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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 盧秋玲 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Fang-Wei Su | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 蘇方薇 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-17T00:12:52Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-08-18 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2012-08-18 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2012-07-10 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 英文文獻
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Journal of Banking& Finance 32, 1552-1565. 中文文獻: 1.周科競,崔呂萍,楊雪婷.2007.北京商報。 2.和訊新聞網。 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/65821 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究檢驗2004/12~2010/12期間中,當中國基金成為中國公司的大股東時和公司績效間具有何種關係?本研究發現基金持股對於被持股的公司績效具有正面影響,可能隱含基金持股對於公司管理者的管理決策具有監督的效果。本研究和過去的研究最大差異點在於本研究的研究背景建立在中國基金的發展跟規範已經成熟,成為中國投資大眾接受的投資工具後,檢視基金持股是否和被持股公司績效間具有正相關?
雖然在研究期間中,中國證監會發布<關於上市公司股份分置改革試點有關問題的通知>,啟動股權分置,但股權分置過程是採取分批進行,在本研究的樣本期間中在外流通股數仍然偏少,仍然有自由騎士的問題存在。本研究得到中國基金持股和中國公司積效具有正相關,也意味著基金持股仍然可以幫助中國因流通在外股數過少而產生的自由騎士的問題。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study tests empirically the impact of mutual funds’ ownership on firm performance in China, using a large sample for the period of 2004–2010.This study find that there is a positive relationship between mutual funds ‘ ownership and firms performance, this result may imply mutual funds governor firms’ managers. This study establish Maximum point of difference is that this study and previous studies research background in the research development fund established in China with the specification has matured, become China's acceptance of the investing public investment tools, examine whether the mutual funds’ holdings and the positive correlation between holding company performance?
Although during the study period, the China Securities Regulatory Commission published < on the shares of a listed company split reform pilot notification on the relevant issues >, start the split share structure, but the process is carried out in batches of the shareholder structure, in the sample of the study period in the number of shares remains low, there is still a free rider problem. This research find mutual funds’ ownership andcompanies’ performance have positive correlation, also means that mutual funds’ holdings still can help China resulting from flows out too few shares of the free rider problem. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-17T00:12:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R99724062-1.pdf: 767288 bytes, checksum: 92f406afe9703ec9161a453acc51a781 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 .................... i
Abstract................. ii 目錄 .....................iii 表目錄 ...................iv 第一章、緒論 ............ 1 第一節、研究動機......... 1 第二節、研究目的..........3 第三節、研究架構..........4 第四節、研究流程..........5 第二章、文獻回顧 .........6 第一節、中國基金的發展....6 第二節、文獻回顧..........10 第三章、實證研究方法與資料來源 . 15 第一節、研究假設..........15 第二節、研究對象與資料來源.15 第三節、資料處理及定義....16 第四節、實證研究方法......21 第四章、實證結果 ........ 23 第一節、敘述性統計....... 23 第二節、相關性分析....... 25 第三節、迴歸結果..........27 第五章、結論與建議 ...... 34 第一節、研究結論..........34 第二節、研究限制與後續之研究建議.34 參考文獻: ................36 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 基金持股 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司績效 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 自由騎士 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | mutual funds’ ownership | en |
| dc.subject | firms performance | en |
| dc.subject | free-rider | en |
| dc.title | 基金持股與公司績效之分析:以中國為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The analysis between mutual funds’ ownership and firms’performance: Evidence from China | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 周德瑋,莊文議 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 基金持股,公司績效,自由騎士, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | mutual funds’ ownership,firms performance,free-rider, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 40 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2012-07-10 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 國際企業學系 | |
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