考慮模組化下逆向供應鏈契約金與獎勵金之均衡決策

Abstract

近年來，環境保護的問題愈來愈受到大家的重視，在相關法令的規範下，製造商(manufacturer，以M表示)必須對電子產品從生產至產品生命週期結束作完全的負責，製造商為了確保回收的工作更有效率會委託第三方物流業者(third-party logistics，以3PL表示)來負責廢棄電子產品的回收處理工作。本研究針對製造商與第三方物流業者在資訊不對稱的情形下討論逆向供應鏈(reverse supply chains)的問題，在決策的過程中，製造商為領導者(leader)，第三方物流業者為跟隨者(follower)，探討製造商與第三方物流業者雙方皆為利潤極大化的前提下，考量齊一性程度作為影響回收利潤的因素，製造商如何訂定最適的契約金額來給予第三物流業者以及探討第三方物流業者在契約金的影響下，如何訂定給予顧客的最適獎勵金，接著，本研究就最適決策做完整的討論與分析，並且解釋雙方的決策所代表的經濟意涵，最後，我們發現製造商的決策是必須根據獎勵金與回收收入的金額才能決定最適的契約金，而第三方物流業者除了根據契約金的高低之外，也必須參考廢棄電子產品在回收的過程中所創造的收入多寡以及低齊一性廢棄電子產品的比例才能決定給予顧客的最適獎勵金。

The issues of environmental protection had drawn much attention in recent years. Due to eco-awareness and legislative requirements, manufacturers have to take the responsibility of recycling their own brand-name products. Many manufacturers require third-party logistics service providers to take the responsibilities for recycling operations of waste electrical and electronic products. We discuss the decision of the manufacturer and the third-party logistics service provider in reverse supply chains under asymmetric information. The model consists of a manufacturer, as a leader, and a third-party logistics service provider, as a follower. Each supply chain member maximizes its own profit functions, where the unit profit of recycled products is affected by the degree of homogeneity. This research derives the optimal contract rent for the third-party logistics service providers and the optimal reward money for customers. Finally, we discuss the impact of the contract rent and the reward money on the equilibrium solution, and we also investigate the impact of the unit revenue of recycled products and the reward money on the expected profit of the third-party logistics service providers.