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完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 簡資修 | |
dc.contributor.author | Hsing-Pei Chen | en |
dc.contributor.author | 陳星貝 | zh_TW |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T08:06:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-07-04 | |
dc.date.copyright | 2014-07-04 | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2014-06-17 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Baumol, W. J. & Oates, W. E. (1988). The Theory of Environmental Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
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dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/58142 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 排放許可證屬於可被交易的財產權,當政府建立減少排放之政策時,執行排放許可證制度在某些條件下會達到經濟效率,而此條件包含受管制者可輕易地在排放許可證市場上做交易,因此排放許可證制度的財產權定義必須明確且交易成本低。本文主要目的為探討排放許可證制度之設計該具有哪些特質將會符合此條件?政府建立減少排放之政策時有三種選擇:傳統的命令控制式管制模式、納稅制度以及排放許可證制度。這三種方式有不同的經濟效率,納稅制度與排放許可證制度兩者經濟效率最高,而傳統的命令控制式則不會產生經濟效率。雖然納稅制度經濟效率高,但稅率無法充分且即時地反映排放所產生的社會成本;而排放許可證制度可隨市場價格的變動而調整,因此可較充分地涵括排放造成的社會成本,因此政府應該要採取排放許可證制度。而排放許可證制度若要達到經濟效率,財產權必須要明確且交易成本要夠低。財產權的確立可幫助減少交易成本,進而促進被管制者在市場上更輕易地做交易。本文分析排放許可證制度的設計如何影響排放許可證的財產權本質及市場上的交易成本。排放許可證制度應該納入夠多的參與者以提升買賣意願;排放許可證制度的設計應包含成本控制方式以維持價格變動的穩定,以利投資者預測未來價格;將排放許可證包裝為金融衍生商品也會使市場擴張並穩定價格。國際上近年來的趨勢為建立各國獨立且可與其他國家連結的排放許可證制度以提升經濟效率。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | Emission allowances of cap-and-trade programs may be characterized in the economic sense as property rights tradable by owners on the market. When the state decides to reduce emissions, implementing a cap-and-trade program would be economically efficient so long as regulated entities can easily buy and sell allowances. To achieve this outcome, the design of a tradable permits program should incorporate well-defined property rights and low transaction costs to facilitate trades on the market. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the characteristics that cap-and-trade programs should embody to satisfy these conditions and for the resulting emissions reductions to be economically efficient. Trade rules, trade ratios, banking, borrowing, allowance reserves, price floors and ceilings, and volatility in allowance prices all play a role in defining the nature of property rights of allowances, which influences transaction costs associated with complying with cap-and-trade programs. The United States was the first nation to introduce a tradable permits program for pollution control beginning in 1974, and many programs have been implemented since then by other nations and regions to address the issue of climate change. The current status of global climate change policy is trending towards individual regions adopting their own cap-and-trade programs and then linking them with programs from other regions. Linking has implications on economic efficiency as it broadens the market for allowances, thereby decreasing transaction costs as market liquidity is increased. | en |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T08:06:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-R00a21120-1.pdf: 842444 bytes, checksum: 627aad003c6c98d1996b9b46346f7899 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 中文摘要 iii
英文摘要 iv 1. Introduction 1 2. The economic efficiency of tradable permits 4 3. Characteristics of cap-and-trade in defining property rights of allowances and the level of transaction costs on the market 11 3.1 Trade rules 12 3.2 Trade ratios 13 3.3 Banking and borrowing 14 3.4 Cost containment measures 17 3.5 Stability of the value of allowances 20 3.6 Allowances as financial instruments 21 3.7 The need for regulatory oversight 22 3.8 Regulatory oversight in the United States 24 3.9 Regulatory oversight in the European Union 25 3.10 Transaction costs 27 4. Non-carbon programs 29 4.1 Emissions Trading Program 29 4.2 Lead additives trading program 33 4.3 Ozone-depleting chemicals 35 4.4 Acid Rain Program 36 4.5 RECLAIM 38 4.6 Conclusion 40 5. Carbon programs 42 5.1 European Union’s Emissions Trading System 42 5.1.1 Overview 42 5.1.2 Property rights 44 5.1.3 Transaction costs 45 5.1.4 Innovation under the EU ETS 48 5.1.5 Analysis and conclusions 50 5.2 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 54 5.3 California’s Cap-and-Trade Program 59 5.4 Australia’s Carbon Pricing Mechanism 62 5.5 Conclusion 65 6. Linking 68 6.1 Basic concepts 68 6.2 Current state of global climate change regulation 70 7. Conclusion 74 References 75 | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | 排放許可證的財產權本質如何減少交易成本 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Nature of Property Rights of Emissions Allowances in Mitigating the Effects of Transaction Costs | en |
dc.type | Thesis | |
dc.date.schoolyear | 102-2 | |
dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 李建良,張英磊 | |
dc.subject.keyword | 排放許可證,財產權,交易成本,經濟效率,法律經濟分析, | zh_TW |
dc.subject.keyword | cap-and-trade,emissions allowances,property rights,transaction costs,economic efficiency,economic analysis of law, | en |
dc.relation.page | 80 | |
dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
dc.date.accepted | 2014-06-18 | |
dc.contributor.author-college | 法律學院 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author-dept | 法律學研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於系所單位: | 法律學系 |
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