政策變遷的動力因素分析─以產業租稅獎勵政策的演化為例

Abstract

許多研究指出，東亞國家在歷經政治民主化與經濟自由化之後，政府干預市場的模式已然調整；但是，所謂的「調整」究竟是指「調適」（adaption）或是指「轉型」（transformation），學者之間則看法不一。同樣的，對於台灣在歷經1980年代末期開展的經濟自由化及1990年代的政治民主化等政經演變後，政府對市場介入的模式或本質究竟有沒有改變，亦存在不同看法。 本研究所欲探討的兩大問題是，第一，到底台灣過去常見的政府干預市場之政經運作模式在1980年代中期之後，究竟是產生全然的質變？或者，本質依舊不變而僅僅只是進行調適而已？第二，如果政府干預市場的政經運作模式已發生改變，那麼又是何種因素促使它改變？是否如同發展型國家論者所言，是民主化、全球化因素使然？若是，那麼這兩項因素又是如何使政府干預市場的模式產生變遷？ 關於第一項問題意識，由於產業租稅獎勵是我國政府產業政策工具中最為重要的一項；因此，以產業租稅獎勵的政策變遷作為分析，將更能掌握台灣產業政策內涵的演化及政府介入市場之程度或政經運作模式的遞嬗。本研究以素有我國「產業憲法」之稱的《獎投條例》、《促產條例》、《產創條例》為研究範圍，探討自1980年中期實行經濟自由化政策以來，政府對市場干預模式和程度的轉變。 研究發現，在政策工具光譜上代表政府干預市場程度最高的產業別租稅獎（同時也最能代表經建官僚追求干預極大化的利益），在第三代《獎投條例》時期，其租稅獎勵項目達到最高峰（六項），之後經第一、二代《促產條例》逐漸減少，最後至《產創條例》時期則完全遭到刪除。因此，就此三大條例中的產業租稅獎勵內涵而言，此一演化趨勢意味著政府對市場介入的程度於1980年代之後漸次降低。 而對於第二項問題意識，也就是何種因素導致產業租稅獎勵政策的變遷？本研究從政策論述或議程設定權力競逐的研究途徑，提出「論述的顯著度」（discourse salience）的分析概念，進行質化資料的量化內容分析。同時，佐以條例制定過程的決策脈絡之質化分析，以釐清導致產業租稅獎勵政策變遷的因素為何。 研究發現，政策議題之爭議的擴大化、複雜化、政治化，將深刻影響其政策變遷的方向和變遷的幅度；換言之，論述顯著度越高，政策變遷的機率和幅度也將同比增加。 從產業租稅獎勵政策變遷的演化過程來看，一九八○年代中期至一九九○年代初期，以經建官僚為核心的產業政策網絡，對於產業租稅獎勵政策的變遷方向及幅度，擁有較大影響力；而經建官僚擁有較高的干預能力，正是發展型國家的重要特徵之一。換言之，此階段的產業租稅獎勵政策正彰顯了高度發達的發展型國家特色。 而一九九○年代末期，由於兩稅合一的稅制改革，使得官僚部門競爭加劇，在正、反兩方論述聯盟相爭不下的情況下，最終只得由最高政務領導高層（李前總統）拍板決定產業租稅獎勵政策的變遷方向。此一脈絡反映了發展型國家已逐漸遭到反對勢力的挑戰，雖然在最高決策者的支持下而得以繼續運作，但仍不得不作出部分相應調整。 二○○○年之後，除了延續既有官僚部門競爭的因素之外，更重要的是，產業租稅獎勵的性質已從單純的「政策議題」逐漸「政治化」，而成為政黨政治競爭的焦點，再加上產業租稅獎勵的政策正當性已遭到全球化挑戰的背景條件，終而導致產業別租稅獎勵在《產創條例》中全面退場。此一條例制定脈絡顯示，發展型國家在政黨政治及經濟全球化的因素干擾下，被迫做出更大幅度的調整，並降低政府對市場干預的程度。不過儘管如此，目前仍有跡象顯示，台灣「發展型國家」的運作模式或許有些調整，但其核心的精神和特質仍持續運作著。

While some researches point out that the economic models of government intervention in East Asian countries have transformed into the market-oriented one in the era of democratization and economic liberalization, others argue that such evolution merely reflect these countries’ adaptation to their new political and Economic conditions. This theoretical debate has great implications for understanding the evolution of Taiwan’s developmental state since the opening of economic liberalization in the mid-1980s and democratization in the 1990s. This study attempts to analyze two questions. 1) Whether the changes in Taiwan’s developmental state model reflected a process of transformation or adaptation? 2) If the model did transform, what were the driving forces of it? What were the effects of democratization and globalization on the transformation of Taiwan’s developmental state? To answer the first question, this research examines the influences of tax incentives and exemptions on Taiwan’s economic changes. It especially focuses on the tax-expenditure clauses in the “Statute for the Encouragement of Investment”, “Statute for Upgrading Industry” and “Statute for Industrial Innovation,” which are the most primary industrial policy tools of the government. They symbolize the main characters of Taiwan’s developmental state. This analysis finds that the items of tax policy sorted by industries which implicates the higher degree of government intervention have gradually decreased in “Statute for the Encouragement of Investment”, “Statute for Upgrading Industry” and “Statute for Industrial Innovation”. The phase-out of tax policy sorted by industries refers to the decline of the government intervention since the mid-1980s. In addressing the second research question, I utilize a model of “discourse salience”, which is inspired by the researches of policy discourse competition and agenda-setting power, to analyze the driving forces of the changes in the tax policy for industrial development. The research result suggests that the possibility and degree of policy changes are positively related to the complexity and politicalization of the argument about policy issues. From the late-1980s to the early 1990s, the industrial policy network dominated by the bureaucratic technocrats in MOEA was the predominant actor of the changes in the tax policy for industrial development, which signified the characters of the developmental state. Bureaucratic competition was drastic as a result of the integration of corporate and individual income tax in the late-1990s, which forced President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) to personally intervene in the dispute of the tax policy for industrial development. And it showed that the developmental state had to adapt when confronted the critics even though it got the endorsement of President Lee. The tax policy for industrial development faced both challenges from politics and globalization beyond 2000, which contributed to the termination of the tax-expenditure clauses in “Statute for Industrial Innovation”. This implies that the developmental state has to abate the government intervention comprehensively and substantially in the context of political struggles and economic globalization. Nevertheless, some clues show that Taiwan is not far ahead of the developmental state; in other words, Taiwan’s developmental state is still in adaption.