請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/66116
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 石之瑜(Chih-yu Shih) | |
dc.contributor.author | Ryota Hiyane | en |
dc.contributor.author | 比屋根亮太 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T00:22:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-12 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2020-02-12 | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-02-12 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/66116 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 近幾年「沖繩認同」的提高,這無異於是「政治權利要求」的提高。不過,不管是在戰前的沖繩或戰後的美軍統治下,沖繩對政治權利的要求,基本上都在追求成為「日本人」而不是「沖繩認同」。因此,本論文想研究的問題是,為何近幾年沖繩對政治權利要求的提高,不再是如以往追求作為日本人的趨勢,而是出現對「沖繩認同」的趨勢?
從琉球/沖繩的歷史演變來看,王朝時代的中國、近代及當代的日本與美國等區域大國,均扮演作為「他者」的關鍵角色。但在現有的沖繩認同研究裡,並未注意到當代中國對沖繩認同造成的影響。琉球和中國分離了百年之後,中國正重新納入成為日、美之外的第三個他者。為此,本文擬具體釐清的問題是,中國再現之後,與近幾年沖繩認同的崛起有什麼關聯?認同崛起是否受到出現了複數他者的影響所致?進而探討,所謂的沖繩認同是什麼? 本論文的理論動機是分析複數他者與認同的關係,因此將會完整地討論沖繩在歷史上與各個他者的關係,分析其間沖繩的他者如何影響沖繩「民族主義」與「認同」。在了解沖繩認同時,也以我者沖繩對「他者」的認識為主軸,探討對日本、美國及中國(包含當代中國)的認識,包括這些他者如何透過其對沖繩的認識,影響沖繩認同的形成與演變。本論文解釋了歷史上搖擺不定的沖繩認同為何近幾年變得較為明確。 當中國作為另一個他者成為現實以後,沖繩便擺脫了過去必須鎖定在某一個特定他者身上界定自己認同的困境。如果沖繩鎖定在與他者日本的關係中,沖繩必須向日本要求與日本其他地方同樣的權利,要麼是平等的日本人,要麼根本不願意是日本人。若日本賦予沖繩更完整的權利時,沖繩人猶如是日本人,若沒有同樣權利卻持續向日本要求權利,猶如是要放棄作為日本人。而沖繩跟中國之間,並沒有同樣這種自我與他者之間的鎖定,因此,沖繩在看待中國的時候,就不需要根據要求平等權利成功與否,來認識沖繩自己。這是中國作為他者的意義,即在於中國並不是權利的賦予者或剝奪者。 本論文將建立複數他者影響在地認同的基本架構,論文主張在我者沖繩對「他者」的認識中,不同數量的「他者」對沖繩認同形成交錯效應。重點是個別的「他者」數目,必須要達到至少三個,才有擺脫特定他者的效果。當他者是兩個以下時,例如,在日本是唯一他者時,沖繩選擇積極回應日本要求的現代化及文明化制度。在同時有日、美兩個他者時,雖然美國施行了離日政策,沖繩卻選擇反美轉向認同另外一個他者日本,當時在沖繩擴散著的是烏托邦日本,也就是個擁有高度社會經濟發展、執行和平憲法理念的日本。然而,他者達到三個複數時,就不必然像前面兩個以下的他者時的情況那樣,造成沖繩選擇另一方。 在沖繩同時出現三個他者時候,沖繩一方面對每一個他者都既有正面印象,又有負面印象,在過程中便產生新的琉球沖繩歷史主義。日本、中國、美國等大國對沖繩的傲慢態度,讓沖繩探究屬於沖繩自己的方向,養成了沖繩在特定對象以外認識自己的意識。換言之,是在沖繩同時出現三個他者的時候,產生了新的沖繩認同主張。本文將建立沖繩認同形成的基本架構,乃透過沖繩認同演變中所出現的三個「他者」,在「交錯效應」下形成了當代的「沖繩認同」。 最後,在複數他者的情況之下,政治權利的要求作為獨立變項影響認同的程度,愈來愈不重要。因為中國再現,導致沖繩發現出現了一個在對抗關係之外的自己,亦即這個自己並不是在對抗中形成的,可以不再受到日本和美國的對抗的束縛。這個就是從複數他者的條件中所演化而來的政治知識。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In recent years, the increasing interest in an “Okinawan identity” reflects an upturn in “demands for political rights”. However, whether with regard to pre-WWII Okinawa under the Japanese empire, or post-WWII under U.S. military occupation, whenever Okinawa has pursued political rights, it effectively acquired a more Japanese rather than Okinawan identity. Therefore, the research question of this paper concerns reasons for why the Okinawan demand for political rights in recent years is no longer following the historical trend of seeking to become Japanese, and instead now seeking an Okinawan identity?
From the perspective of the historical transition from Ryukyu into Okinawa, regional powers such as Ming and Qing-era China, Japan, and the United States all played key roles as “alters”, i.e. entities that add identity specifications that contrast the conscious self. However, existing research on Okinawan identity does not include the influence of contemporary China. This paper assumes that the basis for the research question is related to the resurgence of China. After the failure of the second revolution in July 1913, the subsequent 79 years of separation between China and Okinawa, China has been restored as one of the alters for Okinawa, in addition to Japan and the United States. Therefore, the specific question that this paper intends to clarify is what kind of relevance this has to the emergence of an Okinawan identity in recent years. What is the relationship between the rise of this identity and the multiple alters? What is the so-called Okinawan identity? The theoretical motivation for the dissertation is to analyze the relationships between the multiple alters and identity. To understand Okinawa identity more comprehensively, by utilizing the “alters” as the main axis, comparing Okinawa perception on Japan, the United States, and China (including contemporary China), and evaluate how they have affected “nationalism” and “Identity” in Okinawa. These serve to explain the reasons behind why the Okinawa identity, the basis of which has been oscillating in history, has become more prominent and established in recent years. When contemporary China became the third alter, Okinawa developed a self-identity that did not directly tie itself to any specific alter. If Okinawa were locked in its relationship with Japan as its sole alter, Okinawa would require of Japan a similar status to other parts of Japan, either as Japanese citizens or simply as non-Japanese with equal rights. If Japan provides Okinawa more complete rights, the Okinawan people are more likely to feel as Japanese. If they do not gain the same rights, will continue to claim rights from Japan, or they are likely to give up becoming Japanese. No such locking of self to an alter existed in the relationship between Okinawa and China. Therefore, when Okinawa faces with China, Okinawa does not need to define itself based on whether or not it successfully required rights of equality with China. This is the meaning of China as the alter; that is, China is neither the provider or depriver of rights, but simply a passive influencer of identity. This dissertation will establish the basic structure of influence that multiple alters had on identity. The dissertation argues that Okinawan self perspective on the “alter” holds that different numbers of “alters” form a kaleidoscope effect on Okinawan identity. The point is that the number of individual “alters” must be at least three in order to diminish the power of direct effects from any one specific alter. When the alters are less than two, for example, when Japan is the only alter, Okinawan chooses to actively respond to Japan’s demands for modernization and its chosen system of civilization. When there were two alters of Japan and the United States, although the United States implemented the policy of reducing Japanese cultural identity on the island, Okinawa chose to oppose the United States and identify themselves with the other alter, Japan. At that time, Okinawan perceptions on Japan were utopian, characterized by rapid economic growth, and the concept of developing and implementing a peaceful constitution. However, when the number of alters reaches three or more, Okinawa would not take sides with one particular alter as is the case with less than three alters. When three alters appeared in Okinawa simultaneously, Okinawa has both a positive and a negative impression on the alters, and in this process, a new Ryukyu Okinawa historicism is produced. The aggressive attitudes of Japan, China, and the United States towards Okinawa allowed Okinawa to explore its own direction and develop a self-awareness independent of any specific alter. In other words, when three alters appear in Okinawa simultaneously, a new Okinawan identity will be produced. This dissertation will establish the basic framework for the formation of Okinawan identity. Through historical transition of identity in Ryukyu/Okinawa, when the three “alters” appeared, the contemporary “Okinawan identity” was formed under the “kaleidoscope effect”. This dissertation will also explain that if the alters are three or more in number, the self-identity that is generated is not one that is based on a method of confrontation. Finally, in the case of multiple alters, the degree to which the requirement of political rights as an independent variable affects identity is less and less important. Because of the resurgence of China, Okinawa has discovered an alter whose relationship does not reflect the issue of confrontation. This self will not be formed under the confrontation and can no longer be bound by the confrontation between Japan and the United States. This is the political knowledge that evolved from this unique condition of multiple alters. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T00:22:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-109-D02322009-1.pdf: 4795876 bytes, checksum: 632687cf913313783e327c5647cca82a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 謝辭 i
摘要 iii 目錄 viii 表圖目次 xi 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景及目的 1 壹、 研究背景 1 貳、 問題意識 4 參、 研究目的 7 第二節 文獻回顧 8 第三節 探討沖繩認同之理論基礎 11 壹、 認同定義 11 貳、 「他者」與「認同」之理論基礎 12 參、 「認同」與「民族主義」之理論基礎 15 第四節 研究設計 26 壹、 研究途徑 26 貳、 研究架構 28 參、 研究方法 30 肆、 研究範圍與分期 32 伍、 研究創建及貢獻 33 第二章 兩個他者至一個他者時期—近代沖繩的認同形成(1868年至戰前) 35 第一節 沖繩認同的定義 35 壹、 「沖繩」、「Uchina-」、「琉球」、「Ryukyu」 36 貳、 沖繩研究與沖繩學 40 參、 琉球學(琉球研究)的適切性與「沖繩認同」的定義 43 第二節 近代沖繩的認同思想-尋找自我認同 44 壹、 時代背景 45 貳、 沖繩的認同研究之起源 46 參、 近代沖繩的認同思想-尋找自我認同 48 第三節 日本帝國對近代沖繩的認同影響及沖繩對此之反應 53 壹、 近世琉球時代─從屬雙重朝貢國的琉球人社會 53 貳、 「琉球處分」時期 55 參、 大日本帝國對近代沖繩的政策 58 肆、 近代沖繩對日本政策之反應 62 第四節 中國對近代沖繩的認同影響及沖繩對此之反應 65 壹、 古琉球時代─萬國津梁朝貢體制下的繁榮 65 貳、 中國對沖繩政策的概要 66 參、 時代背景 67 肆、 近代沖繩對中國之反應 68 第五節 小結 71 第三章 兩個他者時期—日本再次崛起(戰後至1991年) 78 第一節 戰後沖繩政治思想史 78 第二節 戰後沖繩的認同思想 83 第三節 日本對戰後沖繩的認同影響及沖繩對此之反應 86 壹、 日本對戰後沖繩的政策概要 86 貳、 影響戰後至1991年的沖繩的認同之觀點 87 第四節 美國對戰後沖繩的認同影響及沖繩對此之反應 91 壹、 美軍政府對戰後沖繩的政策概要 91 貳、 影響二戰後至1991年的沖繩的認同之觀點 94 第五節 小結 98 第四章 三個他者時期—中國再現至今(1992年至現在) 106 第一節 中國再現後的沖繩的認同思想 106 第二節 美國對戰後沖繩的認同影響及沖繩對此之反應 109 壹、 美國對中國再現後沖繩的政策概要 109 貳、 影響1990年之後的沖繩認同之觀點 113 第三節 日本對中國再現後沖繩的認同影響及沖繩對此之反應 114 壹、 日本對中國再現後沖繩的政策概要 114 貳、 影響1990年之後沖繩的認同之觀點 121 第四節 中國再現後對沖繩的認同影響及沖繩對此之反應 127 壹、 中華民國對沖繩政策的概要 128 貳、 中華人民共和國對沖繩政策的概要 131 參、 中國對於沖繩人的認同形成之影響 133 第五節 小結 144 第五章 結論—沖繩認同演變中三個他者-論日、美、中的交錯效應 152 第一節 針對研究目的之回應 152 第二節 沖繩認同思想未來的展望 163 第三節 研究展望 170 參考書目 175 附錄一、沖繩的認同先行研究 202 附錄二、沖繩的認同研究途徑 205 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 建構沖繩認同(1868-2019)—複數他者與形成中的自我 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Writing Okinawan Identities: Politics of Multiple Alters and the Emerging Self | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 108-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 博士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 何思慎(Szu-shen Ho),鄭子真(Tzu-chen Cheng),林賢參(Hsien-sen Lin),楊雯婷(Wen-ting Yang) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 琉球,沖繩,沖繩認同,中國再現,複數他者,民族主義,現代國家, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Ryukyu,Okinawa,Okinawan Identity,Resurgence of China,Multiple Alters,Nationalism,Nation State, | en |
dc.relation.page | 205 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202000441 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2020-02-12 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 社會科學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 政治學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 政治學系 |
文件中的檔案:
檔案 | 大小 | 格式 | |
---|---|---|---|
ntu-109-1.pdf 目前未授權公開取用 | 4.68 MB | Adobe PDF |
系統中的文件,除了特別指名其著作權條款之外,均受到著作權保護,並且保留所有的權利。