影響三大法人持股比例分析-以台灣上市櫃公司為例

Abstract

近年來ESG概念的興起，公司治理的議題被廣泛地討論，本研究為探討三大法人持股比例的影響，將財報中的財務變數視為因子，並加上股權結構以及經營權相關的公司治理變數納入模型，觀察各變數間對三大法人的影響性。結果顯示資產規模愈大時，外資持股比例愈高；ROE愈大時，外資持股比例反而愈低。至於投信及自營的結果恰好與外資相反，資產規模與持股比例呈反向變動、ROE則與持股比例呈正向變動。負債比率方面，外資持股比例與其呈負向關係，投信則呈現正向關係，然而自營卻無顯著影響。此外，營收成長率及股利支付率則對三大法人持股比例均無顯著的影響性。公司治理變數方面，董監質押比例愈高的公司，外資及投信的持股比例會愈低，自營則是愈高。另外，外資較不偏好經理人持股比例高的公司，投信及自營則相反。本研究特別考量到股權結構複雜化之下導致的控制權與現金流量權偏離的問題，結果顯示三大法人均沒有明顯的影響性，與預期的結果不同。此外，外資較偏好非家族的企業，投信及自營則並未表現出這樣的跡象。從以上的結果來看，可發現三大法人對因子的反應常會有不同的結果，並不是一致性地往同一方向變動。就算是同向變動，有的影響是顯著的，有的影響則微乎其微，端看三大法人各自看重的企業特性為何。

Since the concept of ESG has been gaining attention, the topic of corporate governance is widely discussed. In order to research the holding preference from three major institutional investors, this thesis set financial variables and corporate governance variables which contain shareholding structure and the right of management as factors. The result shows that the bigger of the size of the company, the higher of the shareholding ratio of Foreign Investment. The bigger of ROE, the lower of the shareholding ratio of Foreign Investment. And the result of Securities Investment Trust and Dealers are opposite to the result of Foreign Investment. In the aspect of debt ratio, the higher of debt ratio leads to the lower of the shareholding ratio of Foreign Investment. The higher of debt ratio leads to the higher of the shareholding ratio of Securities Investment Trust. And there is no obvious relationship between the debt ratio and the shareholding ratio of Dealers. Besides, the revenue growth rate and the dividend payout ratio have no impact on the shareholding ratio of three major institutional investors. In terms of corporate governance variables, the higher of equity pledge ratio of directors leads to the lower of shareholding ratio of Foreign Investment and Securities Investment Trust; however, it leads to the higher of shareholding ratio of Dealers. Moreover, Foreign Investment prefers companies whose manager shareholding ratio are lower. In the contract, Securities Investment Trust and Dealers prefer the higher of manager shareholding ratio. This research especially takes the issue of deviation of control from cash-flow rights into account. The result shows that there is no obvious impact on the shareholding ratio of three major institutional investors. Besides, Foreign Investment doesn’t prefer family business; however, Securities Investment Trust and Dealers have no effect from that. As mentioned above, we can see that the three major institutional investors have different reaction to each impact factor. The results depend on the characteristics that three major institutional investors regard as important.