選舉式威權與選舉競爭性：選舉穩固或是削弱了威權政體？

Abstract

冷戰結束後，選舉式威權（electoral authoritarianism）成為最普遍的威權政體型態，因此越來越多的研究開始探討選舉對於威權政體的影響。然而學者們的看法分成了兩派：一派認為選舉本質上是威權統治者的工具，使威權政體更加穩固；另一派認為選舉弱化了威權統治，使民主化的可能性提高。為何學者們的意見有所分歧？到底威權國家的選舉，是鞏固了威權統治，還是弱化了威權政體？ 本研究的主要論點認為：選舉的作用，會隨著不同的脈絡情境改變；而關鍵的因素，在於選舉競爭度的高低。在低度競爭性的政體中，選舉能鞏固威權統治；相反地，在高度競爭性時，選舉才可能成為民主化的助力。 面對學者們的分歧意見，本文整合了現存支持「選舉有助於威權統治」的文獻，提出「霸權均衡」的理論觀點，闡述霸權式威權政體如何透過選舉實現霸權均衡，並降低了選舉競爭性，也說明為何低度競爭的選舉，同時也可以反過來鞏固威權，使威權統治的結構更為加強。另一方面，本文也探索在何種情況下霸權均衡會傾頹，使政體出現較高的競爭性，並解釋為何在競爭性較高的環境中，選舉反而提供了機會結構給反對者，進而使政體民主化。 本論文以選舉式威權政體為主要的分析對象，收集了1975-2007年的時間序列橫斷面資料，以驗證本研究的理論與論點。研究發現分成兩部分，第一部分討論選舉式威權政體的次類型分類，即「霸權式威權政體」與「競爭式威權政體」的動態性差異。兩類政體都舉行選舉，但因為競爭度不同，而呈現了不一樣的政體動態性表現。競爭式威權政體不僅較為不穩定，同時也比較容易發生民主化或是民主程度的倒退。 本文第二部分則是探討，在何種情況下，霸權式威權政體的選舉競爭性會變高。本文發現，當政體出現長期的經濟衰退時，競爭程度獲得提昇的可能性大為增加。而較高的經濟發展，則降低競爭度提昇的可能性。此外，也發現選舉類型之差異會與不同的背景因素產生交互作用，改變選舉提昇競爭性的效果。在經濟表現不佳的情況下，只有立法選舉（legislative elections）受到影響，增加了立法選舉提昇競爭性的可能性；相對地，在國家強迫力(coercive power)較弱的背景下，只改變了行政選舉（executive elections）提昇競爭的可能性。本研究指出，這是因為行政、立法選舉透過不同的機制來幫助威權統治，故當不同的脈絡因素變動時，受到影響的只有特定的選舉類型。

After the Cold War, electoral authoritarian regimes have become the modal type of authoritarian regime. As a result, an increasing number of studies have begun to explore the effect of elections on authoritarian regimes. However, there is disagreement between scholars on the effects of elections in authoritarian regimes. One camp argues that such elections are an instrument of rulers used to stabilize authoritarian regimes; another camp argues that elections undermine authoritarian regimes and make democratization more likely. How do we explain these different points of view? Do authoritarian elections foster or weaken authoritarian regimes? This thesis argues that the function of elections depends on the context and the key context is the level of electoral competitiveness. Under low level electoral competition, elections consolidate authoritarian regimes. In contrast, under high level electoral competition, elections provide an opportunity structure for the opposition to achieve democratization. Facing a divergence in the literature, this study integrates the present arguments about how elections prolong authoritarian rule and proposes a “hegemonic equilibrium theory.” The thesis will elaborate how hegemonic authoritarian regimes realizes hegemonic equilibrium and reduce the level of political competitiveness by elections and why the low level of competitiveness in turn consolidates authoritarian rule and acts as a self-reinforcing system to stabilize authoritarian regimes. In addition, the thesis also explores the conditions under which authoritarian regimes gradually deviate from hegemonic equilibrium and embody a higher level of electoral competitiveness. This thesis will also explain why elections tend to provide structural opportunities for the opposition to achieve democratization under the context of a high level of electoral competitiveness. The main unit of analysis is electoral authoritarian regimes from 1975-2007. I employ a time-series cross-sectional analysis to test the theory and divide the analysis into two parts. The first part discusses the dynamic differences between two subtypes of electoral authoritarianism: hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism. The two subtypes of authoritarianism both hold elections but their dynamic behaviors are distinct in terms of the level of electoral competitiveness. The thesis finds that competitive authoritarian regimes are not only unstable, they are more likely than hegemonic authoritarian regimes to democratize, but also more likely to undergo autocratic reversal The second part tries to find the conditions under which the level of competitiveness in hegemonic authoritarian regimes will increase. The thesis finds that when economic performance of a regime deteriorates over a prolonged time, hegemonic authoritarian regimes are more likely to become more competitive, and higher economic development lowers the probability of increasing competitiveness. In addition, the thesis also finds that the effect of different types of election will interact with distinct contextual factors. Specifically, under the conditions of poor economic performance, the probability of legislative elections promoting the level of electoral competitiveness is increased. In contrast, under the context of declining state coercive power, only the probability of executive elections promoting the level of competitiveness is raised. The reason for the above finding is that legislative elections and executive elections have different mechanisms to consolidate authoritarian rule; therefore, when different contextual factors vary, only specific type of election is influenced.