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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61869完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 廖咸興 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Yi-Huan Chang | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 張翊桓 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T13:16:30Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-07-31 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2013-07-31 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2013-07-29 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Baysinger, Barry D., Rita D. Kosnik, Thomas A. Turk, 1991, 'Effects of Boards and Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy', Academy of Management
Journal 34,205-214. Bebchuk, L., A. Cohen, A. Ferrell, 2009, 'What Matters in Corporate Governance?', Review of Financial Studies 22 , 783-827. Bhojraj, Sanjeev and Sengupta, Partha, 2003, 'Effect of Corporate Governance on Bond Ratings and Yields: The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors.', The Journal of Business 76 , 455-475. Bushee, B.J., Noe, C.F., 2000, 'Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility' Journal of Accounting Research 38, 171–202. Chen, T. K., Liao, H. H., Chen, W. C., 2012, ' The Agency Problem Effect between Boards and Minority Equity Holders on Credit Risk: CEO Firing Threshold Perspective ' Working Paper. Fich, Eliezer M., Anil Shivdasani, 2006, 'Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?', Journal of Finance 61, 689-724. Francis, B., Hasan, I., John, K., Waisman, M., 2012, 'Urban agglomeration and CEO compensation' Bank of Finland Research. Gompers, P., J. Ishii, A. Metrick, 2003, 'Corporate Governance and Equity Prices.' Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107–155. Hermalin, B. E., M. S. Weisbach, 1998, 'Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO' American Economic Review 88, 96-118. Ivkovic ́, Z. and Weisbenner, S., 2005, 'Local Does as Local Is: Information Content of the Geography of Individual Investors’ Common Stock Investments' Journal of Finance 55,267–306. John, K., Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., 2011, 'Does geography matter? Firm location and corporate payout policy' Journal of Financial Economics 101, 533-551. Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., Masulis, R., 2011. 'Effects of local director markets on corporate boards. ' Working paper. Loughran, T., Schultz, P., 2005, 'Liquidity: urban versus rural firms.' Journal of Financial Economics 78, 341–374. Masulis, R., Wang, C., Xie, F., 2009, 'Are Foreign Directors Valuable Advisors or Ineffective Monitors?' Working Paper. Petersen, M., 2009, 'Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets:comparing approaches', Review of Financial Studies 22, 435-480. Taylor, Lucian A., 2010 'Why are CEO Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation', Journal of Finance 65, 2051-2087. Yu, F., 2005, 'Accounting Transparency and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads' Journal of Financial Economics 75, 53-84. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61869 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本篇研究致力於探討公司總部地理區域位置對於董事會與小股東之間的代理問題之影響。本篇文章從Taylor (2010) 的模型出發，提供一個指標來衡量董事會與小股東之間的代理問題，進一步根據1991年到2010年的實證資料，探討此代理問題與公司總部地理區域位置的關係。我們發現公司總部遠離大都會地區的公司，因其侷限了小股東監督及了解公司營運狀況的能力，有較嚴重的代理問題以及較高的代理成本。利用五個不同的公司總部地理區位之代理變數，實證結果發現公司總部之地理區域位置顯著的影響董事會與小股東之間的代理問題，隨著到大都會區的距離增加將加重此代理問題。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study explores the relation between the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) and firm location by using the B-E agency proxy developed by Taylor (2010). By employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years, we hypothesize that remotely located firms are more likely to suffer higher B-E agency problem because geographic location limits the ability of minority equity investors to monitor the boards of remotely located firms. We use five different variables to represent location and remoteness of the firm’s headquarters. The empirical results of this study show that a firm’s location significantly affects its B-E agency problem. Higher distance to major city worsens the B-E agency problem. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T13:16:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-101-R00723033-1.pdf: 487058 bytes, checksum: 5bb7b405c222fda52cfc55be79123365 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 致謝 i
摘要 ii ABSTRACT iii Tables v I. Introduction 1 II. Hypotheses 5 III. Data and Methodology 8 A. Sample selection 8 B. Proxy of agency cost between boards and minority equity holders 8 C. Geography 10 D. Control Variables 12 IV. Summary Statistics and Empirical Results 15 A. Summary Statistics of variables 15 B. Empirical Results 16 C. Robustness 19 V. Concluding Remarks 22 Reference 23 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 代理問題 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 地理區位 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 小股東 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 董事會 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 距離 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Agency problems | en |
| dc.subject | Location | en |
| dc.subject | Minority equity holders | en |
| dc.subject | Boards | en |
| dc.subject | Distance | en |
| dc.title | 公司總部地理區位對於董事會與小股東間代理問題影響之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Does Firm Location Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders? | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 101-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 胡星陽,陳聖賢,陳宗岡 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 代理問題,地理區位,小股東,董事會,距離, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Agency problems,Location,Minority equity holders,Boards,Distance, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 33 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2013-07-29 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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