廣播電視集中化管制規範之比較研究--以德國、英國法制為中心

Abstract

本研究係以廣播電視集中化管制規範為主題，以採取比較法研究及市場分析為主要的研究方法。在比較法研究上，係以德國及英國法制為主，透過對於德國及英國廣播電視集中化管制規範及實務的研究，瞭解管制規範目標、方式及手段，並檢視我國現行廣播電視集中化管制規範之不足，並思考在因應數位匯流發展趨勢下，如何重新建構新的媒體集中化管制架構。 在上述研究方法下，本研究主要研究成果如下所示： 一、媒體集中化管制目標，在於避免因媒體過度集中而有減損意見多樣性，進而取得高度影響輿論及設定政治議題的能力。我國司法院大法官釋字第613號解釋理由書中對於「通訊傳播自由」的保障，即在於防止資訊壟斷，確保社會多元意見得經由通訊傳播之平臺表達與散布，形成公共討論之自由領域。此一對於通訊傳播自由的保障，必須由立法者建構積極秩序以達成之。 二、透過對於德國及英國媒體集中化管制規範之研究，發現可區分為「媒體所有權規則」（media ownership rules，或謂「參與模式」）及「市場占有率模式」兩種型態。「媒體所有權規則」係針對廣播電視或報業的相互持股比例或經營，設定持股比例或執照張數限制。「市場占有率模式」則係參考經濟法對於市場界定及認定市場集中度的分析方法，針對媒體對於言論市場影響力進行分析，例如收視（占有）率、收聽（占有）率、閱報率等方式。英國對於媒體結合尚且設置特殊的媒體結合管制規範，以考量個案結合對於公眾意見可能產生的影響為何。 三、對於上述不同管制模式，本研究認為「市場占有率模式」得以兼括不同媒體的言論影響力，以合併考量，此一分析方法可融入於媒體事業結合管制中，讓主管機關判斷系爭媒體結合個案對於言論市場的可能影響。除透過概括的實質審查個案結合的利弊外，對於意見多樣性可能造成具體危險的集中化態樣，得以考慮以設定「媒體所有權規則」的方式，以有效防止具體危險的產生。 四、在設定管制要件上，德國「廣電邦際協約」（RStV）係以電視頻道收視（占有）率30%，作為推定具有支配意見力量的要件，以及「電視頻道收視(占有)率25%，且同時在媒體相關市場具有控制地位」、「於電視及媒體相關市場事業活動之整體評價，與電視收視（占有）率30%相當之意見影響力」。就我國現行電視頻道的收視市場而言，僅電視新聞頻道有較為集中的情形，且為多數觀眾主要收視頻道，因此對於其集中化必須加以留意。本研究認為若參酌公平交易法對於事業結合管制的門檻，市占率三分之一即具有造成市場結構惡化的市場力量，而作為推定具有支配意見力量的要件。 五、對於媒體集團橫跨不同類型媒體以及上、下游的垂直整合態樣，則可分別以四分之一及五分之一作為管制門檻：對於在媒體相關市場具有控制地位者，若同時於電視頻道收視市場具有四分之一收視（占有）率，或者綜合不同媒體意見影響力之評價，可認為與三分之一收視（占有）率相當者。對於報業與電視頻道的結合，則可參考英國20/20 rule規定，限制全國報紙市占率達五分之一（20%）與收視（占有）率達五分之一的電視頻道，其相互持股比例不得超過20%。上述規定應適用於整體電視頻道（all TV）及新聞頻道，以有效防止意見集中化。而對於市場控制地位的判斷，本研究建議可導入德國營業競爭限制防止法第19條第3項之規定，作為推定的要件。 六、在我國頻道授權方面，頻道代理商已然成為最主要的關鍵，其對於頻道授權上架有決定性影響。本研究認為應有必要將資訊揭露機制導入頻道代理商，要求頻道代理商必須揭露「使用報酬率及實施日期的訂定」、「著作相關資訊之公開」、「特定使用型態共同使用報酬率的訂定」以及「使用報酬的分配」，以讓頻道代理市場透明化。 七、對於廣電平臺的集中化管制，基於其具有獨寡占市場的特性，因此可考慮導入媒體所有權規則，設定執照張數限制及持股比例限制，以維持不同平臺之間經營者的多樣性。 八、對於頻道上下架的管制，參考德國實務作法，應考量基本頻道經營者多樣性的要求，以避免特定頻道經營者在特定頻道類型或數量上，取得不均衡的影響力。 九、對於符合一定門檻的媒體事業結合，可參考英國設立媒體事業結合管制規範。在媒體事業結合管制的門檻設定上，考量我國現行媒體市場結構，可以閱聽市場占有率十分之一做為門檻，並例示相關的實質審查要件。此一媒體結合管制規範與前述媒體所有權規則及市場占有率模式並不相互衝突，參考英國實務作法，對於未受媒體所有權規則禁止的媒體事業結合，主管機關仍可審酌其個案對於言論市場的影響，以為准駁之決定。 十、對於上述廣播電視集中化管制，必須有相關的配套，包括關係人的定義必須符合實務需求，主管機關必須有效掌握廣電事業的股權結構，強化股權申報義務及建立資訊揭露機制，均為可供考慮之方向。 十一、對於經認定具有支配意見力量的廣電事業，應採取適當的改正措施以降低其意見力量，包括「採取解體措施」（例如放棄特定頻道之經營、降低在媒體相關市場的控制地位）、「導入內部多元措施」（例如置入獨立第三人播送時段、設置節目諮詢會議）等。目前通傳會於審理廣電事業集中化的個案上，即以附款或由事業以自行提出承諾的方式，對於若干對於言論市場或經濟市場可能產生的不利影響，予以消減。本研究認為通傳會可審酌個案實際情況以為決定。 十二、對於同時符合公平交易法事業結合管制要件的媒體事業結合，尚須經公平會許可結合。從過去公平會審理有關有線電視系統的事業結合個案中，雖公平會體認其與通傳會的職掌分工，僅針對個案是否對於經濟市場有不利影響，進行審酌，但卻又進行若干事前管制的附款要求，直接涉入應屬通傳會的職掌事項，應有加以檢討之必要。

This doctoral dissertation is focused on the broadcasting concentration regulations. The comparative legal analysis and market analysis methodologies are used in this dissertation. From the comparative research on the German and UK media concentration regulations, we understand the objective and strategy of regulations and review the Taiwanese present regulations. Based on the research methodology mentioned above, the main research results as follows: I. The regulation objective of media concentration is to prevent the media over-concentration from impairing the diversity of speech and has more ability to influence the public opinions and political agenda-setting. From the No.613 Reasoning of the Cnstitutional Court, Judicial Yuan, “the freedom of Communications” also has this objective legal meaning. II. Two regulation models are adopted by German and UK media concentration regulations: one is “media ownership rules” (shareholding model) and the other is “market share model”. The “media ownership rules” are regulations on the limitations of share ratio and license numbers. The “market share model” refers the market definition and market concentration ratio analysis in economic law. This model may analyze the influence ability of the market of speech and across different kinds of media. These two models have their merit and demerit. For the cross media concentration, the market share model may take into account the influence levels of different media. And the media ownership rules are suitable for the media concentration with concrete risk for the diversity of speech. III. We think that the German regulations on the media concentration are more valuable for our reference. The market concentration ratio of Taiwanese broadcasting markets are not high, so we may set some regulation thresholds to watch and supervise the market. The “one third” of TV broadcasting market audience share is the assumption of the dominant idea power, and the “one quarter” audience share with the dominant maket power in the media relevant markets is the same. Otherwise it is also included with that the overall assessment of the media aictivities in TV and media relevant markets shows that the influence on public opinions obtained as a result of corresponds to that of an enterprise with one third audience share. IV. Some media ownership rules could be introduced in the Broadcasting Act, including the merge between the TV operators and newspaper operators, and between the broadcasting platform operators. The risk of impairing the diversity of opinions concerning the TV and newspaper merge is higher than the other media concentration, so it fits to be regulated by media ownersip rules. The reason for the media ownership rules on the broadcasting platform operators is that the platform market is tend to the monopoly or oligopoly. V. The media merge control and market share model may be coordinated in one mechanism. The regulatory body may review the market based on the market share model to confirm the influence of speech market. And the media merge control may think over all the other public interest factors. VI. The supporting measures are needed to introduced for the mechanism we suggest, including the definition of the related person needed to fit the requirement of regulatory practice. The shareholder declaration of broadcaster and its information disclosure mechanism are also needed to be built. VII. The remedy measures for the media concentration cases are needed to be regulated. For the media with dominant idea power, the “break-up” and “introducing inner pluralism” measures are both regulated in German Broadcasting Act. The regulatory body needs to confirm that which remedy measures are appropriate for the case and attach what conditions or burdens. VIII. For the media merge cases, if the case fits the merge control requirements of Fair Trade Act, Fair Trade Commission (FTC) needs to investigate it. FTC understands that it should focus on the economic market analysis, not on the speech market which belongs to the NCC’s competence. But in some cases about the cable MSO, FTC requires some burdens which get the pre-approval. These regulatory measures are overlapped with the NCC’s competence, so we think that these measures are needed to be discussed and not so appropriate.