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  1. NTU Theses and Dissertations Repository
  2. 社會科學院
  3. 政治學系
請用此 Handle URI 來引用此文件: http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61742
完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位值語言
dc.contributor.advisor李鳳玉
dc.contributor.authorYo-Yen Tingen
dc.contributor.author丁友彥zh_TW
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-16T13:11:29Z-
dc.date.available2014-01-01
dc.date.copyright2013-09-12
dc.date.issued2013
dc.date.submitted2013-07-30
dc.identifier.citation參考資料
壹、中文部分
吳玉山,2000,《俄羅斯轉型1992~1999一個政治經濟學的分析》,台北:五南。
吳玉山,2002,〈半總統制下的內閣組成與政治穩定:比較俄羅斯、波蘭與台灣〉,《俄羅斯學報》,2:229-266。
李鳳玉,2001,《半總統制下的總統干政與政府穩定:威瑪德國、法國第五共和、後共波蘭與台灣》,台北:臺灣大學政治學研究所碩士論文。
李鳳玉、藍夢荷,2011,〈一致政府下的內閣穩定〉,《政治科學論叢》,47:107-142。
沈有忠,2004,〈半總統制下的權力集散與政府穩定:台灣與威瑪共和的比較〉,《台灣民主季刊》,1(3):99-129。
林繼文,2009,〈共治可能成為半總統制的憲政慣例嗎?法國與台灣的比較〉,《東吳政治學報》,27(1):1-51。
芮正皋,1992,《法國憲法與雙頭政治》,台北:白雲。
胡祖慶,2012,《比較政府與政治》,台北:五南。
徐正戎,2002《法國總統權限之研究》,台北:元照。
張台麟,1997,〈法國雙首長制及第三次左右共治之研究〉,《美歐季刊》,12(4):61-87。
張台麟,2007,《法國政府與政治》,台北:五南。
劉嘉甯,1990,《法國憲政共治之研究》,台北:台灣商務。
左雅玲,1995,《法國第五共和時期左右共治經驗之研究》,台北:淡江大學歐洲研究所碩士論文。
Philippe Ardant等著,陳瑞樺譯,2001,《法國為何出現左右共治?》,台北,貓頭鷹。
貳、外文部分
Amorim Neto, O. and Strom, Kaare. 2006. “Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science. 36: 619-643.
Blondel, Jean. 1968. “Party systems and patterns of government in Western democracies.” Canadian Journal of Political Science. 1(2): 180-203.
Chiroux, René. 2001. “Chronique politique: Les Français commencent-ils à douter de la cohabitation?” La Revue administrative. 324: 652-656.
De Swaan, A. 1973. Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliament After 1918. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Dodd, L. C. 1976. Coalitions in Parliamentary Government. New Jersey: Princeton University.
Dowding, Keith & Dewan, Torun. 2005. “The Corrective Effect of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity.” American Journal of Political Science. 49(1): 46-56.
Duverger, Maurice. 1978. Echec au roi. Paris: Albin Michel.
Duverger, Maurice. 1980. “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government.” European Journal of Political Research 8(2): 165-187.
Robert Elgie. 1993. The Role of the Prime Minister in France, 1981-1991. London: Macmillan Press.
Elgie, Robert. 2008. “The Perils of Semi-Presidentialism. Are They Exaggerated?” Democratization. 15(1): 49-66.
Elgie, Robert and Schleiter, Petra. 2010. “Variation in the Durability of Semi-Presidential Democracies” in Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup and Yu-Shan Wu (eds.) Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy. London: Palgrave.
Ezra N. Suleiman. 1994. “Presidentialism and Political Stability in France” in Juan J. Linz and Artoro Valenzuela eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, pp. 137-162. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
George Vedel. 2001. “Le quinquennant contre les risqué de cohabitation.” Les Cahiers Français. 300: 16-18.
Grossman Emiliano. 2009. “The President’s Choice? Government and Cabinet Turnover under the Fifth Republic.” West European Politics. 32(2): 268-286.
Hurwitz, Leon. 1971. “An index of democratic political stability: a methodological note.” Comparative Political Studies. 12: 3-27.
Indridason, Indridi H., and Christopher Kam. 2007. “Cabinet Reshuffles in the French Fifth Republic.”
Jan, Windebank. 1996. Economic review of the year 1995, Modern & Contemporary France. 4(3): 345-348.
John, D. Huber. and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. 2004. “Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective.” British Journal of Political Science. 34: 27-48.
John, D. Huber. and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo. 2008. “Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Political Science Review. 102(2): 169-180.
José, Antonio, Cheibub. and Svitlana, Chernykh. 2009. “Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?” Constitutional Political Economy. 20(3-4): 202-229.
Kirschke, Linda. 2007. “Semipresidentialism and the Perils of Power-Sharing in Neopatrimonial States.” Comparative Political Studies. 40(11): 1372-1394.
Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. 1991. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Linz, Juan J. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy. 1(1): 51-69.
Linz, Juan J. 1994. “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in Juan J. Linz and Artoro Valenzuela eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, pp. 3-87. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred, Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Petra Schleiter and Edward Morgan-Jones. 2009. “Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets.” American Political Science Review. 103(3): 496-512.
Petra, Schleiter. and Edward Morgan-Jones. 2009. “Review Article: Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz.” British Journal of Political Science. 39: 871-892.
Petra, Schleiter and Edward Morgan-Jones. 2010. “Who's in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies and the Political Control of Semi-Presidential Cabinets.” Comparative Political Studies. 43(11): 1415-1441.
Pierce, Roy. 1991. “The Executive Divided Against Itself: Cohabitation in France, 1986-1988.” Governance. 4: 270-294.
Protsyk. O. 2005. “Prime ministers’ identity in semi-presidential regimes:Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes” European Journal of Political Research. 44: 721-748.
Sanders, D. and V. Herman. 1977. “The stability and survival of governments in Western democracies.” Acta Political. 12: 346-377.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1997. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd. New York: New York University Press.
Schrameck, Olivier. 2001. Matignon, rive gauche : 1997-2001. Paris: SEUIL.
Scott, Mainwaring, and Shugart, Matthew Soberg. 1997. “Linz, Juan, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Approach.” Comparative Politics. 29(4): 449-471.
Shugart, Mathew Soberg. and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shugart, Mathew Soberg. 1996. “Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Communist Europe.” Transiton 2(25): 6-11.
Shugart, Mathew Soberg. 2005. “Semi-Presidential System: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns.” French Politics 3(3): 323-351.
Skach, Cindy. 2005. Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Stevens, Anne. 1992. The Government and Politics of France. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Steven, D. Roper. 2002. “Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes.” Comparative Politics. 34(3): 253-272.
Svolik, Milan. 2008. “Authoritarian Reversals, and Democratic Consolidation.”American Political Science Review 102(2): 153-168.
Taylor, Michael. and Valentine, M. Herman. 1971. “Party systems and government stability.” American Political Science Review. 65: 28-37.
Taylor, Michael. and Michael, Laver. 1973. “Government coalitions in Western Europe.” European Journal of Political Research. 1: 205-248.
Warwick, P. 1979. “The durability of coalition governments in parliamentary democracies.” Comparative Political Studies. 11: 465-498.
Willerton, John P. and Carrier, Martin. 2005. “Jospin, Political Cohabitation and Left Governance.” French Politics, Culture and Society. 23(2): 43-70.
參、網路資源
L’Assemblée Nationale, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/gvt5rep.asp
Le Monde, http:// www.lemonde.fr/
Le Figaro, http://www.lefigaro.fr/
La Libération, http://www.liberation.fr/
Gallup Poll, http://www.gallup.com/poll/politics.aspx
Sondages en France, http://www.sondages-en-france.fr/
CSA/La vie Sondages, http://www.csa.eu/fr/s26/nos-sondages-publies.aspx
TNS-Sofres Sondages, http://www.tns-sofres.com/
Vie Polituque, http://www.vie-publique.fr/
dc.identifier.urihttp://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/61742-
dc.description.abstract近年來,半總統制的學術成果日漸豐碩,有關半總統制內閣穩定的研究也累積相當成果。一般認為共治時期容易因為府會對立與政策僵局,而使得內閣較不穩定,但本文認為未必如此。根據李鳳玉與藍夢荷 (2011) 的研究,本文認為,和一般文獻的看法不同,法國共治時期的內閣穩定可能優於非共治時期,其中原因是因為權力中心的不同所致。
根據既有文獻可知,法國共治時期的權力中心為總理;非共治時期的權力中心則為總統。本文認為,當權力中心為總理時,相較於權力中心為總統時,內閣將較為不穩定。權力中心與內閣穩定之間之所以呈現如此的關係,則是因為幾個因果機制造成。首先,權力中心向總統傾斜時,總統可以透過撤換閣員等方式來規避政治責任;第二,權力中心偏向總理時,總理會迴避改組以避免受到領導失敗的指責;第三,權力中心偏向總理時,若總統大選將近,總理即便想改組內閣以提高滿意度,也可能受制於總統不願配合。本研究透過比較席哈克總統任內的共治時期與非共治時期,證實了權力中心與內閣穩定之間的關係確實如同本研究所預期。此外,本研究也根據法國民意調查的結果,觀察總統或總理以更換總理或閣員來回應政策失敗的時機點與回應速度,結果發現,非共治時期權力中心偏向總統,總統可以在短時間內回應政策失敗與民意指責;共治時期權力中心偏向總理,總理為了避免改組而受到領導失敗的指責,回應政策失敗與民意的時間應該較非共治時期的總統來的長。而這些發現也印證了共治時期的權力中心(也就是總理),相對於非共治時期的權力中心(也就是總統),回應民怨的速度是比較慢的,其中的原因應當與前所述及的因果機制相關。
zh_TW
dc.description.abstractBased on our survey of recent research on semi-presidentialism, we see a growing literature on this topic. It has been widely claimed that cohabitation leads to political gridlock and conflict between a president and a legislature which in turn makes cabinet instable. However, our research on Chirac’s presidency provides a different view and argument. Based on the theories of Lee & Lan (2011), we argue that French cabinet stability is better in cohabitation periods than that in non-cohabitation periods. The reason is because of important differences in who wields actual political power.
It is known that the French power centers are the prime ministers and the presidents during cohabitation and non-cohabitation periods, respectively. We indicate that cabinets should be more stable when prime ministers hold power, compared to the non-cohabitation periods when presidents hold power. Three causal mechanisms explain why. First, when a president controls real power, he can easily shift off political responsibility through reshuffle. Second, when prime ministers have real power, he will avoid reshuffle to keep off the accusation of policy and leadership failure. Third, when the power center is a prime minister, even if he is willing to improve his personal reputation by changing cabinet composition, a president may not cooperate. The findings of this thesis provide strong support for our argument. Moreover, we also observe how fast the different power centers react to negative public opinion, based on French surveys and cabinet data. We find that the reaction time is relatively shorter during non-cohabitation periods than during cohabitation periods, which is again in accordance with our expectation.
en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T13:11:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
ntu-102-R98322006-1.pdf: 2741188 bytes, checksum: 77f6dc1182e10ca34c780e3d6752ebc5 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2013
en
dc.description.tableofcontents目錄
口試委員會審定書........................................I
謝辭...................................................II
中文摘要...............................................IV
英文摘要................................................V
第一章 緒論.............................................1
第一節 研究動機與目的...................................1
第二節 章節安排.........................................4
第三節 預期成果.........................................5
第二章 文獻檢閱與理論假設...............................7
第一節 半總統制民主存續的爭辯...........................7
第二節 半總統制的組閣過程..............................10
第三節 內閣穩定的定義..................................15
第四節 內閣改組的時機..................................19
第五節 權力中心對內閣穩定的影響........................21
第六節 理論假設........................................25
第三章 研究設計........................................28
第一節 案例選擇........................................28
第二節 研究架構........................................30
第三節 研究方法........................................32
第四章 憲法規範與實際運作..............................38
第一節 憲法架構與總統職權..............................39
第二節 三次共治之實際運作..............................44
第三節 本章小結........................................53
第五章 案例分析........................................54
第一節 內閣改組........................................55
第二節 個別閣員撤換....................................65
第三節 總理辭職與總理易人..............................71
第四節 參選總統的競爭關係..............................77
第五節 本章小結........................................79
第五章 結論............................................80
第一節 研究發現........................................80
第一節 研究限制........................................86
第一節 研究貢獻........................................88
第一節 未來展望........................................89
參考文獻...............................................91
附錄:法國席哈克總統時期內閣變動(1995/05 - 2007/05)....97
dc.language.isozh-TW
dc.subject內閣穩定zh_TW
dc.subject權力中心zh_TW
dc.subject左右共治zh_TW
dc.subject半總統制zh_TW
dc.subject法國第五共和zh_TW
dc.subjectSemi-presidentialismen
dc.subjectCohabitationen
dc.subjectFrench Fifth Republicen
dc.subjectPower Centeren
dc.subjectCabinet stabilityen
dc.title席哈克總統時期的權力中心與內閣穩定zh_TW
dc.titleWho's in charge and cabinet stability during Chirac's presidencyen
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.schoolyear101-2
dc.description.degree碩士
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee張佑宗,蔡榮祥
dc.subject.keyword半總統制,內閣穩定,左右共治,法國第五共和,權力中心,zh_TW
dc.subject.keywordSemi-presidentialism,Cabinet stability,Cohabitation,French Fifth Republic,Power Center,en
dc.relation.page98
dc.rights.note有償授權
dc.date.accepted2013-07-31
dc.contributor.author-college社會科學院zh_TW
dc.contributor.author-dept政治學研究所zh_TW
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