兩階層綠色產品鏈之分權式決策

Abstract

綠色產品（Green product）市場隨著環保議題受到重視快速成長，企業因此積極開發符合環保規範之綠色產品。國際間通用生命週期評估（Life-cycle assessment，簡稱LCA），衡量產品從設計端至消費者端，產品生產鏈活動中直接或間接產生之碳排放。然而，大部分綠色產品都著重於產品本身之設計或強調產品之原料環保性與可回收性，而忽略產品在製造或生產供應鏈等相關方面產生之碳排放。本研究考慮產品綠色設計本身對環境之衝擊外，同時也將製造或生產供應鏈相關之碳排放納入考量。本研究提出一個Stackelberg-type模型，先行者（Leader）為上游製造商；追隨者（Follower）為下游製造商。上游製造商之決策變數為產品設計、契約價格以及減碳回饋，其中減碳回饋即每公斤碳排放減少，下游製造商可以得到之獎勵費用。下游製造商會依據上游設計商所給的產品設計、契約價格以及減碳回饋決定其產品之生產供應鏈。透過減碳回饋機制，下游製造商在決定其產品供應鏈時，會將碳排放納入考慮，而選擇較環保的產品供應鏈。此模型可以協助上游設計商，在同質性綠色產品中挑選出符合環境規範且自身成本最小之產品設計。

Green product markets have grown rapidly due to the rise of environmental awareness recently. In addition to complying with environmental regulations, many enterprises design “greener” products in order to gain a larger market share. Life-cycle assessment （LCA） is a technique to assess carbon emission associated with all stages of the life of products from cradle to gate. Most green product designs mainly focus on the design itself or recyclability of materials, but neglect the carbon emission generated through manufacturing and its associated supply chain activities. This research considers the comprehensive carbon emission including a green product design and its associated manufacturing processes. We present a Stackelberg-type model consisting of a leader （the product designer） and a follower （the manufacturer）. The product designer determines the product design, wholesale price, and incentive for the manufacturer to reduce carbon emission （carbon rebate） in order to meet environmental standards. The manufacturer configures a production chain after learning the wholesale price and carbon rebate announced by the product designer. The mechanism of carbon rebates allows product designers to induce the manufacturer choosing a production chain configuration with less carbon emission. A real world table lamp example is used to illustrate the proposed method.