棘輪預算制度對盈餘管理行為之影響－實驗證據

Abstract

本研究主要探討的問題是棘輪預算制度對經理人盈餘管理行為之影響，並延伸Leone and Rock (2002)的研究，進一步在有暫時性盈餘及無暫時性盈餘的情況下，研究棘輪預算制度對盈餘管理行為之影響。故本研究之研究問題為：(1)無暫時性盈餘時，在不同的棘輪預算制度下，經理人是否會有不同的盈餘管理行為。(2)有暫時性盈餘時，在不同的棘輪預算制度下，經理人是否會有不同的盈餘管理行為。 本研究以實驗室實驗的方式，共招募76位大學生及研究生擔任受試者。進行裁決性應計項目之盈餘管理決策工作。研究結果顯示：在對稱的棘輪預算制度下，無論有無暫時性盈餘，經理人皆傾向向上盈餘管理，與研究假說一致；在不對稱的棘輪預算制度下，無論有無暫時性盈餘，經理人亦皆傾向向上盈餘管理，與研究假說不一致。

The primary purpose of this paper is to examine how managers manage earnings under different kinds of ratchet budget, symmetry and asymmetry. In addition, this paper also discusses the ratchet effect under different conditions of transitory earnings, existence and inexistence. We recruit 76 undergraduate students and graduate students as participants in an experiment in which participants perform an accrual-based earnings management decision task. Consistence with our expectation, our results indicate that managers tend to increase reported earnings with discretionary accruals under symmetry ratchet budget. However, the results don’t support our hypotheses that managers tend to make income-decreasing discretionary accruals to offset transitory earnings surprises under asymmetry ratchet budget. Our results indicate that under asymmetry ratchet budget, managers tend to increase reported earnings with discretionary accruals no matter whether transitory exist or not.