準政府組織的課責：以公設財團法人及行政法人為例

Abstract

許多先進國家將政策執行的業務，由行政機關移轉給準政府組織辦理，使機關能專注於政策制定。根據英國、日本的經驗，準政府組織的課責機制如何設計，攸關其運行能否確保公共利益。 我國有公設財團法人、行政法人等兩類準政府組織。長年來，公設財團法人因課責機制不健全而弊象叢生。我國民主化後，公設財團法人持續被政府大量設置，但各界也更注意到其逐漸失控。對此，我國政府引進與公設財團法人的功能類似、但課責機制相對健全的行政法人。然而，公設財團法人、行政法人所受監督的力道不斷加強，使這兩者的差異及其成立初衷逐漸模糊。因此，我國公設財團法人、行政法人的課責機制，有重新釐清與深入研究的必要。 本論文以委託代理、課責為理論基礎，並聚焦於準政府組織的政治課責、行政課責、法人治理等面向。另外，本研究透過文獻分析，以及對80名受訪者進行深度訪談，探討的問題包括：第一，英國政署與非部會公共團體、日本獨立行政法人的課責機制如何設計？哪些經驗值得我國參考？第二，我國公設財團法人、行政法人的課責機制如何設計？在制度的設計與運作上，會受哪些因素影響？第三，綜合比較我國公設財團法人、行政法人的課責機制，有哪些問題需要檢討，以及該如何修正？ 在政治課責方面，本研究發現：第一，英國與日本皆高度授權行政部門來監督準政府組織；第二，我國立委不信任準政府組織，從而擴增國會的預算審議權；第三，立委對於準政府組織的監督，受政黨意識形態、人民陳情、地方政治等因素的影響。 在行政課責方面，本研究發現：第一，英國與日本皆重視準政府組織的退場機制，但我國則否，甚至使其成為牟私工具；第二，官員兼法人職、績效評鑑、預算來源、主管權責等制度性因素，以及官員思維、專業不對稱、人脈、價值等非制度性因素，影響行政課責機制的運作。 在法人治理方面，本研究發現：第一，英國、日本準政府組織的治理機關成員為公開徵才，而我國是部會自行覓才，過程不透明且易被質疑酬庸；第二，董事長與執行首長的薪資限制、官方董監事必須申報財產、董事會性別比例規範等制度性因素，影響準政府組織延攬人才；第三，建立內部控制制度，短期內會衝擊組織，但對組織的長遠發展有利；第四，董事會的專業、執行首長的領導、董事長及執行首長的關係，是影響法人治理品質的非制度性因素。 在實務上，本研究建議將公設財團法人分為：類行政法人、一般政府捐助之財團法人、類一般政府捐助之財團法人等3類。另外，各類準政府組織與行政機關、民間財團法人的課責強度，依序為：行政機關>行政法人≧類行政法人>一般政府捐助之財團法人≧類一般政府捐助之財團法人>民間財團法人。 最後，本研究建議：第一，將課責強度的分級原則制度化；第二，調和並落實部會與準政府組織的目標；第三，強化準政府組織的專業與自律；第四，透過改善行政課責與法人治理，爭取國會對於準政府組織的信任。

Many advanced countries have transferred policy implementation matters from an administrative agency to a Quasi-Autonomous Non-Government Organization (QUANGO) for handling so that administrative agencies can focus more on formulating policies. Based on the experiences of the UK and Japan, the design of the accountability mechanism of QUANGOs is significant if they can operate successfully to ensure public interests. Taiwan currently has two kinds of QUANGO institutions: Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) and Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs). For many years, various problems have arisen with the former due to inadequate accountability mechanisms. After democratization in Taiwan, many GONGOs were subsequently established; nevertheless, people from diverse trades have observed that such institutions have gradually lost control. In view of such norms, the government introduced NDPBs, which share similar functions as GONGOs but have comprehensive and healthier accountability mechanisms. However, when supervision rendered upon GONGOs and NDPBs is strengthened, it simultaneously makes the difference and the initial intention of the establishment between the two increasingly blurred. Therefore, studies on the accountability mechanisms of GONGOs and NDPBs need to be conducted with in-depth investigation and re-clarification. This study is based on principal-agent theory, with accountability as its theoretical foundation, and is focused on the following three aspects of GONGOs: political accountability, administrative accountability, and corporate governance. Furthermore, through literature analysis and in-depth interviews with 80 relevant individuals, this study has investigated the following issues: First, how are the accountability mechanisms of the executive agencies and NDPBs of the UK and Independent Administrative Institutions (IAIs) of Japan designed? What experiences are worthy for us to learn from? Second, how are the accountability mechanism of Taiwanese GONGOs and NDPBs designed, and which factors should impact the design and operation of the system? Third, as a summation of the accountability mechanism of Taiwanese GONGOs and NDPBs which issues should be reviewed, and how they can be corrected? Regarding political accountability, this study has found the following: Both the UK and Japan have empowered their administrative agencies to a great extent to supervise these QUANGOs. Furthermore, members of the Legislative Yuan do not trust Taiwanese QUANGOs, so the Legislative Yuan have increased the review authority of budget with it. Finally, legislative supervision of QUANGOs is influenced by ideology, petition of the constituents, and local politics. As for administrative accountability, this study has found the following: First, both the UK and Japan have a high regard for the withdrawal mechanism of these QUANGOs. That is not the case in Taiwan, so these institutions have been turned into tools in pursuit for private interests. Second, institutional factors, such as officials holding positions in QUANGOs, performance evaluation, budget sources, and supervisory authority of the executives, as well as non-institutional factors as mentality, professional asymmetry, interpersonal network, and values, have influenced the operations of accountability mechanisms. With regard to corporate governance, this study has found the following: Members of the governing boards of QUANGOs in the UK and Japan are found through open recruitment, while ministries in Taiwan find these talents on their own, using non-transparent processes and potentially treating them as a service reward. Moreover, institutional factors, such as remuneration constraints of the board chairmen and CEO, property declaration by board members and supervisors with official capacity, and gender ratio of the board, have properly confined QUANGOs to solicit talents that can contribute. Thirdly, the establishment of an internal control system can impact the organization in the short term but be beneficial to it in the long term. Lastly, professionalism of the board, leadership of the CEO, and relationships between the chairman and CEO are non-institutional factors that affect the quality of corporate governance. In practice, this study would recommend classifying Taiwanese GONGOs into the following three categories: Quasi-NDPBs, ordinary GONGOs, and Quasi-ordinary GONGOs. Furthermore, the accountability intensity of every QUANGO, administrative agency, and civil NGOs should be ranked individually as administrative agencies > NDPBs≧ Quasi-NDPBs > ordinary GONGOs≧ Quasi-ordinary GONGOs > civil NGOs. In summary, this study suggests the following: First, determine classification level principles for an accountability intensity system. Second, mediate and realize the objectives of both the ministries and QUANGOs. Third, improve the professionalism and self-regulation of QUANGOs. Fourth, establish trust between the Legislative Yuan and QUANGOs by improving administrative accountability and corporate governance.