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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.advisor | 黃奎隆 | |
dc.contributor.author | Sheng-Szu Liu | en |
dc.contributor.author | 劉聖慈 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T09:33:46Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-02-17 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2017-02-17 | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2017-02-14 | |
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/59699 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 隨著全球行動網路數據流量不斷成長,網路壅塞發生的發生頻率增加,造成服務品質下降,大眾不斷要求電信商擴建網路設備以因應需求,卻也同時讓提供使用者內容服務之內容提供者受到矚目,本研究在考慮服務品質下,討論設備維護成本的成本分配合約對於電信商與內容提供者雙方效益的影響。
本研究以斯塔克柏格賽局模型為基礎,首先建立電信商與內容提供者合作前之數學模型,作為雙方合作後結果之比較基準,利用逆向歸納法求得電信商最適設備規模與內容提供者最適內容訂閱價之解析解。接著討論電信商與內容提供者在分別擁有不同決策權力的多種合作情境下將如何制定決策,而其決策將如何影響其餘相關參數。 當內容提供者協助負擔網路設備維護成本時,將提供電信商誘因擴建網路設備規模。雙方合作後能讓更多使用者使用內容,服務品質亦可提升。而在內容提供者合作後會改變內容訂閱價的情境下,內容提供者不會將其所需負擔的成本轉嫁至使用者上,反而會調降內容訂閱價,此時能有更多使用者以較低的價格體驗到更好的服務品質。透過成本分配合約,電信商可在不影響內容提供者效益的前提下追求自身利益,同時為大眾帶來益處。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | With the popularity of smart devices and the convenience of the internet, global mobile data keeps growing. As network congestion occurs more frequently, users experience internet service with lower quality and start complaining of internet providers. Internet service provider will have higher reputation if service quality is improved, but the maintenance cost of network infrastructure will increase as well. However, content provider will gain more benefits without paying additional cost after infrastructure expansion. Therefore, internet service provider has no incentive to expand the scale of capacity. In this research, we consider a cost-sharing contract between internet service provider and content provider, and analyze the problem by backward induction. In basic model, content provider decides the subscription price of content after internet service provider decides the scale of capacity provided to users for connecting to the internet. This research considers different cooperation scenario, in which content provider and internet service provider are able to make different decisions, that is, the scale of capacity or the proportion of maintenance cost shared by content provider. Through numerical analysis, we show that internet service provider will have incentive to expand the scale of infrastructure capacity without sacrificing content provider’s utility through cost-sharing contract, and more users can experience internet service with better quality at the same time. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T09:33:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-105-R03546002-1.pdf: 1785683 bytes, checksum: d59a9494e8c22b1eba47be5b45096e1e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書 i
致謝 ii 摘要 iii ABSTRACT iv 目錄 v 圖目錄 vii 表目錄 ix 第1章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景 1 1.2 研究動機與目的 5 1.3 研究範圍與架構 6 第2章 文獻探討 9 2.1 電信商因應網路需求增加之策略 9 2.2 內容提供者之參與 12 2.3 合約設計 15 第3章 問題描述與模型建構 17 3.1 問題描述及定義 17 3.1.1 電信商設定 19 3.1.2 內容提供者設定 20 3.1.3 使用者設定 20 3.2 參數設定與合作前之基本模型建構 21 3.2.1 基本模型之推導與求解 21 3.2.2 模型定理推導 24 3.3 合作後之模型建構與求解─電信商全權決定合約內容 27 3.3.1 電信商全權決定合約內容,內容提供者考慮公平性 28 3.3.2 電信商全權決定合約內容,內容提供者不考慮公平性 31 3.3.3 模型定理 33 3.4 合作後之模型建構─內容提供者參與合約設計 34 3.4.1 電信商決定成本分配比例,內容提供者決定設備規模 35 3.4.2 電信商決定設備規模,內容提供者決定成本分配比例 36 3.4.3 模型定理 36 第4章 數值分析 38 4.1 情境分析 38 4.1.1 電信商全權決定合約內容,內容提供者考慮公平性(情境一) 39 4.1.2 電信商全權決定合約內容,內容提供者不考慮公平性(情境二) 40 4.1.3 內容提供者參與合約設計,決定設備規模(情境三) 41 4.2 廣告效益參數對電信商決策之影響 42 4.2.1 合作前 43 4.2.2 高單位維護成本下不同合作情境之比較 46 4.2.3 低單位維護成本下不同合作情境之比較 50 第5章 結論 57 參考文獻 60 附錄1:Proposition推導 63 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 考量網路服務品質下電信商與內容提供者之合作模式研究 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Cost-Sharing Contract in Consideration of Network Service Quality between Internet Service Provider and Content Provider | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 105-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 孔令傑,陳文智,郭佳瑋 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 成本分配,合約設計,電信商,內容提供者,服務品質, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Cost-Sharing,Contract Design,Internet Service Provider,Content Provider,Quality of Service, | en |
dc.relation.page | 74 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.6342/NTU201700585 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2017-02-14 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 |
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