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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 周雍強 | |
dc.contributor.author | Tyng-Yu Liou | en |
dc.contributor.author | 劉庭予 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T08:31:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-03-08 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2014-03-08 | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2013-12-18 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 英文部分
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/58804 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 在現今講求多元化的產品市場中,大多數產品都擁有正廠品牌及副廠品牌,過去正廠通常被顧客定位在為高品質、高價位的品牌,而副廠則被認定為品質略低,價格略低的產品。近年來副廠的品質、服務水準日漸提升,副廠產品逐漸在市場上被顧客重視,而副廠在市場上也顯得日漸積極,希望能更有力的與正廠競爭。在正副廠競爭的供應鏈中,正廠通常會對下游採取垂直控制的機制而造成零售商被侷限,由於現今供應鏈的力量已逐漸由供應端轉移至需求端,因此正廠的通路控管機制將會出現問題,副廠正好可利用此機會介入,藉由需求端的力量與正廠更有利的競爭。
因此本研究將探討副廠的競爭投資策略,副廠將對需求端進行市場及通路的投資,且正副廠皆預期產業將進行折讓競爭。我們依此建立正副廠品牌競爭的需求模型,經過利潤、需求最優化的推導,建構出副廠投資策略的最佳化模型,以證明副廠投資組合策略的可行性並分析投資所帶來之效益。此外我們也分析副廠在面對不同的市場情境及不同的產品特性時,投資策略應該如何調整。根據數值分析的結果我們證明了副廠的投資策略將能有效的提升需求及市占率,同時發現折讓對兩廠商皆不利。而當副廠的相對市場力量較弱,或面對交叉彈性交高的產品時,投資的效果將較明顯。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | In the diversified products market, the majority of products come in both name brands and generic brands. Name brand products are usually positioned with a high-quality and high-price value, while generic brand products are set with lower prices with lower quality. However, the quality and the service level of generic brand products have been improving recently so that generic brand products are getting more valuable to customers. At the same time, generic brands are competing with name brands more aggressively. In the competitive supply chain between these two brands, name brands usually make some vertical control to management the distribution channel but it has bring some limitations to retailers. Owing to the power of supply chain has shift from the supply end to the demand end, name brands’ vertical control come out with some problems. Therefore, generic brands can take these chances to compete with name brand more advantageous.
Therefore, this paper discusses the competitive investment strategy of generic brand. We assumed that generic brand makes market and channel investment and both two brands expect that the industry will carry out an allowance competition. According to these assumptions, we construct a competitive demand model for these two brands. Through the optimization process, an optimization program is constructed for optimizing generic brand’s strategy and analyzing the investment effects. Moreover, scenario analysis is done to discuss how the investment strategy will be adjusted if generic brands have different market power or face the multiple product types. According to the results of numerical analysis, we prove that the investment strategy will make a positive contribution to the generic brand but the competition of allowance is disadvantageous for both name brand and generic brand. When generic has a weak market power or is facing the product with high cross-elasticity, the effect of investment is more obvious. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T08:31:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-102-R00546003-1.pdf: 1276840 bytes, checksum: 569afd594f961c9147f6ac0362e04466 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 致謝 i
摘要 ii ABSTRACT iii 目錄 iv 圖目錄 vi 表目錄 vii 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 正副廠品牌競爭─以汽車維修零件產業為例 2 1.2 正副廠品牌供應鏈之問題分析 4 1.3 研究目的 6 1.4 論文架構 8 第二章 文獻回顧 9 2.1 副廠品牌的競爭 9 2.2 需求模型 10 2.2.1 產品的替代性與互補性 10 2.2.2 零售商的銷售努力(Sales Efforts) 12 2.3 製造商品牌與零售商品牌 14 2.4 廣告投資策略 16 2.4.1 產業廣告與品牌廣告(Generic Advertising and Brand Advertising) 16 2.4.2 拉式策略與推式策略 (Pull Strategy and Push Strategy) 17 2.4.3 廣告投資與價格敏感度 18 第三章 副廠的競爭策略模型 23 3.1 製造商的競爭策略 23 3.2 策略競爭前時期 (Pre-Competition Period) 25 3.2.1 廠商策略可行性分析 28 3.3 策略競爭時期 (Competition Period) 29 3.3.1 變數與符號定義 30 3.3.2 副廠的期望投資效果 31 3.4 策略競爭時期模型建立 32 3.4.1 A Two Stage Model 33 3.5 需求的投資效果分析 36 3.6 折讓分析 39 第四章 數值分析與市場情境分析 41 4.1 副廠的最適投資組合策略 41 4.2 市場情境對副廠投資策略的影響 44 第五章 結論與建議 51 5.1 研究結果 51 5.2 未來研究方向 52 參考文獻 53 | |
dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
dc.title | 正副廠品牌競爭:副廠的市場與通路投資策略組合分析 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Name Brand and Generic Brand Competition:An analysis of Generic Brand Strategy of Market and Channel Investment Portfolio | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 102-1 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 許錫美,黃奎隆,蔣明晃 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 副廠牌,通路投資,市場投資,價格競爭需求模型, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | Generic Brand,Channel Investment,Market Investment,Price-competition demand model, | en |
dc.relation.page | 55 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2013-12-18 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 工學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 工業工程學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 工業工程學研究所 |
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