內部負債與公司支付政策

Abstract

在過去的文獻中，關於內部負債(經理人的退休金及遞延薪酬)對公司支付政策的影響 並沒有達到共識。為了提供更新的實證研究結果，利用樣本期間於2006-2012，共8,889個美國公司樣本點，本篇論文進一步去探討內部負債與發放現金股利、股票購回決策之間的關係，經由實證結果發現高階經理人持有的內部負債與現金股利彼此有正向的關係，但是高階經理人持有的內部負債與股票購回的關係則是不明確的，結果顯示因 為內部負債將減少公司與債權人之間的代理問題，使得公司在外部融資上能獲得較低 的成本與限制，也因此擁有較多內部負債的公司會願意繼續發放股利。

In the prior literature, the effect of inside debt (pension benefits and deferred compensation) on corporate payout policy is mixed. In order to contribute future empirical documentation, this study, I examine the relation between inside debt and corporate payout policy, including cash dividend payout and share repurchase decision. Using a sample of 8,889 U.S. firm-year observations during 2006-2012. Empirical results suggest that there is a positive relationbetween inside debt and the level and propensity of cash dividend payout. However, the effect of inside debt on share repurchase decision remains unclear. The findings show that inside debt lowers the cost of debt financing. Thus, firms with large inside debt tend to maintain higher dividend payout because of the lower external financing.