以歐盟排放交易體系之決策過程檢視自由政府間主義

Abstract

自《歐盟排放交易指令》通過以來，在近二十年的時間裡，歐盟在創制與改革上，均歷經了劇烈的轉向。本文以歐盟排放交易體系的創制與改革兩個案，檢視自由政府間主義的三個階段「國家偏好形成－協商過程－制度選擇」，以回答本文的兩個研究問題：第一，自由政府間主義是否能有效解釋歐盟排放交易此一「低層政治」的決策過程？第二：由於英國在排放交易中扮演相當積極的「先驅者」角色，在決策過程中，是否能有效將其國家偏好投射在最終制度選擇上，發揮比其他會員國更大的影響力？ 研究發現自由政府間主義大抵上能解釋該二個案，惟須再加上數個解釋變項。首先，在國家偏好形成階段，若國內利益無法有效整合，需依賴政黨競爭變項解決。再者，基於議題特定性，國家追求規範性利益的行為亦須納入考量。在協商過程階段，國家基於不對稱互賴所得的議價權力，並不若其於高層政治中強大；並且，需考慮既有的國際環境治理原則。最後，英國對於決策過程的影響力皆略輸於德國，乃是由於自由政府間主義中，最急於求成的國家會給予最多讓步，以及德國在國內妥協的過程中，在偏好上更趨於中立所造成的結果。

Since the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) was constructed, it had gone through two rapid turnabout, its initiation and reform. This thesis utilizes these two cases to assess the “three-phase framework” of liberal intergovernmentalism: national preference – substantive bargaining – institutional choice, thereby answering two main questions. First, can LIG explain the decision-making process of the ETS, which is a “low politics” issue? Second, as the UK has been the “front-runner” of the EU ETS, does that make the UK the most influential actor in the EU? This thesis suggests that liberal intergovernmentalism can mostly explain the cases, yet some factors need to be considered. In the phase of national interest, if domestic interests cannot be integrated, party competition will be the decisive factor; moreover, in the field of environmental governance, normative interest must be taken into account. In the phase of substantive bargaining, owing to the qualified majority rules, the bargaining power that nations gain from asymmetrical interdependence in low politics is not as strong as in high politics. Last, the influence of the UK was slightly less than Germany because of two reasons. For one hand, the nation that is eager to pass the proposed law, in this case, the UK, will tend to make concession to the others. For the other, the compromises of different interest groups made Germany’s national preference milder and closer to the focal point of the member-states.