金控主體與盈餘管理行為之關聯性

Abstract

本研究藉由分析國內金控之主體究係偏屬銀行或保險，探討其對子公司透過備供出售金融資產進行盈餘管理之影響。我國於2001年通過「金融控股公司法」後，銀行或保險公司紛紛轉型成金控公司。其發展歷程以及主要高層之背景出身，形塑出金控下子公司不同之風貌。對於金控下子公司而言，金控之專業程度及管理面向存在差異，或會連帶影響子公司進行盈餘管理之動機與自由度。 本研究以資產比重、董監事組成，做為判別金控主體之依據。將備供出售金融資產當期所實現損益作為應變數，進行多元迴歸分析。同時探討金控下子公司是否因其他子公司營運不佳，而以票券買賣損益之方式拉高整體金控之獲利。 研究結果顯示，當銀行占金控比重越高，銀行盈餘管理之程度會降低。推測因金控對銀行瞭解程度高，且金控在乎銀行獲利之組成項及變化，而非僅重視盈餘最後財務報表上之呈現，上述理由使得銀行進行盈餘管理之誘因降低。而實證結果並無出現預期中，銀行或保險公司會基於金控整體獲利，以票券買賣損益協助其他獲利不佳子公司之情事。反而發現保險公司之備供出售金融資產已實現損益與銀行獲利呈同向變動。以金控董監事組成劃分金控主體之測試研究發現若金控董事長目前兼任與所屬銀行相關之職務、或過半之金控非獨立董事皆兼職銀行相關之職務，則對銀行之盈餘管理亦有削弱之作用。

This study aims to examine the impact on subsidiary’s earning management through financial assets in available-for-sale by analyzing whether the financial holding companies mainly consist of banks or insurance companies. After “Financial Holding Company Act” was passed in 2001 in Taiwan, banks and insurance companies turned into financial holding companies. The development of financial holding companies and the background of their executive leaders form their subsidiaries in different ways. For the subsidiaries, the differences of the abundance of professional knowledge and management aspects between financial holding companies may affect subsidiaries’ motivation and freedom on earning management. This paper chooses proportion of asset, the composition of directors and supervisors, as ways to identify the main body of the financial holding companies. Using realized gain or loss on financial instruments in available-for-sale as the dependent variable, to run multiple regressions. At the meantime, this paper studies whether the subsidiary uses available-for-sale securities to raise the income of the financial holding company based on poor performance on other subsidiaries in the same financial holding company. The regression results show that the higher the proportion of banking in financial holding companies is, the lower the degree of earning management of the bank is. The reasons are that the financial holding company is highly familiar with the banking system, and examines bank’s earning composition as well as abnormal trends instead of the final figures on the income statement. These reasons above lower the incentives of earning management for banks. Different from the hypothesis, the empirical result does not prove that banks or insurance companies help other subsidiary with unsatisfactory performance in the same financial holding company. When using the composition of directors and supervisors of financial holding companies to differentiate its main body, results show that if the chairman of the financial holding company works in bank-related jobs, or more than half of the directors work in bank-related jobs, the degree of earning management of banking will be weakened.