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http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61861完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 許文馨(Wen-Hsin Hsu) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Huan-Sheng Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳煥昇 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T13:16:10Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2022-07-15 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2020-07-28 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-07-20 | |
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| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61861 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 美國財務會計準則委員會於2001年對商譽之會計處理採用新版的SFAS 142，此舉對於整體市場帶來重大的外部衝擊。在本篇論文中，我們研究了財務報導準則之變更對於公司債務成本之影響。美國財務會計準則委員會曾表示採行SFAS 142之目的係為提升財務報表資訊之透明度與促進商譽相關財務資訊之可靠性，我們認為，遵循SFAS 142下之規範將有助於管理階層在評估商譽的過程中更進一步了解所屬各現金產生單位之營運績效，並提高商譽及其相關減損費用等資訊在財務報表上之可靠程度，進而正面地影響債權人之決策，促使他們降低債務人之借款利率。透過差異中差異法模型，我們發現樣本中受到SFAS 142影響之公司（即實驗組公司）在採用SFAS 142之後，債務成本顯著下降，然而，如此效果對於那些擁有過度自信CEO的公司而言反而毫無作用，甚至產生反效果，讓債權人提高其債務成本。除此之外，若債務公司之財務報表上有認列較大之商譽減損費用，其債務成本增加之效果亦較顯著。整體而言，我們的發現指出，外部財務報導準則的變化可能會通過影響內部資訊環境而改變外部對財務資訊的觀點與看法。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | Considering the adoption of SFAS 142 as an exogenous shock, we examine the effect of changes in financial reporting on firms’ cost of debt. In this paper, we investigate whether complying with SFAS 142 improves information transparency and increases the trustworthiness of goodwill as well as goodwill impairment charges on firms’ financial statements, thereby affects lenders’ decisions and induces them to lower interest rates on debtors. Using a difference-in-differences model, we find that firms affected by SFAS 142 (i.e., treatment firms) experience a decrease in the cost of debt in the post-SFAS 142 period. However, for those with CEOs who have an overconfidence personal trait or experiencing larger goodwill impairment charges on their financial statements in the year loans are issued, the results become the opposite. In sum, our findings suggest that changes in external financial reporting can influence how external users perceive firms’ financial information via their impact on the internal information environment. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T13:16:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 U0001-2006202017182700.pdf: 977068 bytes, checksum: 9689f9d69f2512de08aeeb73af14a31b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 摘要 i Abstract ii 1. Introduction 1 2. Institutional Background and Literature Review 4 2.1 SFAS 142 4 2.2 Related Research in The Accounting of Goodwill 6 2.3 Debt Market 8 3. Hypothesis Development 10 3.1 Effects of Goodwill Impairment Change on Cost of Debt 10 3.2 CEO Overconfidence, Goodwill Impairment and Cost of Debt 13 4. Research Design 15 4.1 Cost of Debt and the Adoption of SFAS 142 15 4.2 CEO Overconfidence Measures 17 5. Sample and Empirical Results 19 5.1 Sample Selection 19 5.2 Descriptive Statistics 20 5.3 Empirical Results 20 6. Additional Analysis 21 6.1 Goodwill Impairment Charges as an Interaction Variable 21 7. Conclusion 22 References 24 Appendix A: Variables Definitions 32 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | SFAS 142 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 債務成本 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 債務成本 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | SFAS 142 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 商譽 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | CEO過度自信 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | CEO過度自信 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 商譽 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Goodwill | en |
| dc.subject | CEO Overconfidence | en |
| dc.subject | Goodwill | en |
| dc.subject | SFAS 142 | en |
| dc.subject | Cost of debt | en |
| dc.subject | CEO Overconfidence | en |
| dc.subject | Cost of debt | en |
| dc.subject | SFAS 142 | en |
| dc.title | 商譽減損規範與債務成本：以財務會計準則公報第142號為例 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Goodwill impairment and cost of debt: Evidence from SFAS 142 | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 108-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 劉心才(Hsin-Tsai Liu),廖芝嫻(Chih-Hsien Liao) | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 債務成本,SFAS 142,商譽,CEO過度自信, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Cost of debt,SFAS 142,Goodwill,CEO Overconfidence, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 41 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU202001080 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2020-07-21 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 會計學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 會計學系 | |
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