控制權移轉與強制公開收購－以公司價值極大化為中心

Abstract

公司控制權之移轉，一般認為有引進更有效率之新經營者、提升公司價值、促進經濟效率之功能，各式達成控制權移轉之併購手段中，最常見之態樣主要為股份收購，惟並未於我國企業併購法中得到規範，就收購控制性股份，我國主要規範於強制公開收購制度，一般之強制公開收購制度，係指當收購人取得目標公司控制性股份時，因涉及公司控制權之移轉，需向公司全體股東發出以相同條件收購股東持股之要約。 強制公開收購制度是否能和其他併購相關規範一樣，達到促進公司創造價值機會之經濟目標，長久以來多受質疑。贊成強制公開收購論者，多立基於控制權移轉時控制性股東基於高額控制性私利，可能將股權高價移轉予不良經營者，為保護少數股東免受控制性股東與收購人剝削，並賦予少數股東平等的應賣機會出場、共享控制權溢價，而課予收購人強制公開收購之義務；反對強制公開收購論者，則指出該制度之高額成本將阻礙一切控制權移轉交易之進行，公司恐因此喪失引進效率經營者、提升公司價值之機會，如此，則公司整體－包含少數股東，均將同受其害。上述觀點實反應了法律經濟分析中，控制性股東與少數股東間的分配正義、與公司價值極大化，兩者間如何調和之討論。 本文遂探討我國強制公開收購制之必要性，檢視目前各國中存在之三種不同立法例－美國的無強制公開收購、英國與歐盟的全面強制公開收購、我國與中國的比例強制公開收制，歸納分析目前文獻對強制公開收購制度之肯定與質疑論理，重省我國強制公開收購之立法目的與經濟效用。本文認為，法律經濟分析中，財富最大化與分配正義間並非截然對立之概念，分配方式將會影響整體得分配財富之大小，在追求公司價值最大化下，將能使全體股東均獲利，達到最適經濟效率，因此，規範控制性股權收購之制度，應以公司價值最大化為中心，建立能鼓勵有效率交易、阻礙無效率交易之機制。本文藉法律經濟分析觀點，就現行存在之三種立法例－無強制公開收購、全面性強制公開收購、比例式強制公開收購制，與可能之替代方案－股份收買請求權，剖析在我國股權結構與市場環境下，何者最能達到鼓勵能增加公司價值之有效率交易、阻礙減少公司價值之無效率交易的經濟效用，得出於我國狀況下，「比例式強制公開收購制」將最能達成追求公司價值最大化之經濟效用。 於確立我國強制公開收購制度之經濟目的後，本文檢討我國現行強制公開收購之適用要件，觸發要件應要能充分擬制控制權移轉交易之情境，始能將控制性股權交易納入規範，適用該篩選機制，惟本文認為，現行五十日收購百分之二十股權的規定與股權計算方式並無法充分擬制出控制權之移轉情境，期間限制與預定取得概念亦造成實務運作上困擾，遂對觸發義務之控制權門檻與計算、預定取得概念之釐清、五十日期間之妥當性，參酌比較法例，提出修法建議。 同時，就我國現行強制公開收購之豁免事由，以模擬當初法律經濟分析之情境為基準，以是否能達到篩選適任收購人為核心，提出現行法之修正與新增豁免事由之建議。檢討現行規定後，發現諸多豁免事由實仍具強制公開收購欲規範之情境，不應予以豁免，立法技術上亦有將其他規範目的規定與強制公開收購併同處理所生之扞格；此外，參酌外國立法例，斟酌我國法制環境，建議新增如無涉控制權移轉、或技術上不可行等豁免事由。期能使我國強制公開收購設計充分發揮其法制建置背後所欲達成之經濟效率目的。

Transfer of control has been acknowledged as an important mechanism to displace inefficient managers, create value of corporation and thus achieve better economic efficiency. Among various acquisition forms, sales of control is one of the most commonly used for transfer of control, which is regulated by the mandatory bid rule under Securities and Exchange Act. Mandatory bid rule requires the offeror, after acquires certain percentage of voting rights in the company that giving offeror the control of the company, to make a public bid to all the holders of such securities for their holdings at the same price and condition.

However, whether the mandatory bid rule could help to achieve the company value-enhancing economic goal has long been doubted and debated. For those favor the mandatory bid rule, the rule is said to protect minority shareholder from the exploitation of controlling shareholder by selling the company control to possible looters or inefficient offerors at high control premiums, gaining high private benefits of control. By requiring a public offer made to all shareholders, the rule provides an exit for minority shareholders and offers an equal opportunity to share the control premium. The opposing view mainly rests on its chilling effect results from the deriving high costs and investing risks that would block all the takeover offers including the value-enhancing ones, deprives company of the opportunities to create more value by efficient transfer of control and thus fail to protect the interests of both minority and controlling shareholders. The above pros and cons of mandatory bid rule reflect the issue of distributive concern between controlling and minority shareholder and corporate value maximization in the context of law and economics. This thesis thus discusses whether it is necessary to have mandatory bid rule in Taiwan and re-evaluates the economic goal of the rule. In the context of law and economic analysis, wealth maximization and distributive concern are not black and white concepts. The way to distribute would actually affect the size of pie to be shared. The thesis proposes that the normative rule seeks to maximize the corporation value would make all shareholders better off and achieve optimal economic efficiency. Therefore, regulation for sales of control should serve as a mechanism to facilitate value-increasing bid (the efficient bid) while blocking value-decreasing bid (the inefficient bid). By law and economic analysis, the thesis analyzes different forms of sales of control－no mandatory bid rule, mandatory bid rule requires acquisition of all holdings, mandatory bid rule requires acquisition on pro rata basis and the proposed appraisal right, and concludes that under the ownership and market in Taiwan, mandatory bid rule on a pro rata basis could best serve as a mechanism to facilitate efficient bids while blocking inefficient bids. After establishing the adoption of mandatory bid rule on a pro rata basis, the thesis further examines the current regulation rule, including the threshold of control, intention of acquisition, and 50 days of limitation as well as the exemptions. By observing relevant comparative studies and seeking to mimic the analysis model, the thesis proposes certain amendments to the current mandatory bid rule so as to achieve the economic efficiency.