影響公司現金持有因素分析-以台灣上市公司為例

Abstract

本研究探討影響公司現金持有之因素，將因素分為一般公司特徵變數和公司 治理代理變數，並採用 Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999)之模型為基 礎，我們排除金融證券業及資料不齊全公司後，將樣本期間為 1991~2011 年之上 市公司做迴歸分析。現金比率的持有主要有交易動機、預防動機及代理動機。 實證結果顯示當公司成長機會高、公司規模小、現金流量比率高、研發支出 比率高、股利發放者、淨利虧損者和公司所面對的產業風險高者使公司持有較高 的現金，而淨營運資金比率、資本支出比率、負債比率和近五年有公開發行的公 司將和現金比率呈現反向關係。若加入公司治理代理變數後，可以發現經理人持 股比率會影響經理人對現金持有的決策，且兩者呈現非單調關係，經理人持股比 率低時會有可能追求私利而提高現金持有比率，但當經理人持股比率高到另一水 準後，經理人會注重公司利益而非私利。大股東的存在可能左右董事會的決策， 而使其亦追求私利而影響公司做有利投資，董事長兼任總經理在此研究並未有顯 著影響。

This study investigates the determinants of corporate cash holdings, and we separate the determinants into two main reasons: corporate characteristics and corporate governance factors. We use the regression models which are based on the Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) model. We get the sample from 1991 to 2011, and exclude the financial firms and omit the data which doesn’t provide enough information. There are three motives for companies to hold more money which are transaction, precautionary and agency motives. The empirical results show that firms with strong growth opportunities, smaller size, higher cash flow, higher r&d, dividends payer, negative net income and face riskier cash flow volatility may tend to hold higher cash ratio. On the other hand, firms with higher net working capital, higher capital expenditure, higher leverage, and IPO in five years may tend to hold lower cash rati o. In addition, we find that there is non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership and cash holdings. When managers hold more shares, they prefer to accumulate cash to meet their own benefits. However, after they hold more shares, they tend to put the firms value at first place that they may hold less cash at the same time. We also find when companies have controlling shareholders, they will influence the decisions made by the board so that they can pursue their own benefits. We find that whether CBO is also the CEO in the company is non-significant.