請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件:
http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/62509完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 陳鴻基(Hung-Gee Chen) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Bo-Yi Lee | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 李柏毅 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T16:03:33Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-07-08 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2013-07-08 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2013-07-01 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | 中文文獻
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/62509 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 輿論長久以來要求台灣政府私有化國營企業,以便得到更高的經營效率與獲
利。然而,過去研究指出私有化僅是成功的私有化計劃中必要而非充分的條件: 公司治理架構乃是成功的私有化中不可或缺的考量因素。依據過去研究的定義 與計量方法(二階段迴歸分析),本研究擬針對臺灣公開上市的私有化企業進 行計量分析,探索其內部公司治理結構(例如股權結構、董事會規模、外部董 事比例、董事長與總經理是否分離、董事股權質押比例、現金流量權與控制權 之偏離程度、以及不同類型股東之持有比例)與經營效率(例如存貨週轉率、 應收帳款週轉率、總資產週轉率、營業費用率)之間的因果關係。 本研究指出,股權越集中、董事會規模越大、越多外部董事、政府持股比例越 高,對經營效率有負面效果。董事長與總經理的分離、越高的質押比例與本國 自然人持股比例,對經營效率有正面效果。 以上結果僅有部分符合假說,可能原因包含:非上市公司資料的不可得性,採 用絕對而非與同業相較的效率數值。除上述原因需要改善之外,本研究亦期待 後續可應用「結構-行為-績效」模式,探究內部公司治理結構對行為的影響, 並納入台灣的特殊歷史脈絡,例如國民黨相關事業在國營企業中扮演之角色, 及其在私有化過程中與之後的影響。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Public opinion has urged Taiwanese government to privatize state-owned firms to
yield higher efficiency and profits. However, previous research have pointed out that privatization is the necessary but not the sufficient condition for successful transformation, which calls for the need of corporate governance. Following definitions of corporate governance and econometric methodology by previous studies, this thesis use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to empirically collaborate the causal relationship between internal corporate governance (such as ownership structure, board size, outside directors in board, whether CEO and chairman is separated, level of pledged shares and deviation between cash flow rights and control rights and types of owners) and firms’ efficiency (such as turnover rate of inventory, turnover rate of account receivable, turnover rate of total asset and operating expense.) This study overall reveals that more concentrated ownership, more members in boards especially outsiders and more government ownership are likely to have negative impact on firms’ efficiency. Separation of CEO and chairman would lead to better efficiency, so would level of deviation and ownership held by local individuals. Some of these results are in line with hypotheses, whereas others are against our hypotheses. Perhaps we could yield more consistent conclusions after overcoming problems such as financial reports of those not public traded privatized firms, using comparative data instead of absolute values of firms’ efficiency, applying “Structure - behavior - performance” model by replacing efficiency variables with strategic actions, or taking Taiwanese context into consideration - roles of family enterprise and ownership by KMT-related organizations. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T16:03:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-102-R00741017-1.pdf: 992572 bytes, checksum: 06bd384d598a1f2228b602bbac49de76 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書..........................................................................................................i
中文摘要.........................................................................................................................ii 英文摘要.........................................................................................................................iii 第一章緒論.....................................................................................................................1 1.1 背景..........................................................................................................................1 1.2 動機與目的..............................................................................................................2 1.3 架構..........................................................................................................................3 第二章文獻回顧.............................................................................................................4 2.1 公司治理..................................................................................................................4 2.1.1 股權結構...............................................................................................................7 2.1.2 董事會特徵..........................................................................................................12 2.2 國營事業私有化.....................................................................................................22 2.2.1 私有化之定義......................................................................................................23 2.2.2 私有化之原因......................................................................................................24 2.2.3 內部公司治理結構與私有化企業......................................................................26 2.3 臺灣相關研究...................................................... ..................... ............................28 第三章研究模型............................................................................................................29 3.1 內生性問題與解決方案.........................................................................................29 3.2 迴歸式.....................................................................................................................30 第四章資料分析............................................................................................................41 4.1 樣本..........................................................................................................................41 4.2 敘述統計.................................................... .............................................................42 第五章迴歸分析................................................... .........................................................49 5.1 迴歸結果..................................................................................................................49 第六章結論.....................................................................................................................95 6.1 發現..........................................................................................................................95 6.2 政策建議.................................................................................................................97 6.3 研究限制與未來展望..............................................................................................98 參考文獻.......................................................................................................................100 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 私有化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司效率 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 台灣經濟史 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 二階段迴歸分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Two-Stage Least Squares | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en |
| dc.subject | Firm Efficiency | en |
| dc.subject | Taiwan Economic History | en |
| dc.subject | Privatization | en |
| dc.title | 內部公司治理在臺灣私有化企業之角色 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | The Role of Internal Corporate Governance in Taiwanese
Privatized Firms | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 101-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 朱宇倩,張伊婷 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 私有化,公司治理,公司效率,台灣經濟史,二階段迴歸分析, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Privatization,Corporate Governance,Firm Efficiency,Taiwan Economic History,Two-Stage Least Squares, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 103 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2013-07-01 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 商學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 商學研究所 | |
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