韓國核武發展可能性之探討－－以薩根的核擴散三種模型分析之

Abstract

1993 年第一次北韓核武危機發生之後，國際社會特別關注東北亞區域核擴散的可能性。雖然已有不少進行針對北韓核問題的研究，然而關於韓國的核武發展可能性，並沒有進行足夠的研究。1970 年代，隨著北韓軍事挑釁巨大增加，對此美國並沒有提供韓國可靠的安全保障，因此在朴正熙總統的指揮之下，試圖核武發展來追求自己的生存。在冷戰結束後，北韓核武危機日益嚴重，東北亞安全環境不再穩定。北韓在2016 年進行兩次的核試驗，朝鮮半島嚴重受到軍事失衡的衝擊。2017 年美國總統川普上任後，韓美同盟關係亦進入難以預測的狀態。這樣的安全環境之下，韓國是否會發展自己的核武來強化自身安全且嚇阻北韓核武？韓國國內有超過60%的國民支持韓國發展核武，部分政治人物也不斷的主張韓國的核武裝，這些韓國國內現象都是我們要更加關注韓國發展核武可能性的原因之一。為了回答本研究的上述題目，本文首先探討冷戰時期韓國核武發展案例，發現其中北韓威脅及韓美同盟關係等安全因素，是對韓國核武發展發揮最大影響力。同時，本研究亦發現，部分國內行為者或國際、國內規範等其他因素也可能扮演重要角色。因此，本文採取薩根的核擴散三種模型（安全、國內政治、規範模型），來探討韓國核武發展可能性，特別針對各種模型裡面的誘因與限制作為分析架構並提出結論。最後，本文提供核擴散問題的多重後果關係（Multicausality）的詮釋及未來東北亞核擴散問題研究的基礎。

The first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 marked the start of an era in which the international community paid particular heed to the possibility of nuclear proliferation in East Asia. While vast research has been conducted on the subject of North Korean nuclear capabilities, little is known about the other Korea - a country regularly facing nuclear threats from North Korea, and which even has a record of attempting to develop its own nuclear weapons in the past. At the end of the 1960s, North Korea committed numerous military provocations against South Korea. A passive approach to such provocations by the US led to an increase of mistrust on the part of South Korea, towards the security guarantee provided by the US. It was under such an environment of national security that the then-President of South Korea, Park Chung-hee attempted nuclear armament as deterrence against North Korean hostility in the 1970s. After the Cold war, East Asian security has continued to be severely threatened by the North Korean nuclear crises, with the occurrence of two more nuclear tests in 2016; At the same time, US-ROK (South Korea) military alliance is deemed to have become more unpredictable following President Donald Trump’s inauguration in 2017. Under such an unstable security environment, is it possible that South Korea will attempt to go nuclear again? Over 60% of South Koreans support the nation’s own nuclear weapons development and a few South Korean politicians strongly argue for nuclear armament; posing reasons for why this question is in dire need of attention. To answer the afore-mentioned question, this study first examines South Korea’s nuclear challenges in the Cold War era and identifies the major factors that determine South Korea’s nuclear decisions, including national security, specifically against North Korean threats and the credibility of the US security guarantee. However, this research also finds that several influential domestic actors or international norms can critically influence vertical nuclear proliferation of South Korea. For this reason, this research applies Sagan’s three models of nuclear proliferation (Security, Domestic Politics, and Norms models) to analyze the possible incentives and constraints of each model regarding South Korea’s nuclear weapons development. This research aims to provide the multicausality of nuclear proliferation problems and form a foundation for future research regarding nuclear proliferation in East Asia.