土地增值稅調降政策對地方財政之中期影響─兼論我國中央與地方之財政關係

Abstract

本文透過分析我國五都改制前2直轄市以及21縣（市）之資料，推估土增稅率調降（民國94年）後，各地方政府財政之稅收損失及可能之補助協助收入增加額，並與財政部實際補助金額做比較。研究結果發現，民國94-98年間，各地方政府因土增稅稅率調降政策所承受之年均損失在1.5與109億之間，平均約為19.7億元，但每年實際上獲得的財政部平均補助金額卻僅有1800萬元。因此，本文認為中央政府制定財政政策之規劃與評估時，實應考慮其對地方財政之中、長期影響，而非僅考慮短期稅收。 此外，地方政府在承受巨額的稅收損失、導致自籌財源流失時，也無積極之作為，針對此項優惠措施向中央要求補償，而是寄望從補助款或統籌分配稅款中獲得更大的分配額，顯示在中央的高壓管制與補助政策之下，地方政府無法擺脫對中央財政之依賴，故個別無財源強制性責任的影響並不被重視，每年所獲得之補助款以及中央統籌分配款之多寡，才是地方財政之命脈，充分驗證了蔡吉源、林健次（2005）所指出的「中央集權、地方依賴」之財政結構。

This study tries to estimate the medium-term (2005-2009) impact of land value increment tax cut on local government finance through the analysis of local governmental fiscal data in Taiwan. In turn, this study will compare the estimated loss of tax revenue, estimated gain of aid-assistance revenues with the actual subsidies from Ministry of Finance in 2 municipalities and 21 counties. The results showed that, from 2005 to 2009, due to the land value increment tax cut policy, the yearly average loss of tax revenues suffered by local governments range from 0.15 to 10.9 billion, and the average loss of all local governments was 1.9 billion per year. However, the subsidies from Ministry of Finance were merely 18 million in average per year. Therefore, this study argued that central government should consider more than its short-term impact but also its medium-term and long-term impact on local governments’ finance while it comes to fiscal policy formulation. On the other hand, while suffering the great loss of tax revenues and self-fundraising resources, local governments had done nothing such as requesting central government for compensation, instead, they asked for a bigger quota of tax for aid distribution and central aid. This indicates that local governments could not get rid of either the high-pressuring restrain of central government or the dependency on the aid policy of central government; hence the impact of single unfunded mandate was ignored. After all, the tax for aid distribution and central aid remains to be the most important fiscal resource to local governments. This study proofs that the fiscal structure which is called 'Central government centralize state power and local governments dependent on central government'(蔡吉源、林建次，2005) still exists in Taiwan.