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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 林修葳 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kuo-Jui Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳國瑞 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T08:26:26Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2014-01-27 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2014-01-27 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2014-01-20 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Bebchuk, L.A., Cohen, A., Ferrell, A., 2009. What matters in corporate governance? Rev. Financ. Stud. 22, 783-827.
Bebchuk, L.A., Cohen, A., 2005. The cost of entrenched boards. J. Financ. Econ. 78, 409-433. Commons, D., 1985. Tender offer: the sneak attack in corporate takeovers. Berkeley: University of California Press. Comment, R., Schwert, G.W., 1995. Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures. J. Financ. Econ. 39, 3-43. Davis, E.P., 2002. Institutional investors, corporate governance and the performance of the corporate sector. Econ. Syst. 26, 203-229. Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith, J., Servaes, H., 2003. International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. J. Financ. and Quan. Anal. 38, 111-133. Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., Metrick, A., 2003. Corporate governance and equity prices. Q.J. Econ. 118, 107-155. Grier, P., Zychowicz, E.J., 1994. Institutional investors, corporate discipline, and the role of debt. J. Econ. and Busn. 46, 1-11. Harford, J., 2003. Takeover bids and target directors’ incentive: the impact of a bid on directors’ wealth and board seats. J. Financ. Econ. 69, 51-83. Mallette, P., Fowler, K.L., 1992. Effects of board composition and stock ownership on the adoption of “poison pills” Acad. Mana. J. 35, 1010-1035. Palepu, K.G., 1986. Predicting takeover targets: a methodological and empirical analysis. J. Acco. and Econ. 8, 3-35. Pound, J., 1987. The effects of antitakeover amendments on takeover activity: some direct evidence. J. Law and Econ. 30, 353-367. Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J.G., 1990. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. J. Financ. Econ. 26, 175-191. Ryngaert, M., 1988. The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth. J. Financ. Econ. 20, 377-417. Sokolyk, T., 2011. The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets. J. Corp. Financ. 17, 612-627. Walsh, J., 1989. Doing a deal: merger and acquisition negotiations and their impact upon target management turnover. Strat. Mana. J. 10, 307-322. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/58701 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 本研究探討哪些因素會影響公司終止毒藥丸計畫。先前研究對於抵禦併購所實施毒藥丸計畫皆著重在其採行的效果,也較未以終止毒藥丸計畫決策為研究重心。本研究區分公司對於併購交易之態度以及公司體質影響兩方面,討論影響公司終止毒藥丸計畫決策之因素。實證結果發現機構投資人持股比例高低、外部董事比例高低、現金比率高低、董事分期改選制度之有無、公司市值高低,以及公司董事年齡之高低與公司停止毒藥丸計畫之決策顯著相關,顯示當公司內部治理狀況較佳,或是公司體質較不容易吸引併購時,公司較傾向終止毒藥丸計畫。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | This study investigates the variables to the termination of poison pill plans. In contrast with the prior studies, which focus on the effectiveness of poison pills in deterring merger and acquisition (M & A) attempts as well as their impact on M & A premium, this study explores two different sets of variables that may help explain the termination of poison pills. Specifically, the sets of variables being explored in this study include firm attitude toward M&A and the characteristics of the firm. We find that institutional shareholding, outside director shareholding percentage, cash-to-total assets-ratio, staggered board, market value, and directors' age significantly correlate with the firms' ceasing these plans. This finding suggests that companies with sound corporate governance mechanism and/or the companies that do not look attractive to potential bidders appear to be more inclined to terminate the poison pill plan. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T08:26:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-R00724002-1.pdf: 456137 bytes, checksum: 1ff84695d457bb10fec729b381a24801 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員會審定書……………………………………………………………… i
謝辭………………………………………………………………………………. ii 中文摘要………………………………………………………………………… iii Abstract…………………………………………………………………………... iv 目錄…………………………………………………………………………….… v 表目錄……………………………………………………………………………. vi 第一章 緒論………………………………………………………………………. 1 1.1 研究背景………………………………………………………………… 1 1.2 研究動機………………………………………………………………… 1 第二章 文獻回顧…………………………………………………………………. 3 第三章 研究假說與方法…………………………………………………………. 4 3. 1 研究假說………………………………………………………..………. 4 3. 2 樣本選擇……………………………………………………….……….. 9 3. 3 變數定義…………………………………………..……………………. 9 3. 4 研究模式…………………………………………..…………………… 10 第四章 實證結果………………………………………………………………… 12 4. 1 樣本敘述統計量……………………………………………………….. 12 4. 2羅吉斯迴歸模型(Logistic Regression Model)……………………… 12 4. 2 成對T檢定(Paired T-test)………………………………………….. 21 第五章 結論………………………………………………………………………… 24 5.1 研究結論……………………………………………………………………24 5.2 研究限制與後續研究建議…………………………………………………24 參考文獻……………………………………………………………………….……. 25 | |
| dc.language.iso | zh-TW | |
| dc.subject | 毒藥丸計畫 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 經理人鞏固私利假說 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 企業併購 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 反併購措施 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | Mergers and acquisitions | en |
| dc.subject | Poison pill | en |
| dc.subject | Corporate governance | en |
| dc.subject | Antitakeover provision | en |
| dc.subject | Management entrenchment hypothesis | en |
| dc.title | 企業停止毒藥丸計畫決策之研究 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | A Study on the Decision of Terminating Poison Pill Plan | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 102-1 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 吳瑞萱,羅懷均 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 毒藥丸計畫,公司治理,經理人鞏固私利假說,企業併購,反併購措施, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | Poison pill,Corporate governance,Management entrenchment hypothesis,Mergers and acquisitions,Antitakeover provision, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 26 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2014-01-21 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 國際企業學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位: | 國際企業學系 | |
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