心安即理得？論法律規範性的理由與守法動機

Abstract

國內對於法律規範性此一主題的討論，大多受哈特與拉茲兩位法理學家的影響，且未能將行動理論放入討論中；未說明人們從事法律行動時所具有的規範性動機與規範性理由之間的關係。本文首先爬梳了此二位法理學家的理論，在其中，拉茲的行動理論補充了上述現象。但本文認為拉茲的理論在說明人們的規範性行動時有所不足，且似乎無法透過拉茲理論的內部資源予以回應。 藉此，本文轉向尋求道德心理學的若干研究，透過這些研究我們更能理解人們如何從事道德判斷與道德行動，理解了人們是以直覺先行的方式做出判斷；而米爾格蘭的服從權威實驗，則指出了人們對於權威的傾向。接著，本文回頭對於法律進行分析，指出法律的意圖融貫性與全面性之條件，有利於人們傾向於法律的權威。 而在進一步討論理由與動機的關係之前，本文處理了幾個援引道德心理學所可能引發的理論爭議。最後，本文討論了規範性動機與規範性理由之間的幾種可能關係。自然主義法理學者Brian Leiter認為，僅具有規範性動機而無規範性理由；而哲學家Bernard Williams則認為規範性理由的必要條件之一就是行動者的動機。本文認為這兩種看待方式都有所偏頗，傾向以更為動態的方式理解兩者的關係。本文認為，規範性動機不能等同於規範性理由，但卻是人們尋找規範性理由的前提；就此而言，規範性動機與規範性理由的斷裂，其實顯示了規範性問題作為一縫隙問題，即所謂的規範縫隙（normative gap）。

Discussions about the normativity of law in Taiwan usually focus on H.L.A.Hart’s / Joseph Raz’s legal theories but fail to emphasize the theory of action. The initial objective of this thesis is to review two influential legal philosophers’ theories, in particular Joseph Raz’s action theory. Considering Raz’s action theory, I think that it cannot fully explain people’s normative actions and their underlying grounds and leaves remaining questions. To answer these questions, we have to turn to the studies of the moral psychology. These studies show how people make moral judgments and take moral actions based on their moral intuitions. In a classic experiment on obedience, Milgram pointed out that people have less difficulty in obeying the authority intentionally than they imagined before accepting the experiment. Beginning from these psychological studies, this thesis then tackles the conditions shaping people’s obedience and demonstrates that the coherent intension of legal authority’s claim and the comprehensiveness of law are two important conditions altering people’s normative motivation. Before discussing the relationship between reasons and motivation, this thesis further deals with several theoretical disputes between moral psychology and normativity of law. In the final chapter, this thesis presents and criticizes various theories concerning the relationship between normative reason and normative motivation. For instance, Brian Leiter, a naturalist legal philosopher, claims the non-exist of the normative reason and proposes that there are only normative motives. In contrast, Bernard Williams insists that the motivations are the necessary conditions constituting the normative reason. This thesis indicates that both approaches are biased and turn to depict the relationship between normative reason and normative motivation in a more dynamic way. Normative motives can’t be equated with normative reasons, but they serve as the prerequisite for people in search for normative reasons. In conclusion, the gap between normative motives and normative reason reveals the normative problem as a gap problem, or “normative gap”.