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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 張文貞(Wen-Chen Chang) | |
dc.contributor.author | Yichen Lo | en |
dc.contributor.author | 駱怡辰 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T17:19:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-08-28 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2012-08-28 | |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2012-08-17 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 一、 中文部分
黃俊龍 (2003),〈民主社會的菁英統治:對密爾《論代議政府》的一個詮釋〉,《政治科學論叢》,第18期,頁217 – 240。 許國賢 (2006),〈政治平等的再考察〉,《政治科學論叢》,第27期,頁41 – 67。 張福建 (2005),〈參與和公民精神的養成:彌爾《代議政府論》的一種解讀〉,《東吳政治學報》,第21期,頁53 - 58。 張福建 (2007),〈代表與議會政治—一個政治思想史的探索與反省〉,《行政暨政策學報》,45期,頁1 – 34。 二、 外文部分 Adler, M. J. (1981). Six Great Ideas. NY: Simonand & Schuster. Aristotle, (1962). Nicomachean ethics. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Aristotle, (1984). Politics. Chicago: Chicago University. Barraclough, G. (1964). An introduction to contemporary history. NY: Penguin Books. Beitz, C. R. (1990). Political equality: An essay in democratic theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bentham, J. (1823). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Bentham, J. (1825). The rationale of reward. Berlin, I. (1969). John Stuart Mill and the ends of life. In Liberty (pp. 218-251). Oxford, UK: Oxford University. Berlin, I. (1969). Political ideas in the 20th century. In Liberty (pp. 55-93). Oxford, UK: Oxford University. Charvet, J. (1981). A critique of freedom and equality. NY: Cambridge University. Crisp, R. (1997). Mill on Utilitarianism. NY: Routledge. Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University. Donner, W. (1992). The liberal self: John Stuart Mill’s moral and political philosophy. NY: Cornell University. Donner, W. (2007). John Stuart Mill on education and democracy. In N. Urbinati & A. Zakaras (Eds.), J.S. Mill’s political thought (pp. 250-274). NY: Cambridge University. Dworkin, R. (2001). Sovereign virtue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. NY: Free. Goodin, R. E. (1995). Utilitarianism as a public philosophy. NY: Cambridge University. Himmelfarb, G. (1974). On liberty and liberalism: The case of John Stuart Mill. NY: Knopf. Kern, P. B. (1977). Universal suffrage without democracy: Thomas Hare and John Stuart Mill. Review of politics, 34, 306-322. Krouse, R. W. (1982). Two concepts of democratic representation: James and John Stuart Mill. The journal of politics, 44, 509-537. Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary political philosophy. NY: Oxford University. Lijphart, A. (1998). Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford, UK: Oxford University. Locke, J. (1664). Questions concerning the law of nature. Locke, J. (1689). Two treatises of government. Mendelbaum, M. (1968). On interpreting Mill’s Utilitarianism. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 6, 35-46. Mill, J. S. (1996). On liberty. In J. M. Robson (Ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (pp. 213-310). London, UK: Routledge. Mill, J. S. (1996). Considerations on Representative Government. In J. M. Robson (Ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (pp. 371-577). London, UK: Routledge. Mill, J. S. (1963). Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson (Ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (pp. 203-235). London, UK: Routledge. Mill, J. S. (2007). Autobiography. In J. M. Robson & J. Stillinger (Eds.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (pp. 1-290). Abingdon, OX: Routledge. Morales, M. H. (1996). Perfect equality: John Stuart Mill on well-constituted communities. London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield. Nussbaum, M. C. (1995). Objectification. Philosophy and public affairs, 24, 249-291. Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Petit, P. (2003). Consequentialism. In S. Darwall (Ed.), Consequentialism (pp.95-107). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Porritt, E. & Porritt, A. G. (1903). The unreformed House of Commons: Parliamentary representation before 1832. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Postema, G. J. (2006). Bentham’s Utilitarianism. In H. R. West (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to Mill's Utilitarianism (pp. 26-44). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Rosen, F. (2003). Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. NY: Routledge. Smart, J. J. C., & Williams, B. (1973). Utilitarianism for & against. NY: Cambridge University. Speck, W. A. (1993). A concise history of Britain, 1707-1975. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University. Thompson, D. F. (1976). John Stuart Mill and representative government. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Waldron, J. (2002). God, Locke, and equality: Christian foundations in Locke’s political thought. NY: Cambridge University. Westen, P. (1990). Speaking of equality: An analysis of the rhetorical force of equality in moral and legal discourse. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Wormuth, F. D. (1949). The origins of modern constitutionalism. NY: Harper and Brothers. Zakaras, A. (2007). John Stuart Mill, individuality, and participatory democracy. In N. Urbinati & A. Zakaras (Eds.), J.S. Mill’s Political Thought (pp.200-220). NY: Cambridge University. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/63817 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本論文試圖透過英國哲學家JS Mill的選舉理論,探究以及檢討當代政治平等原則的核心—一人一票制的理念。以Mill作為思考憑藉,除了因為他所在的十九世紀英國仍是一個當代民主制度還未確立而充滿了爭議的時代,一人一票或一人多票對一般人來說,還是一個不熟悉而需要被說服的議題,Mill跨越形上學、倫理學與政治哲學的思想廣度,更能夠幫助我們從制度進入其背後的抽象道德理念。本文在第二章先介紹了Mill的代議政府選舉制度,從完全代表制、普遍投票制與複數投票制三個層次,說明Mill對於政府好壞的判斷標準、選舉之於平民大眾的教育功能以及如何才符合平等原則。第三章試圖更深入地了解在Mill的選舉制度背面,所欲追求的目的是什麼。我們發現,Mill作為一個具有理想性格的效益主義者,他認為幸福的追求是生命唯一的目的,個人自由應不受拘束,以發展與實現個人的生命意義;但他同時也承認幸福種類的不同以及高低等級的差異,而以最大幸福的追求為個人以及群體的目標。本文進而區分Mill思想當中強版本與弱版本的平等原則,其中,強版本的平等原則與效益主義具有本質的相似性;僅論效益而不論人別的標準,與僅論票數而不論利益歸屬的投票原則,兩者亦相互一致,強版本的平等原則亦足以作為普遍選舉權的理念基礎。本文在第四章則是希望比較與檢討Mill的複數投票制與當代一人一票制之間的理念差異。本文分別從知識論上的懷疑論、政治哲學上的國家中立理論與私領域不干涉原則,比較當代的思想與Mill具有方向性與理想性的效益主義之間的差異,對Mill提出質疑,再以Mill的觀點進行回應與辯護,藉此幫助我們理解當代選舉制度隱藏的現代性格,最後再針對Mill以及自由主義式的政治理論在現實上的可行性問題進行檢討。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This thesis deals with the moral assumptions behind modern concept of political equality, based on the political and ethical writings of JS Mill. “One person, one vote” is a fundamental principle of modern democracy and constitutionalism, but while democracy has been widely accepted and taken as a premise of contemporary political theories, the moral assumptions behind that imperative has gradually moving out from the spotlight. If equality of all mankind is considered an exalted universal value and it is not a counter-factual presumption, but a moral imperative, when it turns into a political one, taking on legal force, how is it related to our modern political institutions? And what is the connection between this principle and the modern concept of political equality, especially the right to equal vote? The aim of this theoretical investigation is to find out, whether there is any plausible moral justification behind this principle, and only with an affirmative answer can we confirm a moral foundation of our acceptance of political equality.
The moral and political writings of JS Mill, which were written in the nineteenth century, before modern democracy has received its steady form and a widespread acceptance, are able to provide us a reference point to our concept of political equality, because they inquired into the necessity of this form of governance, instead of treating it as a prerequisite. Most importantly, the abundance of his writing is to serve as a keystone to build up a link between a political ideal and the moral assumptions behind it. This thesis tries to take advantage of these two qualities, as a means to answer –or at least, clarify –the above mentioned questions. Based on Mill’s political ideas elaborated in Considerations on Representative Government, his ideas about the ideal form of governance, popular representation, and voting rights are presented in the second chapter of the thesis. Their connection to Mill’s moral theory is discussed in the following chapter, and as a conclusion, I try to draw a comparison between the Millian construction of democracy and our modern ones. Written in 1861, Considerations on Representative Government is a collection of Mill’s political writings, which were proposed in a time when the reform of parliament concerning constituency and expansion of voting rights was in a highly debated progress. Mill begins with affirming democracy as the better form of governance than despotism, in that democracy secures moral agency of individuals and improve the average level of knowledge of the people. However, democratic representative government results in the risks of insufficient mental qualifications in the controlling body, or parliament, and class legislation on the part of the numerical majority. To offset these dual evils consequently becomes the objective for further designs. Mill’s ideal of the representative parliament can thus be viewed in three layers: first, comprehensive representation concentrates votes from different constituencies and secures that every minority of the society is to be represented in the state organ. The importance of minority’s returning to the parliament means that the parliament would be “certain of containing the very elite of the country.” Following this leading principle, universal suffrage provides an educational function, especially for the working class, who is more in the need of social education. By means of public discussion and collective political participation, people would be informed and brought beyond their limited life circle, motivated to “feel for and with his fellow citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community.” The third layer –and also the most interesting one– is the plural voting system introduced by Mill, which entitles people with different number of votes according to their occupations. The liberal professions, for example, deserve more votes than an employer in general, because their occupation implies their possession of “individual mental superiority.” Under the leading principle of comprehensive representation, the additional votes accumulated from the minority elite should not excess the majority, since plural voting is only to symbolize and manifest the value of knowledge, and to provide an incentive for the ordinary citizens. Some contradictions seem to arise from this sophisticated scheme. If democracy is to guarantee a sphere, in which individuals are able to make moral decisions based on independent exercise of judgment, and universal suffrage is to enable the realization of individuality of the participants, plural voting nonetheless recognizes superiority of certain kinds of “realization of individuality,” giving them higher influence in public domain and expect the changes they may bring to the ordinary people. Most literature prefers to either neglect the existence of plural voting in Mill’s electoral design, or regard it contradictory, in principle, to the rest of the system. However, this thesis believes that Mill’s ideas about election as a whole can only be fully understood and appreciated in combination with his moral theories. Based on Utilitarianism and on Liberty, I try to reconstruct Mill’s utilitarian and idealistic ethics, which highly correspond to his ideas about election and political rights, in this sense providing a moral justification behind these practical institutions. According to utilitarianism, happiness is the end of action, therefore the end of life. This kind of principle concerning the ultimate end of life cannot be proofed by reasoning; instead it can only be “the subject of a direct appeal to the faculties which judge of fact.” It is due to this empirical epistemology adopted by Mill that the general concept of happiness bears less importance than the aggregate of particular happiness, which come from and can be confirmed by individuals. But how is this difference arising from particularity be understood? Mill’s utilitarianism is notable for its idealistic character, which is well expressed in the famous words, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” He differentiates happiness, or the ends of life for individuals, and believes that “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.” In this sense, Mill cannot be classified as a pluralist; however, such position does not lead him to intolerance. The minority, who have the originality and genius that the society needs for improvement, have –and only have– “freedom to point out the way,” instead of imposing their opinions and judgments on others. Diversity is therefore the result of differences in human capacity, and its value lies in the friendly environment it creates, which encourages and facilitates people with superior intelligence to express themselves. To lead a meaningful life, realization of individuality of every person should be protected, but it does not necessarily mean an equal judgment on the value of every end. Real difficulty arrives in public sphere, where differences in the ends of life turn into competition and contradiction. Mill’s much criticized harm principle, that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others,” indeed lacks the clarity to be materialized. His use of the term “public utility” nonetheless implies a general application of the utilitarian rule, or the greatest happiness principle, to these issues. We could see a corresponding relation between Mill’s moral theories and electoral design at this point, which proves a coherency in Mill’s political ideas. Universal suffrage can be seen as the materialization of the greatest happiness principle at state’s scale: aggregation of particular happiness is transformed through individual’s political participation into accumulation of votes. The greatest happiness principle is applied only when other secondary principles, or doctrines, bring about conflicting considerations and result in incompatible obligations; in this sense, the ends of life are concrete versions of these secondary principles, and election is designed to solve the deadlock. It is not difficult to deduce a mechanism like plural voting, if we notice the differentiation Mill makes in various categories of happiness. The greatest happiness principle should not only take account of quantitative amount, but its quality as well, so the superior end may not necessarily be the one that the most number of people support; in other words, the better ones should receive greater emphasis. And it is also perceivable that giving people with mental superiority larger power –yet not large enough to override others– is preferred to authorizing the very one or few wise men to carry out certain points of view directly, because for Mill, there is no better or best ends of life that are already known; fallibility and corrigibility of all human beings explain the role of education presumed by Mill. The isomorphic relation of Mill’s moral theory and political ideal provides a good epistemological and moral justification for his practical suggestions. Some other questions are therefore brought forth; for example, for those who appreciate Mill’s differentiation of happiness, how is it possible not to embrace Mill’s plural voting at the same time? And can plural voting still be considered democratic? These questions boil down to Mill’s concept of equality. Apart from the weak version of equality as impartiality (equal treatment), which can be dispensed for a greater utility, the strong version requires that “society should treat all equally well who have deserved equally well of if, that is, who have deserved equally well absolutely;” and “this great moral duty rests upon a still deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, and not a mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines.” These definitions, which lie in the closing paragraphs of the book Utilitarianism, deserve much attention because of the hints they may imply in democratic context. This strong version of equality originates from the consequentialist moral position, which, according to utilitarianism, claims that the same kind of utilities should be counted the same in proportion to their volume, regardless of their possessors; in the language of politics, it means that all welfare should be taken into account, regardless of the social status (external factors), or the moral or intellectual capacity (internal factors) of the people. In other words, if election is the process where welfare of individuals is accumulated by their voting, exclusion of any particular person is to count out a part of welfare, which is groundless in the eye of utilitarianism. To conclude, a consequentialist concept of equality is compatible to universal suffrage, but it is confined to a negative position that the quality of the subjects is disregarded, instead of considered identical. The aim of this thesis is never to promote plural voting, let alone to reject equal voting; by means of retracing and reconstructing the moral foundation of the former, I try to draw a comparison between it and contemporary democracy, and to have a closer look at the Zeitgeist behind the modern political participation, in order to clarify the moral presumptions we generally possess and impose on the participants through these institutions. Could equal treatment stand for a neutral moral position? Is it possible to have a completely neutral moral stance? Or is it actually situated on a hidden one? Epistemological agnosticism tends to equalize the value of all kinds of happiness, because they are the same dubious; after separating public and private spheres, liberal neutrality requires the state to abstain from making moral, or value, judgments. In the last chapter of the thesis, the above mentioned moral stances are discussed. And I wish that an inquiry into the moral foundation of modern democracy could better describe the political conditions surrounding every righteous-conscious individual, and thus bring some hints for future improvement. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T17:19:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R97a21033-1.pdf: 1017232 bytes, checksum: 972fb1ddb9a3756b307d56bdae226b48 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 I
誌謝 II 中文摘要 III 英文摘要 IV 第一章 前 言 1 第一節 研究主題 1 第二節 研究方法 4 第三節 文獻回顧 6 第四節 論文架構 11 第二章 MILL的代議政府 12 第一節 MILL與十九世紀英國國會改革運動 12 (一) 時代背景 12 (二) MILL的國會改革方案 14 第二節 完全代議制度 16 (一) 民主代議制為理念上最佳的政府形態 16 1. 政體好壞的判斷標準 16 2. 民主與專制:何者為優? 18 (二) 完全代議制 24 1. 民主理念之下的完全代議制 24 2. 具體的建制規劃 27 3. 制度理念 29 第三節 普遍選舉權 34 (一) 選舉權擴張之功能與目的 34 1. 選舉權之教育功能 34 2. 正義原則所要求之政治參與 35 (二) 選舉權行使之條件 35 1. 基本技能之要求 36 2. 財產條件之限制 37 (三) 複數投票制 38 1. 「容許參與政治」與「授予決定權」之區別 38 2. 複數投票制 40 3. 複數普選制、特權選舉制與平等普選制 42 第三章 MILL選舉制度之哲學基礎 46 第一節 生命的唯一目的:「幸福」 46 (一) 幸福之概念、個別的幸福 46 (二) 不同幸福類型間的素質差異 47 (三) 與BENTHAM理論之間的區別 50 第二節 個人所追求的「幸福」 54 (一) 終極目的之可驗證性 54 (二) 個體性之重要 55 (三) 個體性與素質差異 57 第三節 公共所追求的「幸福最大值」 60 (一) 次要原則衝突的解決:效益原則 60 (二) 效益主義之平等原則 62 (三) 公共領域中的最大效益原則與私人的終極目的之關係 66 第四節 民主、平等、幸福 68 (一) 民主與最大幸福原則:第一層次「幸福總量」的統計 69 1. 平等為兩者共同的基礎 69 2. 普選制為最符合平等原則的選制 71 (一) 以民主追求幸福:第二層次幸福質量的展現 72 1. 以複數投票制使最終的選擇臻於良善 72 2. 民主的教育功能 74 第四章 MILL的政治思想對當代選舉制度理念之反思 76 第一節 平等普選制:制度的形成與背後的理念基礎 77 (一) 以平等普選制為前提的當代民主制度 77 (二) 平等普選制的論證 79 1. 道德平等 80 2. 政治平等 83 (三) 進一步的檢討 86 1. 道德平等原則 87 2. 平等的政治影響力 88 第二節 以MILL選舉制度理念為中心的回應 90 (一) 實體不可知論與程序正義的質疑 90 (二) 國家中立原則 93 (三) 公、私領域的劃分與私領域不干涉原則 95 第三節 現實的考驗?對MILL政治理念的檢討 100 (一) 過於複雜的選舉制度規劃 100 1. 投票資格的設定 101 2. 複數投票制 105 (二) 過度單純的人性觀點 107 第四節 小結:當代的回應 111 第五章 結論 113 參考文獻 116 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | Mill的選舉制度及其政治思想:兼對當代的反思 | zh_TW |
dc.title | JS Mill’s Electoral Design and Political Thought: And a Reflection on Modern Democracy | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 100-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 顏厥安(Chueh-An Yen),蕭高彥(Carl K.Y. Shaw) | |
dc.subject.keyword | 約翰彌爾,政治平等,一人一票,效益主義,複數投票制, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | JS Mill,Political Equality,One person one vote,Utilitarianism,Plural voting, | en |
dc.relation.page | 120 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2012-08-17 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
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