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| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 何耕宇(Keng-Yu Ho) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Wen-Hsin Chen | en |
| dc.contributor.author | 陳文馨 | zh_TW |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-16T07:02:28Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2014-07-29 | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2014-07-29 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2014-07-14 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Anantharaman, D., Fang, V.W., Gong, G., 2010. Inside debt and the design of corporate debt contracts. Columbia University, Rutgers University, and Pennsylvania State
University.Working paper. Cassell, C.A., Huang, S.X., Sanchez, J. M., Stuart, M.D., 2012. Seeking safety: the relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies. Journal of Financial Economics 103, 588-610. Chay, J.B., Suh, J., 2009. Payout policy and cash-flow uncertainty. Journal of Financial Economics 93, 88-107. Chen, F., Dou, Y., Wang, X., 2010. Executive inside debt holdings and creditors’ demand for pricing and non-pricing protections. University of Toronto and The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Unpublished Working Paper. Crutchley, C., Hansen, R., 1989. A test of the agency theory of managerial ownership, corporate leverage, and corporate dividends. Financial Management 18, 36-46. DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., Stulz, R., 2006. Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory. Journal of Financial Economics 81, 227- 254. Edmans, A., Liu, Q., 2011. Inside debt. Review of Finance 15, 75-102. Eisdorfer, A., Giaccotto, C., White, R., 2013. Do corporate managers skimp on shareholders’ dividends to protect their own retirement funds? University of Connecticut and University of New Mexico. Working paper. Fama, E.F., French, K., 2001. Disappearing dividends: changing in firm characteristics or a lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-43. Harford, J., 1999. Corporate cash reserve and acquisitions. Journal of Finance 54, 1969-1997. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54, 471-517. Lambert, R., Lanen, W., Larcker, D., 1989. Executive stock option plans and corporate dividend policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24, 409–425. Lewellen, W., Loderer, C., Martin, K., 1987. Executive compensation contracts and executive incentive problems: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 9, 287-310. Michaely, R., Thaler, R., Womack, K., 1995. Price reactions to dividend initiations and omissions: overreaction and drift? Journal of Finance 50, 573- 608. Murphy, K., 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 11-42. Rozeff, M., 1982. Growth, beta, and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios. Journal of Financial Research 5, 249-259. Sundaram, R., Yermack, D., 2007. Pay me later: inside debt and its role in managerial compensation. Journal of Finance 62, 1551-1588. James, H., Borah, N., 2013. CEO inside debt and dividend payout policy. North American University and St. Cloud State University. Working paper. Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. Jensen, M., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 323-329. Jensen, G., Solberg, D., Zorn, T., 1992. Simultaneous determination of insider ownership, debt, and dividend policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27, 247-263. Wang, C., Xie, F., Xin, X., 2011. Managerial ownership of debt and bank loan contracting. Chinese University of Hong Kong, Clemson University, and City University of Hong Kong.Working Paper. Wei, C., Yermack, D., 2011. Investor reactions to CEOs’ inside debt incentives. Review of Financial Studies 24, 3813-3840. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://tdr.lib.ntu.edu.tw/jspui/handle/123456789/57767 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | 在過去的文獻中，關於內部負債(經理人的退休金及遞延薪酬)對公司支付政策的影響
並沒有達到共識。為了提供更新的實證研究結果，利用樣本期間於2006-2012，共8,889個美國公司樣本點，本篇論文進一步去探討內部負債與發放現金股利、股票購回決策之間的關係，經由實證結果發現高階經理人持有的內部負債與現金股利彼此有正向的關係，但是高階經理人持有的內部負債與股票購回的關係則是不明確的，結果顯示因 為內部負債將減少公司與債權人之間的代理問題，使得公司在外部融資上能獲得較低 的成本與限制，也因此擁有較多內部負債的公司會願意繼續發放股利。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract | In the prior literature, the effect of inside debt (pension benefits and deferred compensation) on corporate payout policy is mixed. In order to contribute future empirical documentation, this study, I examine the relation between inside debt and corporate payout policy, including cash dividend payout and share repurchase decision. Using a sample of 8,889 U.S. firm-year observations during 2006-2012. Empirical results suggest that there is a positive relationbetween inside debt and the level and propensity of cash dividend payout. However, the effect of inside debt on share repurchase decision remains unclear. The findings show that inside debt lowers the cost of debt financing. Thus, firms with large inside debt tend to maintain higher dividend payout because of the lower external financing. | en |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2021-06-16T07:02:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ntu-103-R01723017-1.pdf: 993160 bytes, checksum: d5ef699ca9e445587a663b20820c6c1d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 | en |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 口試委員審定書 ............................................. i
謝辭 .................................................... ii 摘要 ................................................... iii Abstract ............................................... iv Table of Contents ....................................... v List of Tables ......................................... vi 1. Introduction ......................................... 1 2. Related literature and hypotheses development ........ 4 2.1 Agency conflicts and payout policy .................. 4 2.2 Inside debt and payout policy ....................... 5 2.3 Hypotheses development .............................. 8 3. Sample selection and variable measurement ........... 10 3.1 Sample selection and data .......................... 10 3.2 Variable measurement ................................11 3.2.1 Dividend payout and share repurchase ..............11 3.2.2 CEO inside debt holdings ......................... 12 3.2.3 Control variables ................................ 13 4. Empirical results ................................... 14 4.1 Inside debt and dividend payout .................... 14 4.2 Inside debt and share repurchase ................... 15 4.3 Inside debt and payout policy for cash-rich and noncash-rich firms.............................................. 16 4.4 Robustness tests ................................... 17 5. Conclusion .......................................... 19 Appendix ............................................... 21 References ............................................. 23 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | 股利政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | 內部負債 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject | inside debt | en |
| dc.subject | payout policy | en |
| dc.title | 內部負債與公司支付政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.title | Inside Debt and Corporate Payout Policy | en |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.date.schoolyear | 102-2 | |
| dc.description.degree | 碩士 | |
| dc.contributor.oralexamcommittee | 石百達,徐之強 | |
| dc.subject.keyword | 內部負債,股利政策, | zh_TW |
| dc.subject.keyword | inside debt,payout policy, | en |
| dc.relation.page | 45 | |
| dc.rights.note | 有償授權 | |
| dc.date.accepted | 2014-07-15 | |
| dc.contributor.author-college | 管理學院 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author-dept | 財務金融學研究所 | zh_TW |
| 顯示於系所單位： | 財務金融學系 | |
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