公司負責人忠實義務與司法審查標準之建構 —從商業判斷法則出發

Abstract

如何尋求權力與責任之平衡向來係一亙古的難題，本文以「商業判斷法則」作為起點，討論公司負責人忠實義務所現存之問題，以及商業判斷法則在美國和我國實務上運作的現狀，並且進一步探究商業判斷法則與權限劃分的關聯性，嘗試從權限劃分之觀點，建立對於公司負責人忠實義務的司法審查標準。 本文第一章為緒論。第二章探討公司負責人忠實義務之內涵，從責任主體、負責對象以及忠實義務內涵三個面向分別討論，在責任主體上，介紹「影子董事」及「控制股東」之概念，以作為我國「實質負責人」的借鏡；在負責對象上，探討公司負責人對於全體股東、個別股東、債權人是否均負有忠實義務，並進一步思考多數股東行使權利時的界限；在忠實義務內涵上，藉由參考其他各國規範的方式，認為應將我國忠實義務之內涵予以類型化，至於在善意義務上，本文認為善意義務即為忠實義務之重要要素，不具有提升為獨立義務之必要性與迫切性。 第三章介紹美國德拉瓦州法院對於公司負責人司法審查標準，分為注意義務、忠誠義務、善意義務三方面作介紹，在注意義務上，一般案件發展出商業判斷法則，作為緩和高度注意義務之司法審查標準，併購案件則因應案件類型的不同，導致司法審查標準的多元化；在忠誠義務上，董事存有利益衝突時，董事將不受商業判斷法則的保護，而受「整體公平」的司法審查；在善意義務上，因為定位上的不明確導致司法審查標準的歧異。 第四章轉而從不同的面向分析商業判斷法則，首先介紹商業判斷法則的緣起、要件及法律效果，然而，隨著「商業判斷法則」、「章程免責條款」、「安全港條款」、「支出補償」與「董事保險」等機制之發展，導致忠實義務變成「無責條款」；接著，本文比較其他各國適用「商業判斷法則」的情形，瞭解到此一司法審查標準，隨著該國公司治理制度的不同而有所調整；本文進一步從權限劃分的觀點探討商業判斷法則，代理理論與契約連鎖理論的差異，將導出股東會優位主義與董事會優位主義，兩種截然不同公司內部治理模式的選擇，並將影響到公司內部權限之劃分。 第五章本文進行實證分析，研究我國實務上適用商業判斷法則之情形，本文除了對相關判決提出看法外，並思考商業判斷法則在我國民事與刑事實務上適用之可行性；其次在我國董事會與股東會之權限劃分上，本文探討我國是否已朝向董事會優位主義發展，以及「專屬權限」是否存在，試圖劃分我國董事會與股東會之權限，並與第三章所述的司法審查標準作一連結，進而從權限劃分的觀點出發，建立我國對於公司負責人忠實義務司法審查之標準。 第六章為結論，除了扼要提點並總結前述內容外，並提出我國未來修法方向，希冀透過學說與實務的共同努力，擘劃我國將來司法審查標準之樣貌，以在公司治理中追求權力與責任的平衡，進而建立屬於我國之「商業判斷法則」。

Striking a balance between authority and accountability has always been a contentious issue. This thesis starts from the business judgment rule﹐ and aims at the issues of fiduciary duties of corporate responsible persons, as well as the operation of the business judgment rule in the legal system of the U.S. and Taiwan. The thesis then further extends the research scope to the relationship between the business judgment rule and the allocation of decision-making power. The thesis attempts to construct the standard of judicial review from the point of the allocation of power between shareholders and directors. The first chapter of this thesis is the preface. The second chapter focuses on fiduciary duties of corporate responsible persons, including the subject, object, and contents. With regard to corporate responsible persons, this thesis introduces the concepts of “the shadow director” and “the controlling shareholder”, and compares it to the idea of “de facto responsible persons” in Taiwan. With respect to whom the directors are responsible to, this thesis explores the stockholders and creditors, and goes further with the boundaries and limits on the exercise of majority shareholders' power. Concerning the contents of fiduciary duties, it is recommended that the categories of fiduciary duties in Taiwan should be clearly defined by referring to the other countries’ legal systems. As to duty of good faith, this thesis suggests that there is no need to deem duty of good faith as an independent duty. Chapter three introduces the judicial review of fiduciary duties in the Delaware Supreme Court, dividing the discussion into three aspects: duty of care, duty of loyalty, and duty of good faith. In light of duty of care, the business judgment rule has become the standard of judicial review in general cases in order to loosen higher standards of conduct, on the other hand, the judicial review diversifies in cases about hostile takeover. When discussing duty of loyalty, the directors will be scrutinized under entire fairness standard instead of the business judgment rule, because of the conflict of interest. Regarding duty of good faith, the uncertainty of its position in fiduciary duties results in the differences between the judicial review. In Chapter four, the thesis goes on to approach the business judgment rule from different perspectives. First of all, this thesis introduces the reasons, constitutive elements, and legal effects of the business judgment rule. However, the development of the business judgment rule, the exemption clause in the charter, safe-harbor statutes, indemnification, and directors' liability insurance have made fiduciary duties become a “no liability rule”. This thesis then makes a comparison between the applications of “business judgment rule” in different countries, and suggests that this judicial review shall be adjusted with the different corporate governance. Moreover, this thesis focuses on studying the business judgment rule from the point of the demarcation of power. The discrepancy of the agency theory and the nexus-of-contracts theory will result in different models of corporate governance—shareholder primacy and director primacy, and will further affect the the allocation of power between shareholders and directors. Chapter five aims at empirical study of the business judgment rule applying in Taiwan Judiciary. This thesis not only criticizes the judgment referring to the business judgment rule, but also analyzes the feasible application of the business judgment rule in Taiwan’s Civil and Criminal Law. In addition, on the issue of the division of power between shareholders and directors, this thesis further discusses the issue that whether Taiwan’ Company Law has shown the inclination to director primacy and the existence of exclusive power. Moreover, this thesis attempts to draw a clear line between the power of shareholders and directors, and to connect the allocation of power with the standard of judicial review presented in chapter three. Last but not least, this thesis tries to construct the judicial review of fiduciary duties from the point of power division. Chapter six serves as the conclusion. Aside from summarizing and summing up the prominent ideas addressed above, this thesis proposes the future directions of revising Company Law in Taiwan. Through the hardwork of the scholars and judges in Taiwan, it is expected that the standard of judicial review will be constituted in order to balance the authority and accountability of corporate governance, and Taiwan Judiciary will construct our own “business judgment rule” in the future.