法治國中法律動員的解放潛能也有諸多質疑。本文嘗試由批判理論的脈絡理解此一問題，並認為法權與社會解放的關係乃是現代自由內部「自我決定」與「自我實現」之間的緊張關係。 在批判理論內部，哈伯瑪斯的溝通理論試圖透過融主體自我決定的言說程序處理社會解放問題，因而造成自我實現於解放理論中的邊緣化。相對於哈伯瑪斯，Menke的悲劇理論則主張自我實現的規範邏輯與法權自主相異，而無法相容。 本文嘗試由Honneth的承認理論出發，探討自我決定與自我實現之間的調和是否可能。儘管相較於Taylor，Honneth的承認理論一方面掌握了主體形成的對話性，另一方面也正確的理解了法權的批判潛能及其在現代承認原則中的優先性。但在《爭取承認的抗爭》與其他早期文獻中，將法權理解為參與民主意志形成之資格並未成功的說明法權如何能夠與愛、團結共存而不致於破壞其他承認領域的自主性。 在晚近的著作中，藉由引入黑格爾法哲學綱要的架構，Honneth才將具體的承認領域理解為自由實現之場域，也就是自我實現。相對於此主觀的法權自由與道德自由作為自我決定僅是自由的可能性。據此，Honneth的社會理論反對康德哲學的自我決定優先命題，而認為倫理性或自我實現才是自由的真實性。然而，法權並未因此失去其在倫理性社會理論中的重要性，而是作為現代倫理性的必要條件而存在。自我決定與自我實現的衝突僅是社會病理，而得以透過社會自由來解決。 在此一理論中，主觀法權並非自由或正義的全貌，而僅是一種暫時保護機制。即使在社會自由中，法治國或公共領域也僅是正義理論的一環，缺乏對個人關係、市場經濟的分析的正義理論仍不完全。更重要的是，在政府體制與法典以外，透過爭取承認的抗爭累積而來的承認文化才是自由得以實現的土壤，但這不意味著法律或法學無用，相反地欲達成社會解放，則需要以批判介入為目的的法學。

The relation between legal rights and social emanicipation has long been discussed since 19th century, and the emanicipatory potential of legal mobilization was also doubted by Critical Legal Studies in late 20th century. This thesis analyses the issue from a viewpoint of Critical Theory, and argues the relation between legal rights and social emanicipation can be understood as the tension between self-determination and self-realization. Inside Crtitical Theory tradition , Habermas’ theory of communicative action tries to formulate social emanicipation in terms of discursive procedure of intersubjective self-determination; nevertheless, this tendency would marginalize the concept of self-realization in a theory of emanicipation. Contrary to Habermas, Christoph Menke’s tragic theory argues that the normative logic of self-realization differs from that of legal autonomy, and cannot be fully compatiable with the latter. This thesis would like to analyse this issue with Axel Honneth’s recognition theory. Although, compared with Charles Taylor, Honneth holds the idea of dialogical character of subject-formation, and meanwhile correctly understand the critical potential of rights and its primacy over other recognitive spheres, in “the struggle for recognition” and articles in 1990s, rights as recognition to participate in democratic will-formation cannot successfully explain how rights are compatiable with other recognitve spheres like love and solidarity and would not threaten their autonomy. In recent works, Honneth uses the scheme of Hegel’s the Philosophy of Right to argue that concrete recongnitive spheres are the fields that the freedom be realized, or the field of self-realization. On the contrary, rights and moral freedom as self-determination are only the possibility of freedom. Therefore, Honneth’s social theory is against Kant’s thesis of primacy of self-determination, and holds that ethical life or self-realization is the actuality of freedom. Legal rights don’t lose its importance in such kind of ethical social theory, because they are regarded as the necessary condition of the modern ethical life. The collision between self-determination and self-realization is therefore only a social pathology which can be cured with social freedom. In this theory, rights are not the whole picture of the theory of freedom or justice, but only its temporal protection. Even in social freedom, Rectsstaat and public sphere are only one moment of justice, a theory of justice cannot be complete without analysis of personal relationships and market economy. The most important is, that besides the government and the law itself, the recognitive culture accumulated through struggles for recognition is the real environment for realization of freedom. But this does’nt mean that legal rights and jurisprudence are useless; in order to reach social emanicipation, we need a jurisprudence for critical intervention.