善意對過失犯罪構成之意義

Abstract

出於良善、無私、助人目的善意行為，在我國傳統道德評價下是備受讚揚與推崇的行為。但是，一旦在幫助他人的過程中產生疏失，反而造成被幫助者的損害，就很有可能在刑法上成立過失犯罪。善意所彰顯的正面價值與過失背後的負面意義，也將產生衝突與拔河。在玻璃娃娃案、卡玫基救難義工案的社會輿論中，許多民眾認為追究這些善意助人者的法律責任，是道德價值的淪喪和社會正義的扭曲。 可是，刑法原本就擁有一套價值判斷體系，用來區分合法行為和不法行為。過失犯罪的不法基礎建立在行為人的疏失上，而非惡意的動機。日常生活中的各種行為都可能有所疏漏，善意幫助他人的行為也不例外。當一個善意行為經過刑法的重重檢驗後仍然成立過失犯罪，就代表在現有刑法的價值下，該行為完整實現了過失犯罪的不法內涵。亦即，善意行為人的疏忽程度，已經創造了刑法所不能容許的風險。就此，刑法標準與社會評價似乎出現了落差，也產生了許多疑問：善意行為是否應該承擔刑事責任？刑法的判斷標準是否存在不足之處？社會輿論是否考慮不夠周全或對法律有所誤解？以及一個最根本的問題：善意在刑法上的意義為何？ 比較法上，美國存在一項被稱為「善良撒瑪利亞人法（Good Samaritan Law）」的法律，用來調整過失責任原則，免除緊急情況下善意救助者之法律責任。目前國內介紹善良撒瑪利亞人法的文獻極少，多半只有簡短且片面的資訊，聲稱其具有免除刑事、民事責任的功效，如同善意救助者的免死金牌。但其實絕大多數的善良撒瑪利亞人法都只免除民事賠償責任，且在許多州法中適用限制重重。我國在2013年初增訂了緊急醫療救護法第十四條之二，聲稱引入善良撒瑪利亞人法的精神，規定緊急救助行為適用民法、刑法之緊急避難。但經過進一步的推論可以發現，此一法律根本不具有實質效力，只具有提示性質。 本文在介紹緊急救助行為的立法模式後，將回到善意行為的議題，逐一檢驗善意行為在過失犯罪的構成上是否受到正確的評價。在主觀不法上，過失責任是最低限度的行為注意義務，無論何種行為都應該遵守此一標準，善意行為也不例外。在客觀不法上，善意行為的正面利益並不能與該行為的侵害風險互相抵銷，因為只有法益所有者可以決定是否要為了特定利益而承擔損害風險。在有責性上，善意行為人也不比一般人具有更低的期待可能性。最後，由刑法價值以外的角度切入，討論在刑事政策上善意行為是否可能設置特別的免責規範，如同美國善良撒瑪利亞人法對緊急救助行為的處理方式。本文認為，免除善意行為的責任，除了鼓勵更多善行之外，也將導致善意行為人的鬆懈，更容易發生疏忽。因此鼓勵善意行為是否對社會有利，能作為刑事政策的正當基礎，值得懷疑。而且，從心理學的角度來看，善意助人的意願受到很多因素影響，除了實體過失責任以外，訴訟的證明問題與程序紛擾，都是善意行為人會考量的不利益因素。故免責規範所能達成的效果，十分有限。而且，從一些判決案例來看，許多行為都必須經過審判程序，才能正確得知是否應該處罰。所以更不能制訂一體適用於所有善意行為的免責規範，應該回歸一般過失行為的責任原則與處理方式，由法院深入解析個案並判斷是否不法有責。 亦即，刑法的判斷標準並不需要為善意行為做出修正。而善意在刑法上，也不具備特別意義。

Unselfish acts based on the good faith to help others is admirable and applaudable especially by the moral standard of our traditional culture. However, once mistakes occur and damages happen during the process of performing help, the intended good acts might constitute criminal negligence. Thus comes the issue of good faith conflicting with unlawful results. In the case of Brittle Bone Disease and the case of voluntary rescuers during Typhoon Kalmaegi, public opinion widely held that to charge the good-faith helpers under the law is nothing but a distortion of moral values and ignorance of social justice. Nevertheless, criminal law contains its one value system to make judgments distinguishing lawful and unlawful acts. The unlawfulness of criminal negligence is founded on the carelessness of the accused, not malicious motive. Careless mistakes can happen to one’s every move in daily life, not exclusive of the unselfish acts to help others. If an act based on good faith to help others, after examined under criminal law, still constitutes criminal negligence, it means this act is apparently not allowed under the present value system of the law. That is, the extent of the helper’s carelessness is so substantial as to realize the risk which criminal law can no longer permit. Here we see the gap between the standard of criminal law and public opinion. As a result, many question arise such as: Should good faith constitute criminal negligence? Is the standard of criminal law inadequate? Does public opinion lack in thoughtfulness, or simply misunderstand the law? Finally, the fundamental question might be: What can be the function of good faith in criminal law? Comparatively, in the U.S. there is “Good Samaritan Law” to adjust the standard of negligence by exempting the good-faith helper’s responsibility in case of emergency. In Taiwan, rare domestic literatures can be found that introduces “Good Samaritan Law”; most of them, if any, contains only fragmented and rough information. These literatures claim that under “Good Samaritan Law” good-faith helpers are exempted from both criminal and civil responsibility. The fact, however, is that most “Good Samaritan Laws” only exempt the responsibility to compensate under civil law, and in many states their application is not without substantial restriction. In Taiwan, in 2013, Art. 14-2 of the Emergency Medical Service Act was legislated; it professes to introduce “Good Samaritan Law” and stipulates that emergency medical services apply to necessity under both criminal and civil law. Yet further observance indicates that this law is not of substantial effects; it only serves as unbinding instruction. This Thesis, after introducing the legislative model of Emergency Medical Service Act, will return to the issue of good faith acts, examining step by step whether good faith acts is served right under the theory of criminal negligence. Concerning subjective unlawfulness, negligence is the minimum standard of care that applies to all acts, including good faith acts. Concerning objective unlawfulness, the positive value of good faith acts cannot make up for its perpetrating risk; after all, only the legal interest possessors herself can legitimately decide whether to take risk for potential interest. Concerning liability, a good-faith helper is not of less expected possibility than average person. Finally, beyond criminal law, this Thesis discusses whether an exempting provision for good faith acts comparable to “Good Samaritan Law” is proper in criminal policy. This Thesis argues that exempting the responsibility of good faith acts, while encouraging more good acts, will also result in good-doer’s carelessness and thus lead to more mistakes. Hence it is doubtful whether encouraging good acts is a legitimate reason in the name of criminal policy. Besides, from psychology, the good will to help others is contingent upon many factors. Except for substantial negligence responsibility, procedural disturbance and the proof of evidence are also negative factors a good-faith helpers might take into consideration. So the effect of exempting provision is rather limited. In addition, in some cases, many acts can be affirmed as punishable only after going through judicial process. Therefore, a general exempting provision applied to all good faith acts is improper; rather, it is proper to return to the normal rules of responsibility and leave it for the court to adjudicate case by case. In conclusion, this Thesis argues that the standard in criminal law should not be compromised for good faith acts; good faith is of no special function in criminal law.