韓國電信民營化—以政策網絡分析

Abstract

金大中政府在金融危機後上台，在面對IMF的貸款條件以及還款壓力之下，政府展開了以新自由主義為背景的四大領域改革，包括：財閥、金融、勞工以及公部門改革。 針對金融危機後的改革，學者多將研究焦點放在財閥與金融改革上，探討改革對過去發展型國家模式的影響。相對於既有文獻，本文將研究焦點放在政府與公營企業關係上，由於在民營化前韓國的公營企業，在政府的領導下除了提供公共服務外，也扮演政府汲取資金、人事任命以及執行產業政策的工具。因此公營企業的民營化如何影響政府與公營企業的關係成為本文的研究焦點。 本文選擇以韓國電信為例，觀察韓國電信在金融危機前後的兩波民營化改革，可以發現相較於金泳三時期的民營化改革，金融危機後改革程度更深而速度更快，是什麼原因造成兩波民營化的差異？以及在韓國電信完全民營化後，卻可以發現韓國電信在董事以及會長的背景上往往具有官方背景，又除了人事外在公司的經營上也有受到政府影響的痕跡。這使得在民營化後的國家與公營企業之間的關係成為疑問。 既有文獻認為，金融危機帶給金大中政府雙重影響，使得政府對公營企業民營化的意願與能力皆提升，而加速公營企業在金融危機後的民營化。然而既有文獻對於IMF體制下的雙重影響，如何造成決定韓國電信民營化政策的政策網絡發生改變上並沒有多加描述，另外對於韓國電信民營化後的官方背景人事也缺乏說明。 Hugh Compston認為，政策網絡在受到外在環境變化時，會對行為者的問題與解決方案、政策之偏好、擁有資源、採取策略造成影響，另外也會影響政策網絡本身的規定與規範，而當這五項變數中的任一變數發生改變時，便有可能連帶影響參與網絡行為者所擁有的資源以及相互的資源交換，進而使得政策產出發生改變。 本文以Hugh Compston政策網絡理論，在既有文獻的基礎上做出四點假設：首先，受到IMF體制的影響使得政府政策之偏好的改變，對韓國電信民營化的意願提高。第二，在財閥壟斷資金的情況下與財閥妥協。第三，政府在金融危機後採取對工會採取打壓的策略，而工會則受到IMF體制的影響無法抗衡。第四，政府在完全民營化的壓力下，從對所有權的掌握轉移至對經營權的控制。 透過文獻的分析可以發現金大中政府受到IMF體制影響：首先，在政府與財閥的關係上，由於財閥所擁有的資金是達成完全民營化的關鍵，使得政府項財閥妥協，提高財閥持有股份的上限。第二，在政府與電信工會的關係上，一方面政府在金融危機後增加對工會的打壓與控制，另一方面工會則受限於當時的政治情勢，無法再度透過輿論壓力對政府抗衡，使得工會在政府的打壓下，被排除在政策網絡之外。最後，金大中政府在民營化的策略上，採取「分散釋股的策略」，試圖透過建立「沒有主人的公營企業」使得韓國電信在沒有大股東的情況下，公司的經營的重心由股東轉移至專業經理人以及理事會上，以避免財閥在韓國電信民營化後對電信產業的壟斷。 然而分散的持股結構，以及公司的統治結構由所有人轉移至專業經理人使得其後政府在零持股的情況下，往往透過干預會長、理事會以及管理階層的人事，進而對韓國電信的經營決策造成影響。又除了政府對韓國電信的影響，韓國電信也透過與政府的不當連結，促使推動有利於公司的政策。

After the financial crisis, Kim Dae-jung administration took the office. In order to reduce the debt and fulfill the loaning condition asked by IMF, Kim administration conducted a series of reformation driven by neoliberalism. The reformation focused on four main domains: chaebol, finance, labor, and government. Most researches about the reformation after the financial crisis were focusing on finance and cheabol. They discussed the influence of the reformation on models of developing country. This research focuses on the relation between the government and the public enterprises. In South Korea, public enterprises not only play roles in providing services, but also giving access to funds, offering jobs, and implementing industrial policies before privatization. In this research, we try to address how privatization of public enterprises affects relations between the government and public enterprises. We chose Korea Telecom as an example. Observing the two waves of privatization before and after the financial crisis, it is found that compared with the privatization reform in Kim Yong-san government, the privatization reform of Korea Telecom is deeper and faster after financial crisis. What causes the differences between two waves of privatization reforms? Why the board and the president of Korea Telecom are often have official backgrounds after the full privatization? In addition, there were traces showing that the companies operation was affected by the government. This raises questions about the relationship between the government and the privatized public enterprises. Former literature suggests that, the financial crisis has caused the dual impact on Kim Dae-jung government, both increasing the willingness and ability for government to accelerate the privatization of public enterprises. However, former literature did not explain how the dual impact changed the policy networks of the privatization of Korea Telecom. It is neither explained the official background of the boards of Korea Telecom after the privatization. Hugh Compston thinks that, the problem and solutions, preferences of policies, possessed resources, strategies of actors subject to changes of external environment. It also affects the regulation and rules of the policy networks itself. When any one of the five parameters is changed, it affects the resources of the actors in the network and how they exchange resources, leading to the change of policy making. Based on the Hugh Compston's policy network theory, four assumptions are made on the basis of the existing literature. First, the willingness of Korean Telecom to privatize is increased by the change of preference of government policy, which is influenced by the IMF institution. Second, the government compromises with the chaebols when chaebols monopolize capitals. Third, the government in the financial crisis will adopt a strategy to suppress labor unions. Labor unions, affected by the IMF system, is unable to fight against the suppression. Fourth, under the pressure of full privatization, the government shifted from the control of ownership to the control of rights of management. We found the influence of IMF system on Kim Dae-Jung after analyze the literature. First, on the relationship between the government and the chaebol, the government tends to compromise because the money owned by the chaebol is the key to full privatization. It leads to the raise of the upper limit of the shares the chaebol can hold. Second, on the relationship between the government and the telecommunications labor unions, the Government in the financial crisis increased the control and suppressions over the labor union. On the other hand, the union was limited by the political circumstances at that time. It could not fight against the government through public pressure. Under pressure from the government, labor union were excluded from the policy network. Last, Kim Dae-jung's strategy of 'decentralizing the shareholding”, or 'public enterprise without owner” during the privatization reform tried to shift the power of the company from the shareholders to professional managers and the board, in order to avoid chaebols from monopolizing the telecommunication industry after the privatization of Korea Telecom. However, decentralized structure of shareholding, as well as the structure of management of the companies, enables the government to affect the company’s decision making by intervening the appointment of personnel such as the president, the board of directors, even though it didn’t hold any shares. In addition to the government's influence on Korea Telecom, KT has also promoted a pro-corporate policy through improper links with the government.